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This dissertation traces the internet’s assimilation into the marketing system during the 
1990s. It analyzes the construction of the online advertising industry and clarifies its role in the 
reconfiguration of commercial media. The conceptual framework is that of critical political 
economy. Archival sources, government documents, and trade press accounts provide a 
foundation for an assessment of how online advertising evolved in relation to a changing 
capitalist political economy.  
The “dotcom” period was characterized by broad market liberalization, a technology 
investment bubble, and accelerating disruption of established media business models. In this 
context advertising and media firms, major marketers, and a group of newly formed online 
advertising companies sought to fashion the world wide web into a marketing platform and 
secure their own position at the heart of the internet’s nascent media economy. Deeply integrated 
into speculative financial markets, these actors appropriated key digital technologies and 
influenced public policy in order to steer the development of the web toward a model of 
advertising based on pervasive and surreptitious consumer surveillance. This confluence of 
factors rapidly broadened the scale and scope of online advertising, altered the technical 
character and everyday experience of the web, and established a framework for the continued 
transformation of advertising and media in the 21st century. 
This research situates online advertising’s development as an ongoing and contested 
process rooted in historical social relations. It emphasizes the interconnected roles of finance, 
technology, and politics in shaping the internet’s evolution and delimiting the boundaries of its 
acceptable use. At the same time, it sheds light on the dynamic nature of capitalism by charting 
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its interaction with a powerful new interactive medium that was and remains simultaneously 
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Advertising, Media, and Political Economy 
This dissertation chronicles the construction of advertising on the internet and the world wide 
web in particular. The title alludes to Gil Scott-Heron’s famous poem, “The Revolution Will Not 
Be Televised,” which became associated with the United States protest movements of the 1960s 
and 70s. Full of references to popular advertising campaigns of the period, the poem carries the 
message that social change of a genuine character will not be embraced or advanced by a 
commercial media system; marketers do not generally sponsor revolutions. This project seeks to 
explain how the “digital revolution” of the 1990s came in fact to be heavily sponsored in its 
nascent stages and analyzes the implications of this transformation for the character of the 
internet and the arrangement of media in society more broadly. 
The conceptual framework is that of critical political economy, which situates the 
development of online advertising in relation to the commercial media system and capitalist 
economy at large. Today, marketers spend more money on internet advertising than any other 
medium outside of television, but in the early years of the web’s emergence there was no 
certainty that it would function as a marketing platform.1 Although some recognized it more 
quickly than others, the web presented an existential challenge for marketers dependent upon 
commercial media to “connect consumer goods and services with potential markets, and indeed 
to bring those markets into being.”2 Annexing the web into the marketing system became an 
overriding shared imperative among advertising and media firms, the major marketers that 
employ their services, and a group of newly formed online advertising companies that sought to 
secure their own position at the heart of the internet’s growing media economy. 
                                                
1 Interactive Advertising Bureau, 2011 IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report (April 2012), 19. 
2 John Sinclair, Advertising, the Media and Globalisation (New York: Routledge, 2012), 2. 
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The internet was the first new communications medium of broad social significance to 
arise since television in the post-war era. The world wide web, created as a research tool and 
released into the public domain to encourage its diffusion as a “universal medium for sharing 
information,” became the internet’s popular interface in the 1990s.3 Support for advertising was 
not a standard feature of this technology; a capacity for marketing had to be constructed. As Dan 
Schiller argues, “the sponsor system would have to labor to claim the heart and soul of this 
emergent medium. A whole institutional infrastructure had to be brought into being in a 
concerted attempt to develop the web’s selling capabilities.”4 
Between 1995 and 2000, leading companies from the marketing and media sectors – 
herein collectively referred to as the marketing complex – worked to transform the web from an 
outpost on the fringes of business to an essential component of modern advertising.5 The 
struggles among these actors over the particulars of the internet’s commercialization not only 
shaped the development of the new online media, but catalyzed major changes in the structure of 
the marketing complex at large. The internet functioned as an accelerant to a set of tensions that 
had been smoldering within the marketing complex for decades. Problems of audience 
fragmentation and interactive media convergence amounted to a loss of control for marketers 
over a changing media system that had long been dictated by their interests.6 By the 1990s, 
media business relations were shifting at an increasingly rapid pace. In 1965, a marketer could 
                                                
3 Tim Berners-Lee and Mark Fischetti, Weaving the Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World 
Wide Web by its Inventor (New York: HarperBusiness, 2000), 84; CERN Press Office, “CERN celebrates Web 
anniversary,” April 29, 2003, http://press.web.cern.ch/press-releases/2003/04/cern-celebrates-web-anniversary 
4 Dan Schiller, Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 118. 
5 The marketing complex concept is adapted from Sinclair’s notion of the manufacturing/marketing/media complex. 
Government entities and consuming publics (audiences) are vital components of the marketing complex as well, but 
they wield considerably less power when it comes to structuring media system development. Sinclair, Advertising, 
the Media and Globalisation. 
6 Matthew McAllister, The Commercialization of American Culture: New Advertising, Control, and Democracy 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996). 
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reach 80% of 18- to 49-year-old women by purchasing three television commercials; three 
decades later it required nearly 100 prime-time spots to achieve the same result.7 
The internet was at the center of these changes, seemingly giving consumers ever greater 
autonomy regarding their media experiences, including enhanced capabilities to excise 
commercial messages altogether. As the web became more popular, the marketing complex 
began to perceive it as genuine threat, but also as a new frontier for growth. Through much trial 
and error, greater personalization of advertising was positioned as a solution for making 
marketing work on the web and reigning in the chaos wrought by interactive media. Newly 
created online advertising companies such as DoubleClick developed novel ways to appropriate 
the web’s technical affordances in order to deliver targeted ad messages and collect marketing 
information via new methods of consumer profiling. Surveillance-based ad targeting and an 
attendant business model built around the concept of infrastructure provision (addressed below) 
became the keystones around which online advertising was constructed.   
Like many revolutionary technologies, the internet’s popularization and commercial 
development were deeply integrated with financial markets.8 In the late 1990s, a speculative 
bubble formed around internet technology investment that funneled huge sums of capital into the 
nascent online advertising industry, catalyzing its rapid growth. Public policy played a 
fundamental role as well. Alarmed at the rapidly advancing scale and scope of internet data 
collection, privacy advocates pressured legislators and regulators to enact policies to govern the 
collection and use of online consumer information. Increasingly dependent upon data collection, 
                                                
7 Raju Narisetti, “New and Improved: Ad experts talk about how their business will be transformed by technology, 
Wall Street Journal, November 16, 1998. 
8 Carlota Perez, Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages 
(Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002). 
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the marketing complex formed lobbying and public relations coalitions to halt these regulatory 
efforts.  
Ultimately, the construction of internet advertising was grounded in the common need 
among all businesses to grow and impelled by broader changes in the global capitalist economy. 
More specifically, it was implicated in a reconfiguration of production, finance, and consumption 
that had been underway since business began a sustained push to develop and appropriate 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the 1970s.9 So, while this dissertation is 
principally about the construction of online advertising, it is also about the dynamism of a 
capitalist economic system that increasingly takes up both marketing and finance as sites of 
expansion. To be clear, my argument is not that the internet – past or present – has been fully 
dominated by commercial interests. To a much greater extent than established mass media or 
proprietary computer networks, the internet has facilitated a range of activity that is unbridled by 
the discipline of economic rationality. Unlike cable television or Microsoft’s Xbox Live gaming 
and entertainment network, there is a vast non-commercial web. Likewise, the affordances of 
digital technology and networked communication more broadly have been disruptive to many 
media business models, especially those primarily based on the creation of artificial scarcity. 
Even today, the state of internet advertising is far from a business utopia.  
Nevertheless, a critical mass of internet activity is supported by advertising business 
models. Seven to nine of the top ten most visited web destinations in the US commonly generate 
a majority of their revenues through advertising.10 The percentage of total US advertising 
expenditures allocated to online channels has significantly increased nearly every year since data 
has been available, outpacing the growth of both cable and broadcast television during each of 
                                                
9 Dan Schiller, How to Think about Information (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007); Herbert I. Schiller, 
Information and the Crisis Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
10 Alexa, “Top Sites in the United States,” http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/US 
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their first 16 years of measurement.11 The third quarter of 2012, the latest period for which data 
is available, was the biggest quarter on record for online ad spending.12 Already among the top 
advertising channels, some analysts predict that the internet will unseat television as the largest 
ad medium by 2016.13 Though many billions of ads are served on the web every day, it is not 
merely a delivery platform. The web has also become a massive engine of marketing research 
conducted via pervasive and surreptitious consumer surveillance. As this dissertation shows, the 
foundational “surveillance infrastructure” upon which modern consumer profiling practices 
depend was forged in the dotcom era. Already by the year 2000, profiling web users for 
advertising purposes was effectively ubiquitous.14 
This project engages an interdisciplinary body of scholarship that broadly analyzes the 
social significance of the internet. Some of the most influential work in this area such as Yochai 
Benkler’s Wealth of Networks, Henry Jenkins’ Convergence Culture, and Lee Rainie and Barry 
Wellman’s Networked provide important insights regarding new forms of cooperative production 
and cultural participation engendered by interactive media.15 The internet’s capacity for 
individual and collective empowerment is a vital area of research, yet this approach must be 
accompanied by perspectives that address the ways in which the web’s participatory canvas has 
been shaped by its development within differential relations of power and the commercial media 
system in particular. We might delineate research that examines issues such as race, labor, 
                                                
11 Interactive Advertising Bureau, 2010 IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report (April 2011), 21. 
12 Interactive Advertising Bureau, “Internet Advertising Revenues Hit Historic High in Q3 2012 at Nearly $9.3 
Billion,” December 19, 2012, 
http://www.iab.net/about_the_iab/recent_press_releases/press_release_archive/press_release/pr-121912 
13 Robert Hof, “Online Ad Spend to Overtake TV by 2016,” Forbes, August 26, 2011, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/2011/08/26/online-ad-spend-to-overtake-tv/ 
14 Federal Trade Commission, Online Profiling: A Report to Congress (June 2000), 6. 
15 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide 
(New York: New York University Press, 2006). Lee Rainie and Barry Wellman, Networked: The New Social 
Operating System (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012). 
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ideology, political engagement, and cultural production from this perspective as critical internet 
studies.16 This project draws most heavily from elements within the critical internet studies 
literature that place the internet’s relation to capitalism at the forefront of analysis. The 
framework of political economy of media focuses on the power dynamics through which market 
structures, technologies, public policies, and media systems are mutually constituted in society.17 
This perspective foregrounds the historical development of marketing and media as essential and 
integrated components of capitalism. Applied here, the question is not simply how marketing 
affects the internet, but rather to what extent has the internet been incorporated into the larger 
commercial media system of which marketing is the driving force? 
In the tradition of C. Wright Mills, this approach recognizes that increasingly centralized 
instrumental power is often exercised in relation to overarching structural pressures and limits, 
whereby the activities of disparate actors are coordinated (with relative autonomy) by the 
systemic needs of those at the top of social hierarchies.18 Along these lines, scholars such as 
Michael Dawson have theorized marketing as a form of “class struggle from above,” a system 
                                                
16 Lisa Nakamura, Digitizing Race: Visual Cultures of the Internet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2008); Trebor Scholz, ed., Digital Labor: The Internet as Playground and Factory (New York: Routledge, 2013); 
Thomas Streeter The Net Effect: Romanticism, Capitalism, and the Internet (New York: New York University Press, 
2011); Zizi Papacharissi, A Private Sphere: Democracy in a Digital Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); Evgeny 
Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011); Rebecca 
MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle For Internet Freedom (New York: Basic Books, 
2012); Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and 
Control Creativity (New York: Penguin, 2004); Tarleton Gillespie, Wired Shut: Copyright and the Shape of Digital 
Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007). For another formulation of “critical internet studies” as defined by Marxian 
analysis and a common “commitment to the struggle for emancipation, critique of positivistic Internet studies and 
instrumental rationality, and critique of domination,” see Christian Fuchs, Nick Dyer-Witheford and Mark 
Andrejevic, “The State of Critical Internet Studies” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International 
Association for Media and Communication Research, Istanbul, Turkey, 2011). 
17 Vincent Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication: Rethinking and Renewal (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 
1996); Robert W. McChesney, Communication Revolution: Critical Junctures and the Future of Media (New York: 
New Press, 2007); Vincent Mosco and Janet Wasko, eds., The Political Economy of Information (Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1988; Nicholas Garnham and Fred Inglis, Capitalism and Communication: Global 
Culture and the Economics of Information (London: Sage, 1990). 
18 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Vincent Mosco, Pushbutton 
Fantasies: Critical Perspectives on Videotex and Information Technology (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1982). 
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for mobilizing the consumption of many for the benefit of a relative few.19 Taking up both 
instrumental and structural power, this dissertation demonstrates how distinct entities within the 
marketing complex came together to construct an advertising-supported internet; to fashion it 
into a new tool for selling. Smaller rivalries aside, a broad range of companies maintained a 
common interest in bringing advertising to as many areas of social life as possible and sought to 
redefine the potentialities of the internet medium accordingly. Crucially, these efforts were 
motivated by real and perceived crises throughout the marketing complex status quo. In other 
words, they were conditioned at the structural level by the dynamism that characterizes capitalist 
economies. Political economy shows that this is a well-worn pattern in media and marketing 
development.  
The “modern” form of national advertising progressed in relation to major political 
economic changes in the early 20th century.20 Advertising through commercial mass media and 
the broader business discipline of marketing were forged to rationalize the creation of demand 
within an increasingly productive and centralized corporate capitalism.21 A rich literature of 
critical media history chronicles these developments, unearthing the contested processes 
whereby marketing imperatives came to dominate the structure and content of successive media 
systems and highlighting attendant social problems such as the degradation of journalism, 
persistent class bias of media fare, and broadening of commercialism throughout society.22 From 
                                                
19 Michael Dawson, The Consumer Trap: Big Business Marketing in American Life (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2003). 
20 Daniel Pope, The Making of Modern Advertising (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Richard M. Ohmann, Selling 
Culture: Magazines, Markets, and Class at the Turn of the Century (New York: Verso, 1996). 
21 Michael Dawson, The Consumer Trap: Big Business Marketing in American Life (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2003); Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and 
Social Order (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966). Historians also argue that mass advertising was a strategy 
developed by manufacturers to gain mercantile advantage over wholesalers and retailers. See Daniel Pope, The 
Making of Modern Advertising (New York: Basic Books, 1983. 
22 James Rorty, Our Master’s Voice (New York: John Day, 1934); Gerald Baldasty, Commercialization of News in 
the Nineteenth Century (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992); Janet Wasko, How Hollywood Works 
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this perspective, the history of commercial media development is fundamentally intertwined with 
the history of creating markets for consumer goods and services. The shared lineage of media, 
marketing, and consumer culture is the starting point for critical analysis of online advertising.  
Advertising strategy was fairly straightforward in its earliest formations. Mass produced 
goods in the same product category were often more or less equivalents, so advertising was 
employed to create product differentiation, or what Thorstein Veblen called the “production of 
saleable appearances.”23 Over time the tone of advertisements shifted from the descriptive nature 
of early print ads to the more abstract character of brand marketing, but the core component of 
mass media advertising was its reach. The advertising industry developed tactics such as 
manufacturing social dilemmas to be solved by buying products. Without discounting the 
systemic discrimination that was built into consumer culture from the start, many of these 
appeals can still be understood as largely generic.24 “Chronic halitosis” was constructed as 
everyone’s potential embarrassment. Beginning with turn of the century large circulation 
newspapers and magazines and intensifying during the network television era, “scale was 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003); Roland Marchand, Advertising and the American Dream (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1985); Robert W. McChesney, Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy: The Battle 
for the Control of U.S. Broadcasting, 1928-1935, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Erik Barnouw, The 
Sponsor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); William Boddy, Fifties Television: The Industry and its 
Critics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990); Herbert I. Schiller, Mass Communications and American 
Empire (1969; repr., Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); Susan Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed: The Making of 
the American Mass Market (New York: Pantheon, 1989); Inger L. Stole, Advertising on Trial: Consumer Activism 
and Corporate Public Relations, (Urbana IL: University of Illinois Press, 2006); Stuart Ewen, Captains of 
Consciousness: The Politics of Style in Contemporary America (New York: Basic Books, 1988); Stuart Ewen, PR!: 
A Social History of Spin (New York: Basic Books, 1996); Robert W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: 
Communication Politics in Dubious Times (New York: New Press, 2000); Ben Bagdikian, The New Media 
Monopoly (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004); Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The 
Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 1988). 
23 Thorstein Veblen, Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: The Case of America (New 
York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1964/1923), 309. 
24 Eileen R. Meehan and Ellen Riordan, eds., Sex & Money: Feminism and Political Economy in the Media 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). 
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king.”25 Audience segmentation entered into the picture somewhat with commercial radio and 
specialty market magazines, but only according to rough estimations of consumer demographics.  
The 20th century commercial media system coalesced around the task of building national 
markets and as these markets centralized, advertising became a cornerstone of corporate strategy. 
In increasingly prevalent oligopoly scenarios it functioned as a barrier to would-be entrants and 
as a means of competition among evenly matched rivals.26 More broadly, advertising became a 
“leading edge of global consumerism,” serving the ideological and market-building needs of a 
massively productive industrial economy.27 As post-war economic growth began to falter, the 
marketing complex embarked upon a reconfiguration that pivoted around information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) and the systemic integration of consumer data into 
advertising practices.  
The 1970s saw the beginning of what economic historian Robert Brenner calls the “long 
downturn,” a period of a debilitating stagnation that “held the US and world economy in its grip 
from the early 1970s right up to the middle 1990s, making for the snail-like growth of 
productiveness and declining living standards for more than a generation.”28 To mitigate slowing 
growth, the forces of corporate capital began to shift to what David Harvey terms “flexible 
accumulation.”29 Businesses began to appropriate and invest further in heretofore largely 
                                                
25 Joseph Turow, Breaking Up America: Advertisers and the New Media World (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), 23. 
26 Baran and Sweezy, Monopoly Capital. 
27 Schiller, Mass Communications and American Empire, 13-14. 
28 Robert Brenner, The Boom and the Bubble (New York: Verso, 2002), 4. David Harvey argues that stagnation has 
been the result of the “inability of Fordism and Keynesianism to contain the inherent contradictions of capitalism” 
manifested in the built up rigidity of labor contracts and consumer markets, fixed capital investments of US 
industrialists, and dependency upon state spending commitments. Brenner places more emphasis on the rise of 
global inter-capitalist industrial competition as Germany, Japan, and other nations revolutionized their means of 
production in post-war rebuilding efforts. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the 
Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge: Wiley-Blackwell, 1980), 142. 
29 Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity. Related framings are Dan Schiller’s “informationalized capitalism,” Manuel 
Castells’ “information age/network society,” and the highly influential, less critical theory of “post-industrialism” 
developed by Daniel Bell.  
10 
 
publicly funded ICTs in order to reorganize systems of production, finance, and consumption on 
a global basis.30 The financial sector became increasingly important as banks and investors 
pioneered new forms of technology-enabled speculative markets and ratcheted up the use of debt 
throughout the economy.31  
At the center of these complex and highly uneven transformations was the expansion of 
consumer markets, which required the liberalization and privatization of media systems on a 
global scale. Political force was mobilized to “relax or eliminate barriers to commercial 
exploitation of media, foreign investment in communication systems, and concentrated media 
ownership.”32 This was articulated forcefully in the US through the political ideology of market-
liberalism and manifested as “deregulation” across a spectrum of public policy issues. In 
particular, longstanding regulatory frameworks in the finance and technology/media industries 
were gutted as these two sectors were positioned as the twin engines of a 1990s economic 
recovery that ultimately proved to be a speculative financial bubble.33 
Grounded in these transformations, online advertising was constructed as the demands of 
a capitalist system in need of new investment opportunities converged upon the emerging 
internet. Disruptive as it would become, the world wide web came about within an already 
changing media and marketing landscape expressive of the larger political economy. Although 
mass advertising still maintained tremendous momentum, the rise of more narrowly targeted 
media platforms including cable television accompanied by a diversifying US population forced 
                                                
30 Schiller, How to Think about Information; Schiller, Information and the Crisis Economy. 
31 Financialization is ongoing and accelerating in the 21st century and, as evidenced by the “Great Recession,” there 
have been profound consequences for the livelihood of millions of people. 
32 Robert McChesney and Dan Schiller, “The Political Economy of International Communications: Foundations for 
the Emerging Global Debate about Media Ownership and Regulation,” UNRISD Technology, Business and Society 
Programme, no. 11 (2003), iii. 
33 The Glass–Steagall Act was repealed in 1999, which removed rules separating the activities of commercial banks, 
investment banks, and insurance companies. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 similarly “de-regulated” the 
media and telecommunications sectors.   
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changes within the marketing complex.34 Within an increasingly chaotic media environment, 
marketers needed to find new ways to “cut through the clutter.”  
In the 1980s and 90s, advertisers began to employ computerized databases and 
demographic audience information to target increasingly specific audiences through tactical ad 
placement across various media (“media buying”).35 New methods of cross-pollinating mass and 
direct marketing strategies emerged in trends such as loyalty programs and “customer 
relationship marketing” that sought to establish lasting interactions with core groups of desirable 
consumers.36 By the advent of the web in the early 1990s, formerly distinct institutional and 
strategic spheres within the advertising industry had begun to overlap considerably. The creation 
of online advertising precipitated a more dramatic realignment and convergence of marketing 
practices around widespread consumer surveillance and targeted ad messaging. This is the 
jumping off point of this research effort.  
Before outlining the individual chapters, it is important to situate this project within the 
body of literature that addresses internet advertising directly. Much of the academic research on 
internet advertising employs experimental methods to advance the efficacy of industry 
advertising practices.37 Other approaches use similar techniques to evaluate relationships 
between advertising consumption and human perceptions of world and self (e.g. body image) or 
                                                
34 Turow, Breaking Up America. 
35 Joseph Turow, The Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry Is Defining Your Identity and Your Worth. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). 
36 Don Peppers and Martha Rogers, The One to One Future: Building Relationships One Customer at a Time (New 
York: Doubleday, 1993). 
37 Louisa Ha, “Online Advertising Research in Advertising Journals: A Review,” Journal of Current Issues & 
Research in Advertising 30, no. 1 (2008): 31-48. Industry executives serve on the editorial boards of major scholarly 
journals of advertising and marketing, which take as their mission to “bridge the gap between theory and 
application” (Journal of Marketing) by publishing work that addresses the “managerially important problems” 
(Journal of Interactive Marketing) of the marketing industry. 
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between advertising and physical health (e.g. obesity).38 This work aims to understand the social 
effects of certain kinds of commercial messages and to recommend policies or best practices that 
will reduce harm in cases where adverse outcomes are identified. From a more humanistic 
perspective, Andrew McStay’s Digital Advertising provides an outline of the technologies and 
strategies of online advertising in the 2000s, focusing primarily on developments within the 
United Kingdom.39 Christina Spurgeon’s Advertising and New Media addresses the same period 
from a more global standpoint, but offers a largely celebratory interpretation of the rise of 
consumer control in the digital age.40 While works such as these give useful descriptive accounts, 
they do not foreground marketing and media as economic structures of power or address the 
wider social significance of these arrangements.   
There is a limited amount of scholarship that approaches internet advertising from a 
critical structural perspective and very few works that focus on its historical development.41 
Veteran media activist Jeff Chester’s Digital Destiny provides a valuable historical narrative of 
internet and digital media policy-making that outlines a range of advertising trends, though his 
immediate purpose is not stitching them together into a larger analytical framework.42 Dan 
Schiller’s Digital Capitalism stands out as an important contribution to this effort. Schiller 
devotes a chapter to analyzing the commercialization of the web as an expression of various 
                                                
38 Kimberly Bisseil and Amy Rask, “Real women on real beauty: Self-discrepancy, internalization of the thin ideal, 
and perceptions of attractiveness and thinness in Dove’s Campaign for Real Beauty,” International Journal of 
Advertising 29, no. 4 (November 2010): 643-668; Janet Hoek and Philip Gendall. “Advertising and Obesity: A 
Behavioral Perspective.” Journal of Health Communication 11, no. 4 (June 2006): 409-42. 
39 Andrew McStay, Digital Advertising (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
40 Christina Spurgeon, Advertising and New Media (New York: Routledge, 2007). See also Bob Garfield, The Chaos 
Scenario (Nashville, TN: Stielstra, 2009); Jeff Jarvis, What Would Google Do? (New York: Collins Business, 2009). 
41 For work that addresses internet advertising from the perspective of social theory, see Greg Elmer, Profiling 
Machines: Mapping the Personal Information Economy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004); Andrew McStay, The Mood 
of Information (New York: Continuum, 2011). 
42 Jeff Chester, Digital Destiny: New Media and the Future of Democracy (New York: New Press, 2007). 
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industries vying for control over the emerging media form and grounds these developments 
within many of the larger trends of capitalism outlined above.43  
Joseph Turow’s work also forms a key building block for this project. Breaking Up 
America provides an institutional history of the rise of audience segmentation as a marketing 
tactic, showing that it is not a new practice purely engendered by digital technology.44 The 
follow-up Niche Envy brings the history further up to date and argues that the computer database 
has become a dominant mediator of relations between producers and consumers in the 21st 
century.45 Finally, 2012’s The Daily You provides the most comprehensive treatment to date of 
the economic structure of online advertising and the internal dynamics therein that have 
produced a system based on consumer profiling.46 While a substantial portion of the book 
addresses the later 2000s, Turow makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of online 
advertising’s growth by framing it as embedded within a fundamental shift in the business 
relations of the established advertising industry. Turow emphasizes the role of media buying 
agencies, which took up the task of quantifying marketers’ return-on-investments via 
increasingly rationalized forms of measurement and saw the web as a space to extend these 
practices. Additionally, the body of scholarship sometimes grouped under the heading 
“surveillance studies” often addresses internet advertising as one among many increasingly 
prevalent forms of surveillance.47 Mark Andrejevic’s iSpy is a particularly valuable contribution 
that situates consumer surveillance within the broader history of scientific management and 
                                                
43 Dan Schiller, Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999). 
44 Turow, Breaking Up America. 
45 Joseph Turow, Niche Envy: Marketing Discrimination in the Digital Age (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006). 
46 Turow, The Daily You. 
47 See David Lyon, Surveillance Studies: An Overview (Malden, MA: Polity, 2007). 
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presents the concept of “digital enclosure” to theorize how surveillance has become a condition 
of access for many interactive spaces.48  
This project builds upon and modifies key themes of this literature by emphasizing the 
political economic transformations wrapped into the marketing complex’s appropriation of the 
internet medium in relation to specific web technologies, public policies, and especially the 
exploding financial markets of the dotcom bubble. This entails homing in on the contested 
interactions among corporate, financial, government, and public advocacy actors in the 1990s 
when the range of options regarding web development was still relatively broad. The 
periodization is deliberate. A major argument of this work is that the financial investment of the 
dotcom era was immensely consequential to online advertising’s evolution. Most scholarship in 
this area glosses over the 1990s as a prosaic era of banner and pop-up ads, a false start in the 
history of the web’s commercialization that was swept away in the bubble’s collapse. Even 
research that directly engages the internet’s broader commercialization often gives short shrift to 
elements of finance, let alone its connections to advertising.49 Nor is advertising usually 
addressed by work that focuses on the bubble directly.50 Political economy of media in general 
has displayed a tendency to regard finance as divorced from the “real world” of economic 
production. It is seen as either irrelevant or wasteful, but almost never as integral to the 
functioning of media systems. With a few notable exceptions such as Janet Wasko’s study of the 
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banking and film industries in the 1930s, Cees Hamelink’s analysis of the information services 
and banking sectors in the 1970s, and Nuria Almiron’s recent examination of financialization 
and journalism, finance has been a “blind spot” of critical media scholarship.51 
The counter-argument presented here is that while the crash was destructive to the 
financial wealth created by speculation, it was highly generative of modern structures of online 
advertising. An outgrowth of the broader trend of systemic financialization, the structural 
relationship between finance capital and internet technology became a central factor in the re-
composition of advertising around new media. Though by no means comprehensively or 
flawlessly implemented, the advertising system grounded in targeted appeals and consumer 
surveillance that was instantiated during the dotcom bubble was of a qualitatively different 
character than mass media advertising. These developments altered the technical character and 
everyday experience of the web and set a framework for the trajectory of advertising in the 21st 
century.  
Chapter one makes the case that online advertising networks played a pivotal role in the 
early transformation of the web from a non-commercial space into a functional and increasingly 
mainstream marketing platform. Beginning in 1996, ad networks married established offline 
advertising practices with new digital technologies to forge the first viable large-scale online 
advertising business model. Combining a network sales format with centralized systems for 
targeted ad delivery, inventory management, and basic audience profiling, ad networks propelled 
the scale and precision of online advertising far beyond what was available at the time, enabling 
the nascent industry to make a rapid generational leap. The most important of these companies 
                                                
51 Janet Wasko, Movies and Money: Financing the American Film Industry (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1982); Cees 
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was DoubleClick, an early pioneer and enduring market leader (now owned by Google) that 
came to view its business model as fundamentally about supporting “the logistics of internet 
advertising on a large scale.”52   
The first chapter shows how DoubleClick and a core group of rivals worked in varying 
capacities to fashion the web into an advertising-supported medium and to secure their own 
position at the center of its business structure. Technology appropriation was at the heart of these 
processes. Ad networks exploited the affordances of the web’s communication protocols and the 
flexible design of the HTTP cookie in order to build a unique system in which ad delivery and 
consumer profiling functioned as reciprocal processes. Breaking down these details shows how 
the structure of web technologies played a fundamental role in the creation of a business model 
in which every ad served was also an opportunity to gather data about internet users. The fluidity 
with which DoubleClick was able to integrate its operations into the basic functionality of web 
serving enabled it to grow remarkably fast and solidify market power early on in the industry’s 
development. Moreover, it established the technical foundations for increasingly sophisticated 
forms of consumer surveillance that came to occupy the center of online advertising’s 
construction.  
While chapter one addresses the consequences of technological form, it also advances an 
argument about the social construction of web advertising technology. As Raymond Williams 
argued in his seminal study of television: “The key question about technological response to a 
need is less a question about the need itself than about its place in an existing social situation.”53 
Thus, a central task of the first chapter and the dissertation at large is to foreground how online 
advertising technologies were appropriated and legitimized through the arrangement of material 
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and ideological resources such as market structures, investment rationales, public policy 
discourses, and prevailing notions of the 1990s “New Economy.”  
Chapter two continues this effort by examining the connections between the dotcom 
investment bubble and the growth of online advertising through the lens of a marketing/finance 
feedback loop. In the latter half of the decade, speculative investors funded the lavish advertising 
expenditures of a host of largely unprofitable dotcom companies through which billions of 
dollars poured into the online ad sector. This generated a surge of demand for online advertising 
services and helped legitimize the commercial internet at a time when many traditional marketers 
and ad agencies were still highly ambivalent about interactive media. These outlays, which 
would have been marked as risky just a few years earlier, were rationalized through a New 
Economy/Get Big Fast business ideology that greatly privileged marketing practices. Traditional 
measures of economic valuation (e.g. profitability) were superseded by metrics grounded in 
advertising principles (e.g. brand recognition, “mindshare”). Advertising thus became a 
fundamental dotcom business strategy, necessary not only to gain customers, but also to attract 
essential investment capital.  
Linking chapters one and two, chapter three demonstrates the vital role of dotcom 
investment in the growth of the two most important players the emerging online advertising 
sector, DoubleClick and its main competitor, CMGI. Case studies are presented that show how 
these companies’ deep integration with financial markets enabled them to rapidly expand their 
operations and pioneer a business model based on “infrastructure provision.” The concept of 
infrastructure is introduced to theorize the particular arrangement of technologies, service 
offerings, and business relationships pursued by these companies in their efforts to control and 
inflate the online ad market. Led by DoubleClick and CMGI, advertising infrastructure providers 
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leveraged their market positions and technology expertise in order to function as intermediaries 
for the broadest possible range of ad-related transactions. Fueled by speculative investment, 
these companies developed massive capacities to deliver targeted ad messages and collect 
information about web users; DoubleClick alone went from delivering 1.5 billion ads in 1996 to 
some 621 billion in 2000. Moreover, marketers that had previously exhibited reluctance to spend 
money on web advertising began to move online as ad buying and campaign management 
processes were improved. The investments made by DoubleClick and CMGI in this period 
yielded an inertia that granted them significant market power and put them in a position to shape 
the particulars of online advertising’s construction.  
The chapter concludes by arguing that the collapse of the online advertising market in the 
wake of the dotcom crash has been greatly overstated even among its most insightful observers.54 
While the failure of the New Economy momentarily stalled online ad spending, the larger 
consideration is that in the short period of the bubble, a core group of companies emerged to 
provide a robust infrastructure for online advertising that included a greatly enlarged capacity to 
deliver targeted advertising and profile consumers. This “surveillance infrastructure” is the real 
legacy of the dotcom era and is examined in detail in chapter four. 
In 1998 and 1999 a critical mass of major marketers began to adopt the internet as an 
advertising tool and sought to use their influence to control the medium to the greatest extent 
possible. Responding to marketer demands to increase the “relevance” of targeted ads and 
provide more precise measures of return-on-investment, DoubleClick and other infrastructure 
providers pursued advances in behavioral profiling and expanded forms of data exchange among 
their publisher and marketer clients. These practices hinged upon increasingly invasive and often 
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secretive practices of data collection, whereby information was gathered about internet users for 
the purpose of cataloguing them for differential engagement. Although these systems often 
remained ungainly, the developing surveillance infrastructure signaled an important milestone in 
the progression of online advertising that took it far beyond the profiling techniques created by 
ad networks just a few years prior.  
Chapter four explains how, even as new practices of surveillance-based advertising were 
implemented on a competitive and ad hoc basis, formerly distinct elements of the marketing 
complex began to converge around the systematic collection, analysis, and exchange of 
consumer data. Such data became the focal point of marketers’ ongoing crusade to increase 
efficiency and maximize returns, which demanded blurring the boundaries that separated the 
various constituents of the marketing complex. Internal competition over the particulars 
notwithstanding, the creation of a surveillance infrastructure was driven by marketers’ 
overarching needs to bring the internet into the marketing complex and, to the greatest extent 
possible, maximize its utility for purposes of selling. These developments were at the center of 
online advertising’s construction in the late 1990s and remain a pivot around which 
contemporary marketing practices are being reformulated. The chapter concludes by exploring 
the ways in which surveillance-based advertising reproduces social discrimination and inequality 
in online contexts. Such discrimination is facilitated by processes of “digital enclosure” whereby 
submission to surveillance increasingly becomes a condition of internet access. 
The fifth chapter chronicles the public policy struggle between advocacy groups, industry 
coalitions, and government actors over issues of online data collection, disclosure, and consent. 
In what was framed as a matter of internet privacy, these groups mobilized to influence the shape 
of online advertising’s most basic regulatory parameters. The flashpoint of this conflict was a 
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controversy surrounding DoubleClick’s acquisition of the marketing database company Abacus 
Direct, whereby anonymous online profile data was combined with personally identifiable 
information obtained from offline sources. However, this was merely the highest-profile event in 
a more protracted confrontation over whether federal regulation would mandate that individuals 
be given some control over the data produced by their internet use or whether a regime of 
industry “self-regulation” would be extended online. 
Privacy advocates achieved some measurable victories, stewarding the passage of the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act in 1998 and pressuring Congress to consider “opt-in” 
legislation mandating that companies obtain prior consent from all web users regarding data 
collection practices. This threatened to undermine the developing surveillance infrastructure 
business model that relied on pervasive data collection as a default practice of internet use. 
Despite broad public support for privacy rules, a sector-spanning coalition of industry groups 
successfully fought to maintain the status quo of advertising self-regulation by exerting their 
influence over a policy-making system unfit to withstand commercial power. The policy regime 
that was enacted established a framework for data collection and consumer privacy on the 
internet at the start of the 21st century. 
This research draws from a range of largely archival sources, including:  
• Trade publications in the advertising and information technology sectors (e.g. Advertising 
Age, Ad Week, InternetWeek, ComputerWorld) 
• National newspapers (e.g. New York Times, Wall Street Journal) 
• Reports and press releases from trade associations (e.g. Interactive Advertising Bureau, 
National Venture Capital Association)   
• Archived corporate web sites (accessed through the Internet Archive digital library) 
• Regulatory and Congressional hearings and documentation (e.g. Federal Trade 
Commission reports) 
• The William J. Clinton Presidential Library archives, paper collection of Ira Magaziner 
(Senior Policy Advisor, 1993-1998) 
• Corporate financial data (e.g. annual reports to shareholders and financial information 
from database services such as Bloomberg) 
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• Selected interviews 
 
The advertising trade press in particular is a major source throughout and as such warrants a 
brief comment. Like all sources of evidence, the intended audience and objectives of trade 
publications must be factored into their interpretation. These are commercial enterprises that 
often engage their subject absent much contextualization and at times with a degree of 
sensationalism. Nevertheless, trade publications provide valuable beat reporting covering 
developments in business strategy, technology, public policy, and trade association activity. 
Beyond this, the trade press represents a conversation among industry observers (journalists), 
analysts, and practitioners, including many advertising and marketing executives who are 
frequently quoted as sources and often author opinion-editorial pieces. In this way, trade 
publications offer a gateway to understanding how decision-makers talked among themselves in 
a public forum, clarifying their assumptions, anxieties, and ambitions, and revealing collective 
agreements and disputes regarding the nature of the perceived challenges facing their industry in 
this period.55 
While the ad industry trade press is a significant source, the Madison Avenue 
establishment and web publishers themselves are somewhat secondary actors in this narrative, 
which places greater emphasis on the relations between marketers, investors, government, and 
the major companies of the newly created online advertising services sector. This latter group 
pioneered the technology appropriation and market-building activities that produced the greatest 
impact on online advertising’s construction. Advertising infrastructure providers in particular 
were among a vanguard within the marketing complex that toiled within multiple social arenas to 
institute advertising as a standard business model on the web. Among this group, DoubleClick is 
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a touchstone of all the vectors of ad development addressed in this research: integration with 
financial markets, the socio-technical relations of the ad network format and subsequent 
surveillance infrastructure, and public policy conflicts regarding data collection and privacy. 
Moreover, as addressed in the conclusion, the company was acquired by Google in 2007 and 
now comprises a major component of its preeminent online advertising business, revealing a 
concrete trajectory from the dotcom era to the present day ad landscape. The dotcom companies 
and their investors are highlighted for similar reasons. These groups played a vital and generally 
overlooked role in funding early online advertising at a time when most marketers were yet 
unconvinced of the web’s value as an advertising platform. While dotcoms and ad infrastructure 
providers were on the front lines, many among the ad industry proper remained ambivalent about 
the internet until marketers compelled them otherwise. 
Of course media systems do not follow linear paths of development. This research makes 
clear that the construction of online advertising was a highly contingent process involving 
multiple interests. Numerous people and institutions pursuing diverse objectives and limited by 
specific social contexts influenced the web’s evolution, which remains ongoing and uneven. As 
Tim Berners-Lee, the web’s primary inventor, remarked, the web has grown by a “process of 
accretion.”56 So there is a practical truth to media critic Bob Garfield’s quip that attempting to 
write about the internet is like “sketching the Kentucky Derby.”57 Nevertheless, three decades 
after the web’s introduction it is possible to grasp its basic characteristics and organizing 
principles. It is also possible to build an evidence-based argument as to why such characteristics 
and principles have come to exist. The web we have today is not the only one that could have 
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been constructed. This particular version – heavily integrated into the sponsor system – has come 
into being for reasons that can be explained. This dissertation contributes to this effort. 
In the introduction of the tenth anniversary edition of No Logo, Naomi Klein 
contemplates the nature of the research she conducted for the original book. She notes that once 
one begins to critically examine the activities of advertising and branding, the conversation 
quickly broadens to include “everything except marketing – from how products are made in the 
deregulated global supply chain to industrial agriculture and commodity prices. Next thing you 
know you were also talking about the nexus of politics and money that locked in these wild-west 
rules through free-trade deals at the World Trade Organization ... In short, you were talking 
about how the world works.”58 At the heart of Klein’s remarks is the understanding that to speak 
of advertising is to speak of contemporary capitalism. Ultimately, there was a cross-sector 
competitive imperative to colonize the emerging online medium for selling. This research 
clarifies the specifics of this history and presents an understanding of the web as a technology 
firmly rooted in historical social relations. It emphasizes the interplay of finance, technology, and 
public policy in shaping the development of commercial media systems and delimiting the 
boundaries of their acceptable use. At the same time, it sheds light on the dynamic nature of 
capitalism by charting its interaction with a powerful new interactive medium that was and 
remains simultaneously disruptive and catalytic.  
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Chapter 1 
Advertising at the Dawn of a New Medium: Networks, Cookies, and DARTs 
This chapter makes the case that a group of newly formed companies called online advertising 
networks played a pivotal role in catalyzing the transformation of the world wide web from a 
non-commercial space into a functional and increasingly mainstream advertising platform. 
Beginning in 1996, ad networks married established offline advertising practices with new 
digital technologies to forge the first viable large-scale online advertising business model. 
Combining distributed sales representation with centralized technological systems for targeted ad 
delivery, inventory management, and basic consumer profiling, ad networks propelled the scale 
and precision of online advertising far beyond what was previously possible, enabling the 
nascent industry to make its first rapid generational leap. The most important company in this 
period was DoubleClick, an early pioneer and enduring market leader whose management came 
to view its business model as fundamentally about supporting “the logistics of internet 
advertising on a large scale.”1  
Emphasizing DoubleClick’s development in particular, this chapter demonstrates that ad 
networks not only enabled the growth of web advertising, but laid the groundwork for a 
realignment of the larger marketing complex in relation to consumer surveillance. Through 
competition and collaboration, DoubleClick and others worked to fashion the web into an 
advertising-supported medium and to secure their own position at the core of its business 
structure. As more websites sprang up, more consumers moved online, and more financial capital 
flooded into the emerging dotcom sector, ad networks sought to integrate publishers, marketers, 
and audiences into a network-centric advertising economy. Responding to marketer demands, 
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they created new technical means of profiling web users based on their behaviors in order to 
deliver targeted advertising with greater precision than the offline media of the day. 
Technology appropriation was central to these tasks. Ad networks exploited the 
affordances of the web’s communication protocols and the flexible design of the HTTP cookie in 
order to build a unique system in which ad delivery and consumer profiling functioned as 
reciprocal processes. Close examination of these components shows how the structure of web 
technologies played a fundamental role in the creation of the network business model in which 
every ad served was also an opportunity to gather data about internet users. The fluidity with 
which DoubleClick was able to integrate these operations into the basic functionality of web 
serving enabled it to grow remarkably fast and solidify market power early on in the industry’s 
development. Before stepping into this narrative in detail, this chapter sets the stage with a 
summary of the pre-ad network era of online advertising.  
Online Advertising before Networks 
Marketers were interested in the possibilities of “interactive media” well before the advent of the 
world wide web. The 1970s and 1980s saw failed attempts to commercially develop early 
networked information services such as videotex and teletext, which transmitted text-based data 
over telecommunications lines and broadcast signals.2 More advanced computer-based 
commercial online services such as CompuServe, Prodigy, and America Online (AOL) were 
created in the 1980s and some began to carry advertising in the early 1990s, although buy-in 
from marketers was limited.3 The Clinton and Gore administration’s promotion of the coming 
“information superhighway” spurred interest and anxious speculation among the marketing 
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complex during this period, though most of the focus was on interactive television (iTV) and, to 
a lesser extent, computer-based publishing technologies such as CD-ROMs.4 
By the end of 1994, it was becoming clear that the personal computer and not the 
television would be the dominant interactive medium of the foreseeable future.5 Commercial 
online services had grown in popularity and emerged as a principal means of internet access, 
although they would soon be unseated by graphical web browsers and dial-up internet service 
providers.6 Still, compared to the established mass media, the world wide web was a relative 
backwater. The total count of websites and users numbered in the tens of thousands and the 
medium was seen as both hard to navigate for general audiences and as harboring a culture that 
was largely hostile to commercial purposes. “Academic, international, and apparently free, the 
internet developed into an almost militantly egalitarian and cooperative community,” recalled 
Marc Andreessen, co-creator of the Mosaic/Netscape web browser. “Virtually nobody made any 
money from it directly.”7  
By 1995 select magazines and newspapers had begun to experiment in the online space, 
incorporating limited advertising when possible.8 Often this meant partnering with commercial 
online services, but gradually publishers began creating their own websites, as did broadcasters 
and increasing numbers of marketers themselves.9 Still, advertising on the net was scarce. The 
first web banner advertisements did not appear until the fall of 1994 and Yahoo, one of the first 
websites to reach large numbers of users on a daily basis, did not begin hosting ads until mid-
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1995.10 Though they were intrigued by its potential, the majority of traditional marketers and ad 
agencies were highly ambivalent about the internet as an advertising medium. Although a few of 
the most highly trafficked sites such as Hotwired and ESPNet were able to attract some notable 
sponsorships early on, there was no consensus among marketers that the web could be 
successfully commercialized and certainly no infrastructure to support advertising on a large 
scale.11 At the same time, a fear of being left behind compelled the marketing complex to pursue 
the new interactive media. Proctor & Gamble chairman Edwin Artzt gave a high-profile address 
to the American Association of Advertising Agencies that called upon the ad industry to “grab 
technology change in its teeth” in order to create the “greatest selling tool ever conceived.”12 
What resulted was a mixed bag of experimental online advertising attempts that primarily added 
fuel to marketers’ uncertainty. It was not until 1996 that a core group companies developed the 
technologies and business services that enabled online advertising to expand in a more systemic 
fashion. No company was more important in these efforts than DoubleClick. 
DoubleClick’s roots stretch back to the period in which business historian Daniel Pope 
locates the institutional and ideological “making of modern advertising.”13 Founded in Omaha in 
the 1920s, the tiny ad agency of Bozell & Jacobs began as an intermediary between local 
newspapers and real estate brokers. It found moderate success in its first three decades, acquired 
smaller competitors, and relocated its headquarters to New York in the 1960s.14 By the 1980s the 
company had become a major player on Madison Avenue and among the largest 15 agencies in 
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the US. In the early 1990s under the banner Bozell Jacobs Kenyon & Eckhardt (BJK&E), the 
firm was among the first advertising holding companies to move into new media. In 1993 a 
business-to-business division of BJK&E called Poppe Tyson acquired Carlick Advertising, an 
agency based in Mountain View, CA that specialized in the technology sector.15 David Carlick, a 
veteran marketer of personal computers, was made senior vice president and general manager of 
the combined operation’s West Coast office. 
Led by Carlick, Poppe Tyson transformed itself from an “unglamorous” business-to-
business shop into a “sleek, trendy cyber-agency leading Madison Avenue’s uncertain charge” 
into the realm of “interactive media.”16 Interactive media was a catchall term for a range of 
emergent electronic platforms whose common attribute in the eyes of the ad industry was the 
potential “to go beyond the one-way flow of traditional media” in order to engage customers in 
more meaningful ways.17 Poppe Tyson quickly established itself as a leader in the sector by 
casting a wide net of interactive advertising projects spanning CD-ROMs, commercial online 
services, and proto-interactive television systems for clients such as Time Warner, Chrysler, and 
American Airlines.18  
But the agency’s most consequential interactive ventures were based on the fledging 
world wide web. Poppe Tyson was one of the first traditional ad agencies to design corporate 
websites and manage early online ad campaigns for a handful of major marketers in the 
technology sector including Hewlett Packard and Intel.19 In a connection that foreshadowed the 
important link between online advertising and public policy, Poppe Tyson also created some of 
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the first official websites for the Clinton administration, whose hands-off approach to regulating 
online advertising would later be influenced and applauded by the ad industry.20 Doubling down 
on these early successes, BJK&E rolled the new media operations of all of its subsidiary 
companies into Poppe Tyson in spring 1995 and named Carlick as a top executive.21 The 
reorganization marked BJK&E as among the first Madison Avenue holding companies to take 
the interactive sector seriously and signaled that company leadership saw the web in particular as 
its brightest prospect.22  
While most mainstream advertising agencies dismissed the web as a ‘low budget and 
experimental” fringe medium, Poppe Tyson was not entirely alone in the market for online 
business services.23 In the website development sector the agency faced competition from a 
number of specialized interactive design companies such as Modem Media, Razorfish, and 
Organic Online. These newly formed ventures emphasized their independence from the 
advertising industry establishment, claiming that interactive media had brought about a paradigm 
shift that required different marketing approaches, often implemented through what was then 
cutting-edge web design.24 
Conversely, Poppe Tyson’s major contribution to the development of online advertising 
came not from breaking the mold of established ad industry practices, but rather grew out of a 
very conventional ad sales relationship with a mold-shattering internet company. That company 
was Netscape, whose dominance in the web browser market was rapidly making it a widely 
recognized symbol of the internet revolution. The default home page of Netscape’s Navigator 
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browser was the company’s own website, making it among the most visited locations on the web 
throughout the 1990s. While negotiating a web development contract with Poppe Tyson, 
Netscape chairman Jim Clark “jokingly mentioned that the company should take ads” in order to 
monetize the immense popularity of its website.25 But Netscape saw its primary business as 
software development and IT services and was reluctant to divert resources to advertising sales. 
Carlick reportedly “jumped on the opportunity,” proposing a deal whereby Poppe Tyson would 
sell ad space on Netscape’s web properties on a commission basis, effectively acting as an 
outside sales team. 
Under this arrangement, Netscape became one of the first companies to earn significant 
online advertising revenues and Poppe Tyson began to sketch the contours of a new business 
model that would transform the web into a fully-fledged advertising platform.26 With Poppe 
Tyson’s assistance, Netscape leveraged its dominance in the browser market into an alternative 
source of income, quickly securing major advertisers such as AT&T, MasterCard, and Adobe 
Systems.27 The most popular site on the web was now open for business as a billboard for 
corporate sponsors. Recognizing the potential of this sales arrangement, Poppe Tyson began to 
broker ad space for other major websites of the day such as Playboy and the portal Excite.28 In 
this capacity, Poppe Tyson became one of the first agencies to offer online advertising sales 
representation (“sales repping”), utilizing its rolodex of marketer clients and experience with 
online media to operate as an exclusive external advertising sales force for select web publishers. 
While this specialized sales intermediary function was a well-established business model in other 
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ad-supported media sectors (more on this below), its application to the internet was novel in 
1995.  
While highly publicized interactive television experiments like Time Warner’s Full 
Service Network were crumbling, the rapid growth of commercial online services and the world 
wide web catapulted the internet to the forefront of the new media landscape. Increasing 
excitement and anxiety regarding interactive media swept through the marketing complex. As 
Netscape became a stock market phenomenon and kick started the dotcom financial bubble, 
Poppe Tyson was inking deals with sponsors to shell out an unprecedented $30,000 a month to 
display banner ads on the browser-maker’s home page. As MediaWeek reported, “with that sort 
of money trading hands, it’s no wonder that by the start of 1996, several of the web’s largest 
[publishers] were rumored to be shopping for new or additional sales talent.”29  
Competitors of various stripes including design shops CKS Group and True North Media 
began “developing ways to sell ad space on interactive content.”30 Newly formed repping 
ventures like Softbank Interactive Marketing and WebRep entered the market as well. Even more 
significantly, Katz Media Group and Petry, Inc., leaders in the broadcasting ad repping business, 
also threw their hats into the ring, forming dedicated units to represent web publishers, 
commercial online services, and, just in case, the floundering interactive television projects.31 
The entrance of established broadcast rep firms into the online market signaled that the web was 
gaining legitimacy among established industry players.  
While some of the leading websites such as Microsoft’s MSN opted to maintain ad sales 
in-house, the cost of assigning or hiring a dedicated online sales force was prohibitive for many 
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web publishers.32 Even for those with deep pockets, expertise in the quickly evolving online 
platform proved to be a scarce resource. Major media companies including CBS and NBC, 
arguably among the best positioned to sell advertising inventory, hired outside firms to handle 
their web inventories.33 These developments helped contribute to a surge in demand for web rep 
companies in an online advertising market that was essentially non-existent just one year earlier. 
The sector experienced a rush for sales personnel with any modicum of interactive experience, 
e.g. “anyone who [could] translate web gobbledygook into language that marketers [could] 
understand.”34  
Aggregate online advertising spending was picking up steam, growing from virtually 
nothing in 1994 to $55 million in 1995 and $267 million in 1996.35 Propelling this growth was 
the rising number of ad rep firms as well as the success of premium sites like HotWired in 
attracting lucrative sponsorships.36 Netscape alone billed online marketers nearly $2 million in 
the fourth quarter of 1995.37 By February 1996, Advertising Age declared that “the hottest web 
business” was no longer creating websites; it was “selling ads on them.”38 
As this momentum accrued, BJK&E’s multi-pronged approach drummed up controversy 
among its peers and in the trade press.39 As one of the first and most visible agency 
conglomerates to offer web design, media buying, and online ad repping services, BJK&E and 
Poppe Tyson in particular were criticized for operating with significant conflicts of interest. 
Advertising Age warned of the ethical breach engendered “when an agency charged with getting 
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the lowest price possible for its marketer client is also supposed to get the highest price possible 
for its media client.”40 Facing backlash from ad agency media buyers hesitant to purchase 
inventory from a rep firm owned by a competing agency, BJK&E announced in late 1995 its 
intention to spin off its Poppe Tyson web ad repping division into a stand-alone company of 
which it would retain an ownership stake.41 This company would be rechristened DoubleClick. 
Despite online advertising’s upward trajectory, it remained far outside of the marketing 
mainstream, accounting for just two-tenths of one percent of total ad spending in 1996.42 The 
majority of spending came from a relatively small group of marketers with the wherewithal and 
inclination to allocate a portion of their ad budgets to experimental platforms.43 A far greater 
number of marketers and ad agencies exercised deliberate caution when approaching interactive 
media and the web in particular, a conservatism that reflected their ambivalence regarding its 
practicality and efficacy as an advertising vehicle.44 It is telling that BJK&E, one of the early 
agency leaders of the nascent online advertising sector, promptly jettisoned its web repping 
business in the face of moderate controversy. 
The collective hesitation among the marketing complex establishment was rooted in a 
few key factors. For starters, there were simply not that many consumers on the internet, limiting 
its attractiveness to mass marketers. And while internet usage was growing quickly and the 
average user was demographically desirable, the roughly 18 million online consumers were 
unevenly scattered among various local internet service providers and commercial online service 
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providers like AOL and Prodigy.45 In other words, there was really no means to replicate the 
model of mass advertising favored by many national marketers. 
Secondly, the business landscape of online advertising was simply too chaotic for media 
buyers/planners – the group within the ad agency system responsible for placing ads in various 
media outlets. The volume and diversity of websites was growing quickly, but there were no 
established criteria upon which they could be reliably judged. Offline media had customary 
pricing models such as CPM (the cost to reach 1,000 people), third-party audience measurement 
systems like Nielsen Ratings, and standard creative formats like the 30-second spot or quarter 
page ad. While some of these systems were applied hodgepodge to the web by assorted 
publishers and sales reps, few standards had emerged.46 Trade groups such the Interactive 
Advertising Bureau (IAB) were formed to tackle these issues, but they found little early success 
amidst a chaotic and rapidly expanding market. 
As Joseph Turow argues, the major exception to this state of affairs was the 
implementation of the mouse click as a standard measure of value for online advertisements.47 
The click was compelling to marketers and media buyers because it offered a measure of 
verification that was unique to interactive media and provided a quantifiable representation of 
consumer intention.48 In short order the “click-through rate” – the percentage ad impressions that 
generate clicks – became a more or less universal metric for evaluating the efficacy of banner 
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ads.49 Nevertheless, the practice of buying ad space online remained cumbersome for most media 
buyers. Every aspect of a banner campaign, including the specifics of the creative, the placement 
and duration of ads, and expected audience exposure had to be negotiated between media buyers 
and the ad sales representatives of web publishers.50 Absent established conventions, ad planning 
was largely a guessing game muddied by publisher sales forces that would extoll the merits of 
their inventory without providing supporting data or offering streamlined mechanisms to conduct 
business. Some reasonable assumptions were possible – visitors to ESPNet were likely sports 
fans – but all in all the tools of early web ad management were blunt instruments. 
Admonishment regarding the lack of standard measures and practices became an oft-
repeated refrain in the trade press. “If the web is a 100,000-plus channel universe in which each 
site is its own program, [web advertising] so far is an exasperating reflection of that chaos,” 
exclaimed MediaWeek.51 Even DoubleClick’s Carlick, limit-testing his role as one of online 
advertising’s top evangelists, unfavorably likened the online ad market to “Dodge City,” 
admitting, “the structure’s a mess right now.”52 
Diagramming DoubleClick 
At the start of 1996, the newly independent DoubleClick and a cadre of rivals set out to bring 
order via conquest to the unruly online advertising marketplace. Their efforts brought about a 
business model that blended established network-based sales representation practices with 
innovative ad delivery and management technologies. Though varied in its implementation, this 
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strategy was consistent to the extent that it involved the development of database-driven, 
centralized ad serving systems to manage advertising processes across groups of websites 
aggregated into distinct networks. Loosely, ad serving systems represented an advance and 
appropriation of technology, while networks represented a repurposed business structure.53 
Together these components qualitatively altered the character of advertising within the emerging 
digital media landscape. We turn detailed attention to them now. 
As DoubleClick separated from BJK&E, it began to assemble a collection of popular 
websites in order to sell bundled ad packages from a larger pool of inventory. The goal was to 
serve as the exclusive ad sales representative for a group of leading web publishers in order to 
provide a one-stop-shop to advertisers looking to reach large aggregates of online consumers. In 
other words, DoubleClick sought to tame the chaos of the online ad market for marketers that 
needed assistance buying ad space and for publishers that needed help selling it. 
With many marketers and media buyers wary of online advertising, DoubleClick utilized 
familiar broadcast terminology calling its stable of web publishers a “network” and even giving 
it call letters: “WCLK.” But the network model went deeper than employing well-known 
references. John Nardone, media director at the interactive agency ModemMedia, noted that 
“DoubleClick was one of the earliest proponents of thinking about the web as a series of big TV 
networks.”54 In the press, Carlick explicitly invited comparisons between DoubleClick and the 
major television networks, while emphasizing the allegedly superior “interactive” qualities of the 
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online medium. “ABC, NBC and CBS can serve big numbers of couch potatoes to advertisers. 
WCLK will be the first network to deliver a huge, audited number of interactive users.”55 
While DoubleClick was among the first to apply the network sales structure to the web, 
the strategy itself, much like that of ad sales representation, was already firmly established in the 
offline advertising sector.56 The tactic of selling ad space across multiple media properties 
developed with print in the late 19th century and took on a more modern network-based form 
with the rise of radio in the 1930s. As early as 1889, J. Walter Thompson sold bundled ad 
inventory across some 30 major magazines such as Harper’s and Cosmopolitan.57 Though 
Thompson would abandon ad sales to focus on creative, Edward Petry later established one of 
the first radio advertising sales representation firms in 1931, moving into television in the 1950s, 
and to the web in the 1990s.58 In 2001 the ad sales representation sector at large (representing 
primarily small an mid-size “old media” outlets, e.g. newspapers, magazines, radio, and 
television) earned $3.8 billion in revenues among some 2,800 businesses.59 
The basic character of the network business model has remained stable in print, 
broadcast, and online media. The aggregation of various media properties presents opportunities 
to create economies of scale for marketers looking to reach large groups and can offer prospects 
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for enhanced audience targeting within those groups. From its inception DoubleClick hinted at 
plans to form various “subnets” in order to target specific audience niches, but the initial task at 
hand was to serve marketers and agencies looking to easily purchase large quantities of ad 
impressions across many web destinations.60 In order to put this vision into practice, 
DoubleClick would need to greatly expand its technological capabilities. 
The network model introduced substantial technical and operational hurdles that 
exceeded the expertise of most ad sales personnel. During the separation from BJK&E, 
DoubleClick’s leadership realized they needed a means to centrally manage and deliver ads 
across the network they were compiling and that building such capacity would require significant 
investment in technology and labor. Even the tech-savvy Poppe Tyson had outsourced difficult 
technical work to firms like the early web measurement specialist I/PRO and the broadcast 
ratings giant Nielsen Media Research, which was inching its way into the online market.61 
DoubleClick on the other hand sought an in-house solution for both large-scale ad 
delivery and comprehensive audience reporting. It found a partner in Atlanta-based start-up 
Interactive Advertising Network (IAN). IAN’s founders, Kevin O’Connor and Dwight 
Merriman, were software engineers and successful entrepreneurs in the computer networking 
sector.62 Like many others surveying the new media landscape at the time, O’Connor and 
Merriman saw commercial opportunity in the burgeoning web and created IAN with the original 
plan to “act like your local cable company” by aggregating channels of subscription-based 
content online.63 They predicted that content subscription was going to be the major online 
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business model and sought to simplify the process by creating a platform for one-stop shopping. 
When it became apparent that consumers were largely rejecting online subscription services, 
O’Conner and Merriman changed course, focusing instead on advertising. Adapting their 
original business plan, they developed the technical means to aggregate ad buys for marketers 
across websites, laying the groundwork for what would become the ad serving and management 
system that powered DoubleClick’s network.64 
After a brief round of negotiations, Carlick and O’Connor agreed to join forces. IAN 
would be integrated into DoubleClick and O’Connor and Merriman would take significant 
ownership stakes and hold key executive positions, with O’Connor assuming the role of CEO. 
IAN brought to the table the technology for ad delivery, management, and reporting, while 
DoubleClick brought advertising industry credibility, an experienced sales force, and, most 
importantly, a stable of web publisher and marketer clients. As O’Connor told Advertising Age, 
“We realized we had the same goals: They had the sales and we had the technology. It was a 
merger made in heaven.”65 
DoubleClick officially launched its network in early 1996, having by then dropped the 
“WCLK” designation. Building on established business connections, DoubleClick invited high-
traffic web publishers to join its network free of charge.66 Among the first to sign on were 
Travelocity, USA Today Online, Quicken Financial, Macromedia, U.S. News Online, and the 
site for the popular Dilbert comic.67 By August DoubleClick was courting over 100 partners, 
including some of the tech sector’s major companies such as Microsoft and Intel and large 
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publishers like Ziff-Davis, the Wall Street Journal, and the Chicago Tribune.68 The network 
coalesced with approximately 30 participating sites.69 Publishers entered into exclusive 
agreements whereby DoubleClick sold and delivered their banner ad inventory, generally 
splitting the revenues down the middle.70 Early advertisers included American Airlines, Bank of 
America, Honda, Nissan, and Toyota. 
Further extending the broadcast network model, DoubleClick packaged its websites into 
“vertical” content segments allowing marketers to target particular demographic groups based on 
their affinity for certain categories of media fare. For example, marketers could opt to reach the 
audiences of sites focused on business, news, and/or sports.71 As O’Connor explained: “Think of 
NBC. Very rarely does NBC say here, you’ve got to buy the entire network. What they say is, 
here is a collection of very high-quality products that reach various target audiences, which 
shows do you want to buy? And we’re very much the same way. You can think of us as the 
Burger King of internet advertising. We give it any way you want.72 
Despite the efficiencies of segmentation and the network format, simply replicating the 
broadcast model on the web failed to address the root of marketers’ concerns about online 
advertising. The real issue stemmed from one of marketers’ most enduring problems: the 
“historical anxiety over whether people notice their persuasive messages, or, even more, care 
about them.”73 For all of the anticipation regarding interactive media’s potential for hyper-
efficient customer acquisition and one-to-one relationship management, marketers were simply 
not convinced of the effectiveness of banner advertising.    
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A few months after DoubleClick’s launch, the trade press was already urging marketers 
to go “beyond the banner.”74 A novelty in 1994, by 1996 banner ads had grown increasingly 
pervasive and gimmicky, trends that owed in no small part to the rise of ad networks 
themselves.75 As Robert McChesney et al. have pointed out, one of advertising’s “core 
contradictions” is that the more companies advertise in order to “distinguish themselves from 
their competition, the more commercial clutter there is in the media and culture,” reducing the 
efficacy of any given ad.76 Whatever intrigue the banner format had initially possessed had 
begun to fade with overuse. Click-through rates began to slip downward. 
A range of flashy features were implemented as part of efforts to update the basic banner 
format and assuage marketers’ dissatisfaction. Among them were augmenting static banners with 
sound and animation, adding more robust interactivity such as ecommerce capabilities, and 
utilizing HTML frames to ensure that ads remained in the viewing area as users scrolled and 
navigated through sites. New banner shapes and sizes proliferated, supplementing the basic 
rectangle with “skyscrapers, verticals, half-sizes, and micros.” One account found 242 unique 
banner sizes in use in October 1996.77 Much to the disdain of web users, pop-up advertising (ads 
that opened up in a new browser window in front of the desired content) also proliferated during 
this period.78   
Yet many of these enhancements were essentially cosmetic and their slipshod 
implementation only added to the disorder of the medium. More importantly, they failed to 
address what marketers increasingly saw as the central challenge and promise of the web, 
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“targeting ads specifically to users.”79 This kind of individual-level messaging remained out of 
reach, a “holy grail” for many marketers.80 Frustrated, early adopters of online advertising such 
as Sony began to tighten the purse strings of their new media budgets. Of course this was not 
true across the board as new marketers were coming online during this period and aggregate 
spending was increasing steadily. But in general terms, as one ad executive put it, “the initial 
wave of investment for the sake of learning [was] over.”81  
Marketers began to demand more specific ad targeting capabilities, which stemmed from 
their long-standing desire for higher standards of audience measurement and ad performance 
across all media platforms. Turow has shown that the increased emphasis on quantifying 
advertising results was an outgrowth of systemic changes within the advertising industry 
beginning in the 1980s.82 While the drive to measure advertising outcomes in increasingly 
precise ways began well before the advent of the web, interactive media was taken up by some as 
a place to advance this trend to its limits. 
As such, ad networks placed targeted advertising and improved metrics at the very core 
of their operational goals and implemented them through the integration of ad serving 
technology into the network sales structure. This took a variety of forms, but DoubleClick’s was 
among the most advanced. Building on IAN’s software, DoubleClick developed a multi-
functional system that utilized centralized servers to deliver dynamically targeted ads to sites 
across its network, while simultaneously gleaning information in order to profile web users and 
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internet domains. The service was later expanded to include ad management tools for reporting 
the performance of specific ad campaigns and implementing modifications based on the results. 
DoubleClick packaged all of these functions into a centralized technology suite branded 
as the Dynamic Advertising Reporting and Targeting (DART) system. DART became the core of 
DoubleClick’s business and was continuously refined and enhanced as the online ad market 
matured. DoubleClick described DART as a comprehensive technology that “enables advertisers 
to optimize ad performance by dynamically targeting and delivering ads to web users based on 
pre-selected criteria. As a user visits the websites of web publishers that utilize DoubleClick’s 
solutions, DART collects information regarding the user and his or her viewing activities and ad 
responses, and applies this data to improve its ability to predict the user’s reaction and enhance 
DART’s ad targeting capabilities.”83 Upgrading the network format with the technological 
capacities of the DART system was, in O’Connor’s words, DoubleClick’s “big breakthrough.”84 
And while the specific implementations of these functions were crude by contemporary 
standards, they nonetheless represented a “quantum leap forward” for the web advertising of the 
period.85 
O’Connor and other company spokespersons relentlessly aggrandized DoubleClick’s 
targeting prowess in the trade and business media. This was a common strategy during a period 
when public relations cache was easily translated into investment capital windfalls via the 
internet-crazy financial market.86 DoubleClick used the press and its own marketing campaigns 
to tout its capability to “get the right advertisement to the right person at the right time,” 
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promising to achieve the “ultimate in target marketing.”87 In other words, the company 
positioned itself as the antidote to marketers’ disquiet, promising to transform the web from 
“dodge city” into “an advertiser’s dream – a medium that could home in on individual consumers 
cheaply and directly.”88 
Over the next four years DoubleClick would take the lead in creating the standard ad 
network technology suite of centralized ad serving, dynamically targeted ad delivery, user 
profiling, and self-service ad management that formed the technical backbone of the emergent 
online advertising market. Putting these mechanisms into practice involved shepherding the 
web’s technological development in ways that were amenable to advertising (especially in the 
case of HTTP cookies, discussed below) as well as intervening into the marketing complex’s 
established political economic structure (i.e. the relations between marketers, ad industry, and 
publishers). It bears repeating that these processes also intimately involved the domains of public 
policy, public opinion, and the financial system in particular, factors addressed in subsequent 
chapters. 
The activities of ad networks during this period are the genesis of the consumer 
surveillance that became the hallmark of online advertising. A nuanced understanding of this 
history requires unpacking the technical details of ad serving technologies, which are grounded 
in the basic data communication protocols of the world wide web. As Robert Bodle argues, 
clarification of the “relationships between technical features and their social implications” 
reveals how market logics have impacted the very structure of the internet.89 While examining 
the particulars of something like the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) may seem arcane, it 
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provides an essential vantage point for apprehending the web’s transformation into an 
advertising channel and lays bare the unique characteristics of that transformation. As I hope to 
illustrate, the technology matters quite a bit. Fleshing out the details requires a closer look into 
processes of computer networking and web serving.    
Decentralized Web Protocols, Centralized Ad Systems 
The files that make up websites are stored on internet-connected machines called web servers. 
Publishers such as FastCompany.com would generally host the text, media, and organizing 
information that constituted its website content on one or more proprietary web servers. In the 
early days of online banner advertising circa 1994, Fast Company’s servers would also host any 
ads displayed on its site, which were designed either in-house or by an outside ad agency 
representing a marketer client. Even in scenarios in which a repping firm like Poppe Tyson sold 
ad space on a publisher’s behalf, the publisher itself would be still charged with hosting and 
delivering the ads using its own web servers. Publishers that sold their own ad inventory would 
manage their own accounts and provide limited metrics such as aggregate impressions and click-
throughs.  
DoubleClick’s ad network model essentially transferred all of these functions (ad sales, 
hosting, delivery, campaign management, and reporting) from publishers to the network firm 
itself. Thus, in addition to selling ad space on behalf of publishers within its network, 
DoubleClick hosted their ads on its own servers and assumed control of delivery, management, 
and reporting. This division of labor was technically possible because of the characteristics of 
web-based data transmission.  
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In order to access a given website a user must connect to the hosting server using a 
“client.”90 During this period the most common clients were web browsers developed by 
Netscape (first Mosaic, then Navigator) and Microsoft (Internet Explorer). Web communication 
is facilitated by a method of data connection called Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), through 
which clients and servers issue requests and responses for various site components.91 Behind the 
scenes, a website that appears to load as a unified entity is actually an amalgamation of various 
media elements assembled by the browser client according the parameters laid out in the 
hypertext markup language (HTML) that underpins all web pages. All but the most basic pages 
are normally constituted via multiple client/server requests and receptions of HTML files, media 
files, scripts, and/or other site components, including banner advertisements. Further, HTTP 
requests are all treated as discrete communication events between the server and client, making 
the web a “stateless system.” This concept is important for the discussion ahead pertaining to 
HTTP cookies and user profiling. 
In a basic configuration, a client would receive all the files that make up a given web 
page from a single server, but this does not necessarily have to be the case.92 Different website 
elements can be hosted on multiple servers with no readily apparent change in the final display 
or functionality.93 This ability of browsers to seamlessly render multisource documents via 
HTTP is one of the technical features that made possible the often-celebrated decentralized 
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structure of the web.94 Ironically, it also enabled the much less renowned proliferation of the 
centralized delivery of online advertisements. In this way, the developing model of online 
advertising was a microcosm of changes in global capitalism, whereby information and 
communication technologies facilitated increasingly decentralized international production and 
consumer markets while at the same time enhancing concentrated and “flexible” administrative 
control. 
Capitalizing on the affordances of the web communication protocols, ad networks were 
able to offer publishers and advertisers fully outsourced ad delivery and management services by 
hosting and delivering ads to a number of sites from their own centralized servers. Thus, when 
Fast Company joined DoubleClick’s network in 1996 it contracted out not only its ad sales 
operation, but also its ad delivery and associated processes of inventory management. This 
redirect was technically simple to achieve and had the added benefit of operating behind the 
scenes, i.e. undetectable to the majority of end users. Configuration simply required the inclusion 
of instructions in Fast Company’s HTML documents to retrieve banner ads from DoubleClick, 
rather than its own server. The process is represented in figure 1. 
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Figure 1. DoubleClick’s ad serving process.  
Source: DoubleClick, DART White Paper: Counting Methodologies, July 12, 2001, 2. 
This service proved attractive to web publishers who wished to sell ad space but were not 
able to take on the wide range of accompanying business responsibilities. As an executive at the 
financial services site Edgar Online told the New York Times, working with DoubleClick “allows 
us to focus on what we’re good at, the selling and marketing of S.E.C.-based products, but not on 
what we’re not good at – dealing with ad agencies, trafficking ads, and sending advertisers 
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reports.”95 As will be demonstrated, centralized ad serving laid the foundation for more advanced 
practices of “database marketing” and “simplified tracking creative.”96 
The Reciprocity of the Web: Protocols, Data Collection, and Ad Targeting 
DoubleClick extended this centralized distribution model over its entire network, utilizing its 
own DART servers to house and deliver many different ads to many different websites. Yet 
centralized delivery alone was insufficient for one-to-one ad targeting, which necessitates 
knowing information about audiences, or better yet, individuals. In order to better approximate 
this kind of customization, ad networks took advantage of the multi-directional nature of web 
server/client communication. While the principal use of web servers was to host and distribute 
information, they could also be configured to collect it. Leveraging this reciprocity, DoubleClick 
turned its ad delivery network into a distributed apparatus for gathering information about web 
users and their behaviors. 
Since the ads delivered by DoubleClick were centrally hosted on its own servers, the 
company established HTTP connections with every browser that accessed any of the sites in its 
network. For example, when a user visited Fast Company’s site, her browser sent requests to 
Fast Company servers that returned the magazine’s online content while also directing the 
browser to DoubleClick servers in order to retrieve banner ads. Thus, accessing Fast Company’s 
site established a connection not only between the client and Fast Company, but also between the 
client and DoubleClick. This relationship extended to all sites in DoubleClick’s network, 
enabling it to capture and analyze a range of data, which it then deployed as the foundation of the 
DART ad targeting system. 
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DoubleClick assembled databases of targeting information through what it called the 
“Derive Profiles Process” (DPP).97 The DPP constructed profiles of users’ web clients and 
internet domains in order to determine which ads to display across the network. Roughly, web 
client profiles provided information about when, where, and from what device users accessed a 
given site, while domain profiles gave information about the type of internet access. From these 
basic information sources, a broad range of data could then be extrapolated. As O’Connor put it, 
“building an accurate and comprehensive user and domain profiles database is fundamental to 
targeted advertising with DoubleClick.”98 The company gathered profile information from three 
main sources: protocol-based data derived from the standard information passed between web 
clients and servers in HTTP transactions, third-party data purchased from external companies, 
and tracking data gathered by depositing HTTP cookie files onto the machines of users visiting 
sites in its network. 
Protocol-based data: All HTTP requests contain standard components, including various 
“headers” that define the parameters of the transaction and provide meta-data about the client 
making the request. In this way HTTP allows site administrators to learn a bit about their 
visitors. For example, standard web page requests include headers that contain information 
describing the client’s computer operating system and browser (User-agent header), acceptable 
languages for display (Accept-language header), and the date and time the request was sent. 
Stored in files called server logs, this information was useful to web administrators who wanted 
to accommodate the variance among the capabilities of different browsers or perform basic 
analysis of traffic patterns.  
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HTTP requests also include the client’s internet protocol (IP) address, which uniquely 
identifies a specific computer on a network.99 IP addresses are assigned to clients by internet 
service providers (ISPs), which are allocated inventories of addresses by regional internet 
registry organizations such as the American Registry of Internet Numbers (ARIN). Such registry 
organizations publish IP address directories that can contain certain identifying information. For 
example, ranges of addresses are often assigned to particular geographic locations. Using this 
information, IP addresses can be used to determine users’ internet domains and to approximate 
their geographic location. For example, a user accessing the web from an internet connection 
supplied by a university or employer uses a client with an IP address that is associated with a 
respective domain such as Illinois.edu or Intel.com. Similarly, a user on a private internet 
connection is assigned an IP address that is traceable to her specific internet service provider. As 
I write, my internet connection uses the IP address “108.199.241.68,” which is associated with 
the ISP domain host “108-199-241-68.lightspeed.dctril.sbcglobal.net.” A publicly available 
online directory indicates that my IP address is traceable to an AT&T internet service provider 
(AT&T is the parent company of SBC Global) located in Decatur, IL, about 55 miles from my 
workspace in Urbana.100  
Third-party data: A considerable amount of information can be inferred using only 
approximations of ISP domains and geographic locations. As O’Connor explained, the IP 
address passed on by browsers “tells you a lot,” especially when “integrated with third party 
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data” from consumer marketing lists and census records.101 Companies such as Digital Envoy 
sold access to proprietary IP address location databases, which were compiled by combining 
public data sets with information gathered from various forms of web traffic analysis.102 Building 
on third party data providers, DoubleClick constructed its own database of ISP domain profiles. 
Expanding beyond geographic information, the company compiled detailed domain records by 
marrying “ZIP codes with census data to create demographic profiles” and overlaying data on 
“Fortune 500 companies and their industries” such as revenue, number of employees, and 
industry classification codes (OSHA SIC).103 In this way DoubleClick was able to make ad 
serving decisions based on the pre-existing domain profile that most closely matched the IP 
address information of incoming browser requests. Each new request was added to 
DoubleClick’s domain name database, which after just 9 months included some 70,000 
institutional records and by 1998 grew to 500,000.104 
Pairing the full range of HTTP header and IP address (domain profile) information and 
external data with the content of specific sites allowed DoubleClick to dynamically target ads in 
ways that most marketers, let alone users, thought impossible in 1996. New methods were 
employed such that two visitors to the same website – one in Schenectady using a Macintosh 
machine on a local dial-up ISP and another in Silicon Valley using Windows on their employer’s 
network connection – might receive entirely different banner ads based on the meta-data 
generated from their browsing activities. When asked whether DoubleClick could “enable an 
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advertiser to reach, for example, only women aerospace engineers who like sports in Southern 
California,” O’Connor responded, “If you worked for Lockheed [Martin] in Orange County and 
you’re accessing the sports scores for women’s soccer [on a site within DoubleClick network], 
we’ve got you.”105 
What made the process “dynamic” was that the targeting was automated and executed in 
real time. This meant that DART could deliver individually targeted ads on the fly by consulting 
its profile database to determine the appropriate ad to send in any given instance. This process of 
dynamic targeting would become the prototypical form of online advertising and, as will be 
shown, highly dependent upon increasingly pervasive data collection. For marketers and 
publishers, these kinds of dynamic targeting applications offered a dramatic improvement over 
earlier, more static methods of ad placement. First generation banner ads circa late 1994 and 
1995 were clickable, but still fixed in the sense that they ran in particular locations for set 
durations.106 Like billboards on the interstate, the placement and design of most banners 
remained unchanged throughout their campaigns, which often spanned weeks or months.  
Tracking data: Improvements notwithstanding, protocol-based dynamic targeting was 
still based on rough inferences made from header and IP address data. The major technical 
breakthrough for online advertising came from the integration of HTTP cookies, which greatly 
increased the granularity and precision of profiling, targeting, and management and made 
available new forms of persistent profile data based on recorded user behavior, rather than 
inference. According to Turow, cookies “would do more to shape advertising…on the web than 
any other invention apart from the browser.”107 Moreover, the widespread appropriation of 
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cookies by ad networks and publishers altered the technical composition of the web itself by 
introducing a new level of persistence, and thus a capacity for consumer surveillance, into a 
formerly discrete, or “stateless,” communication environment.  
In order to maximize efficiency, HTTP was designed as a “stateless” protocol, meaning 
that all communication transactions are treated as discrete events.108 A relationship exists 
between the client and server “only for the duration of a [given] transaction, and each transaction 
stands alone.” 109 The basic steps of an HTTP transaction are as follows: 
1. Client connects to a server; 
2. Client makes a request of the server; 
3. Server fulfills the request for the client; 
4. The connection is closed.110 
Statelessness results from the fourth step, which disconnects the client and server at the 
end of every transaction. Thus, the server engages every HTTP request as a freestanding event 
independent of all others, rather than as part of an extended session of activity.111 Entering a web 
address into a browser initiates a discrete set of transactions. Clicking on a link initiates another, 
and so on. In other words, no enduring “state” is maintained between client and server beyond 
the scope of individual data transactions. 
This presented a challenge for website administrators who wanted to quantify and 
analyze page traffic beyond the information contained in headers. Most web servers were 
configured to automatically record certain details about their activities in server log files, but 
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these contained separate entries for each HTTP request; every HTML page, every image, every 
file request generated a unique line in the server log. The problem was in stringing these discrete 
transactions together. The basic statelessness of HTTP made it nearly impossible to accurately 
determine whether any given series of requests represented the activity of one or multiple users. 
Early online audience measurement companies such as I/PRO attempted to dissect the contents 
of server logs to glean information about web traffic patterns. Some degree of analysis was 
possible using IP addresses and the information contained in “Referer” [sic] headers, which show 
the URL of the previous page from which a link to the current page was followed.112 But as 
I/PRO’s founder explained, although log files held “an immensely rich trove of information,” 
they were “ungainly veins.”113 
While I/PRO achieved some success matching IP addresses with third party data sources, 
the company was never able to reliably divine the activities of individual users (“unique 
visitors”) without forcing people to register on given websites.114 For most, server logs presented 
only “flurries of unrelated [HTTP] queries.”115 The major innovation pioneered by DoubleClick 
and other ad networks was to appropriate the web technology of the HTTP cookie to effectively 
tie together otherwise overwhelming and incongruent streams of server log data. A simple and 
flexible mechanism for bringing “state” to the web, cookies were deployed by ad networks and 
publishers to persistently track user behavior in order to build individual profiles for targeted 
advertising. 
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HTTP Cookies and Ad Networks 
The original specification for “persistent client state HTTP cookies” was created at Netscape by 
Lou Montulli, one of the company’s first software engineers.116 Broadly conceived, cookies were 
created as a means to solve a set of problems that statelessness posed for conducting business 
online.117 Common features of contemporary websites such as retaining user preferences and 
account information between pages or visits were difficult to implement under the stateless web 
protocols. As David Kristol explains, “Statelessness makes it easier to build web browsers and 
servers, but it makes some web applications harder to write.”118 Though Netscape’s primarily 
focus was not building web business applications at the time, Rajiv Shah and Jay Kesan have 
shown that the company’s “need to generate revenue influenced the motivations and goals of its 
developers and led to an emphasis on features supporting commerce.”119 In mid-1994, Montulli 
led the team that created cookies as part of a contract to build an online shopping cart application 
that required a persistent connection between clients and servers.  
The typical HTTP configuration did not allow for a shopping cart that could retain items 
from one web page to the next. Imagine a store where shoppers can select only one item at a time 
and must check out before purchasing something else. As the Wall Street Journal put it, websites 
of the period “made poor shopkeepers.” 120 The challenge was to enable sites to see “users as 
distinct individuals so that [they] could remember things about them.”121 Existing fixes to these 
                                                
116 Cookies were named in homage to the early days of networked computing. “When machines passed little bits of 
code back and forth for such purposes as identification, early programmers called the exchanged data ‘magic 
cookies.’” John Schwartz, “Giving Web a Memory Cost Its Users Privacy,” The New York Times, September 4, 
2001. 
117 Netscape Communications, “Persistent Client State HTTP Cookies,” archive captured October 27, 1996, 
http://web.archive.org/web/19961027104920/http://www3.netscape.com/newsref/std/cookie_spec.html 
118 Kristol, “HTTP Cookies,” 152. 
119 Rajiv C. Shah and Jay P. Kesan, “Recipes for cookies: How institutions shape communication technologies,” 
New Media & Society, 11, no. 3 (2009), 321. 
120 Weber, “The Man Who Baked The First Web Cookies.” 
121 Weber, “The Man Who Baked The First Web Cookies.” 
57 
obstacles were cumbersome, unsecure, and often unable to withstand the use of the browser’s 
“back” button.122 Moreover, many solutions were session-based, meaning that they were only 
valid for the duration of a single, uninterrupted visit.123 Montulli’s elegant breakthrough was to 
implement a method for preserving state on the client side of the transaction rather than the 
server side. In other words, instead of burdening web servers with the messy task of maintaining 
persistent connections with multiple clients, Montulli’s solution recorded and preserved state 
information on the client’s system using a small text file: the HTTP cookie.  
Upon visiting a cookie-enabled site for the first time, a client would be prompted by the 
server to create a cookie file containing a unique identifier. As the client then interacted with 
sites hosted by the server, the cookie would be updated to reflect the actions of the user. Each 
time the client made requests of the server, it would also send along all of the current information 
stored in its cookie file, enabling the server to “recognize” the client and effectively maintaining 
a persistent state of communication. Translation: “With a cookie, a web server essentially says: 
Here, hang on to this file and show it to me the next time you ask me something. It will remind 
me who you are and what we’ve already talked about.”124 
Cookies were technically implemented by introducing a new set of headers to the HTTP 
transactions between servers and clients. A “Set-Cookie” header sent by the server deposits the 
cookie text file on the client’s system. This file contains three basic components that together 
make it possible to maintain persistent communication despite the discrete nature of individual 
HTTP requests.125 The first is an identifier code that corresponds uniquely to the client upon 
which the cookie resides. Note that this code uniquely identifies a web client only. In cases 
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where web clients are shared among multiple users, a cookie does not contain information 
corresponding to the actions of a single person.126 The second component specifies information 
about the cookie’s source and delimits the range of servers that can access it in the future. The 
third is an open-ended field for storing various types of state information such as shopping cart 
items and user preferences. Cookies may also contain other variables such as expiration limits, 
which can range from days to years to indefinitely.  
The link between a cookie’s unique identifier and its originating web server is what 
makes persistence possible. When a client accesses a site for the first time, the server sets a 
cookie on the client’s system. After this initial connection, the client then sends along the 
uniquely identified cookie’s updated information as part of all subsequent communication with 
corresponding servers. Here is a simple cookie/shopping cart example: 
1. User visits a cookie-enabled site (shopping.com) for the first time. 
2. Responding to the client request, the shopping.com server also sets a cookie, which 
includes the identifier “ID-123” and specifies that the cookie may be accessed by all sites 
and pages that fall within the shopping.com domain. For example, a site might have a 
number of component sites under its top-level domain (shopping.com) such as 
sports.shopping.com and kids.shopping.com. 
Example cookie set by shopping.com: 
[HTTP header] [unique identifier] [domain specification] 
Set-Cookie Name=ID-123 Domain=shopping.com 
 
3. User clicks to add “item1” to the shopping cart and the client sends its cookie identifier 
along with the request.  
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4. Responding, the server instructs the client to append cookie “ID-123” with state 
information that designates that “item1” has been placed in the cart. Usually this 
information takes the form of a short character string that occupies a single line in the 
cookie file, coded such that only the host server can decipher it.127 
 
The appended cookie now contains: 
[HTTP header] [unique identifier] [domain specification] [state information] 
Set-Cookie Name=ID-123 Domain=shopping.com State Info=item1 
 
5. Now, if the user navigates to another page on the site (shopping.com/page2), the 
cookie information is again sent as part of the URL request. Shopping.com’s server 
apprehends that cookie “ID-123” contains “item1” in its shopping cart and loads 
“shopping.com/page2” with the appropriate item populated in the cart. Note that the 
client only sends the cookie because the URL “shopping.com/page2” falls within the 
domain range specified in the original cookie. This “domain-matching” component of the 
cookie specification was intended to limit the use of cookies to the primary website that a 
user was visiting.  
 
Despite the discrete nature of the many HTTP connections occurring in this scenario, 
state information persists because the uniquely identified cookie file is amended as needed and 
sent back and forth between client and server as part of the basic process of HTTP 
communication. Moreover, state is maintained as long as a non-expired cookie exists on the 
client machine, even if the user visits other sites in the meantime. 
Support for cookies was integrated into Netscape’s Navigator 0.94, released in November 
1994 to succeed earlier versions of its Mosaic browser. Concurrently, Netscape posted a 
“preliminary specification” document on its website that described cookie implementation for 
web administrators and developers.128 Apart from this document, Netscape publicized cookies 
very little after initial release.129 Nevertheless, hundreds of websites began experimenting with 
them upon their incorporation into the popular Navigator browser.130 Microsoft too played an 
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important role in the diffusion of cookies, as it was one of the first major companies to use them 
to retain user preferences on its own website in 1995.131 More importantly, when developing the 
Internet Explorer browser to compete with Navigator, Microsoft included support for cookies as 
a “no brainer,” effectively solidifying their position as a common web development tool.132 By 
January 1997, Network World described cookies as “a de facto standard” of online commerce.133 
Cookies were deployed in a variety of capacities such as the shopping cart application in 
the above example, but also to preserve user preferences and account information and, 
increasingly, to help measure website traffic. As Montulli noted in the original specification, 
“This simple mechanism provides a powerful new tool which enables a host of new types of 
applications to be written for web-based environments.”134 Montulli envisioned Netscape’s role 
as building an “infrastructure for the web” that “would be useful for the entire community.”135 
As he later told The New York Times, the goal was to create a tool with the flexibility to be put to 
many different uses, including “things we hadn’t thought about.”136 
It is important to stress that cookie functionality was embedded into the standard method 
for serving web pages (the HTTP header mechanism). Regardless of the source, the “Set-
Cookie” header could be added to any server communication. As noted earlier, web pages are 
multi-source documents that routinely contain components originating from multiple servers. 
This created a technical “loophole” whereby “third parties” could deposit cookies through 
websites for which they were not the primary hosts, provided that they served some component 
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of the page.137 Any component would do, whether a media file, an application like a hit-counter, 
or a banner advertisement. 
DoubleClick capitalized on this opportunity, shrewdly including the “Set-Cookie” header 
with each banner ad it served, regardless of the site upon which it appeared. This created and 
maintained a state relationship between DoubleClick and the clients that visited any of the sites 
within its network. Dispersed across the web through ad networks’ centralized delivery systems, 
banner ads became conduits for distributing cookies on a scale and scope that far exceeded 
anything in practice at the time (and went well beyond the expectations of Montulli and 
Netscape).138 Most significantly, the appropriation of cookies gave ad network companies an 
entrée to develop greatly improved user tracking and profiling capabilities. It also gave large ad 
networks like DoubleClick leverage in the form of “network effects,” whereby building bigger 
networks, setting more cookies, and capturing more data increased DoubleClick’s market power 
and the value of its services for advertisers. 
Cookies could be configured to act not only as bridges, preserving connections between 
clients and servers, but also as cameras of sorts, recording details about users’ behavior as they 
browsed the web. It is difficult to discern precisely which ad network company was the first to 
use cookies in this manner.139 What is clear is that throughout 1996 DoubleClick and a group of 
competitors integrated cookies into their the heart of their ad serving systems in order to compile 
databases of user profiles and deliver targeted ad messages in real time. In addition, cookies were 
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deployed to refine back-end processes of ad management, including campaign testing and 
reporting.  
In the hands of ad network developers, cookies added an unprecedented level of 
granularity to existing targeting and profiling techniques, accelerating the scope and 
sophistication online advertising far beyond the more common use of protocol-based HTTP 
header and IP address data. The regularly updated state information stored in cookie files 
provided the secret sauce with which to build user profile databases, effectively enabling 
individual-level surveillance of web clients as a proxy for consumers.140 State information such 
as browsing behavior and ad frequency tallies were collected on the fly and merged with 
protocol-based data to build detailed profiles, which were in turn integrated into automated ad 
targeting processes. 
When a client accessed a DoubleClick network site for the first time, the DoubleClick ad 
server instructed the client to create a cookie, while sending an ad based upon the client’s HTTP 
header and IP address information. If the client already had a cookie from a previous visit to any 
DoubleClick site, it would send the cookie’s unique ID as part of its request for the DoubleClick-
hosted ad and DoubleClick’s server would match it to a central database profile. This profile 
would then factor into the automated process that determined which ad would be sent to the 
client. DoubleClick boasted that all of this happened in “milliseconds.”141 At the time it was the 
leading company developing this capacity. As Crain’s New York Business observed, “No one 
else [was] doing it in nearly as sophisticated a fashion.”142 
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While some scrutiny of browsing history was possible via server logs, cookies enabled 
much more refined tracking of users from site to site, or what became known as “clickstream” 
analysis. Cookies recorded each time a client visited any site within a given ad network. When 
used in combination with server logs, cookies allowed ad networks to compile detailed browsing 
histories that included information about the time, duration, and order of sites visited. This was 
possible because cookies persisted on clients’ machines over time. As such, cookies mitigated 
the inaccuracies that plagued other basic methods of tracking browser activity while remaining 
simpler to implement than available alternatives.143 
Tied to unique cookie IDs, clickstreams provided much greater insights into online 
consumer behavior. It was the difference between knowing whether a given click on an 
advertisement represented the activity of a non-specified web user or that of a particular client 
that was linked to one or more consumer profiles. In cases where profiles contained browsing 
histories, marketers were able to see the specific routes that brought consumers to their sites. The 
change was subtle but significant, as marketers increasingly focused on knowing as much as 
possible about their customers in order to encourage repeat business. This was the “renewal of an 
old idea,” the “80-20 rule,” which held that 20% of a merchant’s customers generate 80% of 
sales.144  
Moreover, click-streams were integrated into user profiles, adding layers of behavioral 
tracking data to protocol-based and third-party data. As Forbes explained, after receiving an 
initial DoubleClick cookie “whenever you visit any of the sites [in the network], the DoubleClick 
server picks up the [cookie] ID number and tucks away information about your visit. Gradually it 
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builds a pretty complete dossier on you – and your spending and computing habits.”145 No 
company was more aggressive towards profiling than DoubleClick, which in its first year of 
operation deposited some 40 million cookies and compiled a database containing 10 million 
unique user profiles.146 To get a sense of scale, the size of DoubleClick’s database was 60% 
larger than the entire subscriber base of America Online, at the time the nation’s largest internet 
service provider.147  
Beyond clickstream analysis, the open-ended nature of the state information storable in 
cookie files allowed for novel customizations by ad networks. For example, DoubleClick 
established the technique of using cookies to track the frequency of displayed ads. Via a service 
called “Click Boosters,” the company tallied the number of times users were exposed to 
particular ads and included this information in their profiles.148 After a set of number of 
impressions, ads that were not clicked on were swapped out for fresh ones. Marketers could set 
the limit themselves, although DoubleClick recommended a threshold of three exposures. “After 
the third time, you’re wasting your money,” said O’Connor. “It’s banner burnout.”149 
Although web publishers represented its primary client base, DoubleClick did not limit 
its services to the supply-side of the advertising market. Ad serving technologies could also be 
applied to various ad management functions such as ad buying, testing, and reporting. 
DoubleClick and others began to offer marketers and their agencies suites of self-service tools 
for buying and managing ad campaigns across their networks, allowing them to “select types of 
user and domain profiles to target, select website profiles, control sites used, and set impressions 
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desired.”150 To assist with media buying, DoubleClick offered an “Editorial Targeting” service 
that would place ads adjacent to specific types of content. Scanning websites to track “themes 
and keywords, the editorial targeting system assures that ad content matches editorial content,” 
explained Advertising Age. “Travel marketers, for instance, might want to appear on pages where 
words like ‘vacation’ or ‘leisure’ appear.”151 Likewise, an airline “could buy an ad banner on a 
page carrying a story about air travel to London, but not about crashes.”152  
Additionally, DoubleClick’s “TestIt” service allowed marketers to “test the effectiveness 
of the creative content of an advertisement before launching an ad campaign by comparing click-
through rates of alternative” versions.153 This kind of live testing was faster and less expensive 
than anything previously possible on the web, let alone traditional media. But perhaps the most 
important ad management service offering was DART’s “daily online performance reporting” 
that allowed “advertisers and web publishers to actively monitor and react to the success of 
particular ads, marketing campaigns, and website traffic patterns, respectively.”154 These reports 
were attempts to mitigate marketer discontent and confusion regarding audience and ad 
performance measurement. 
Although plenty of skepticism remained regarding ad networks and online advertising in 
general, DoubleClick’s targeting capabilities began to attract a growing stable of marketers and 
publishers. Seeking a precise online campaign, manufacturing conglomerate 3M hired 
DoubleClick to place targeted ads for a $10,000 state-of-the-art video projector.155 
Understanding the limited the consumer market for the product, DoubleClick used HTTP header 
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and IP address (domain profile) information to show the ads only to people using the Unix 
operating system (generally favored by advanced users) and to those accessing the web from 
ISPs most likely to serve potential buyers, such as advertising agencies and technology 
companies. It also used cookies to create profiles of the users that saw the ad and to track display 
frequency, never showing it to any single user more than three times. Prior to the campaign, 3M 
used forms on its website to generate leads for the projector, which reportedly generated some 10 
to 15 responses per week. According to DoubleClick promotional materials, DART’s targeted 
advertising campaign boosted that figure to 460 leads per week.156 
In late 1996 DoubleClick signed an exclusive contract with the search engine/web portal 
AltaVista, at the time one the most popular sites on the web, garnering 24 million visits a day.157 
Prior to aligning with DoubleClick, AltaVista had been the only remaining major portal site 
without advertising, but the allure of ad dollars and the need for revenues compelled 
management to enter the market. The partnership proved fruitful for both companies in short 
order. Nine months after joining DoubleClick’s network, AltaVista’s third-quarter ad revenue 
“jumped to $4.5 million, up 65% from the second quarter.”158 The arrangement was even more 
important for DoubleClick in that AltaVista came to account for some 45% of its total revenue in 
1997.159 In addition to being a financial boon to both companies, their partnership provided 
“further credibility” to the online ad network business model and helped to cement 
DoubleClick’s position as the sector’s flagship company.160 As one analyst told the Wall Street 
Journal, “your network is only as good as your prime-time lineup. If you were to compare 
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DoubleClick to a fledgling online version of say, NBC, AltaVista gives them a Seinfeld, which 
they haven’t had before.”161  
Conclusion   
By late 1997, some 800 marketers had used DoubleClick’s services.162 The company was serving 
approximately 750 million ads per month and capacity was growing.163 A raft of competitors 
emerged to offer various iterations of the network sales structure, centralized ad serving, 
dynamically targeted ad delivery, user profiling, and self-service ad management. Among the 
most important of this group were NetGravity and Accipiter, which provided “turn-key” ad 
management solutions to web publishers that wanted advanced targeting and reporting 
capabilities but did not wish to outsource ad sales or bundle their inventory in a network 
alongside competing sites.164 Dozens of smaller ad networks began to enter the market as well. 
Web rep firm Softbank Interactive Marketing formed a network to compete with DoubleClick’s 
stable of premium publishers, while start-up Clickhouse focused on packaging websites around 
tightly focused niches.165 Newspaper publishers too attempted to enter the space by establishing 
the New Century Network, a collaborative effort of over 100 affiliates to bundle inventory across 
their websites and sell national advertising on a unified portal.166 
While some leading publishers such as Microsoft and the New York Times kept ad 
services largely in-house, Forrester Research declared that “the future of web advertising 
belonged to ad networks rather than single websites.”167 Though outstanding disputes remained 
over important issues such as audience measurement standards, the services provided by ad 
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networks and related companies made it more practical for marketers to allocate portions of their 
ad budgets online. Boosted by ad networks and the beginning of the dotcom bubble, online 
advertising spending reached nearly $1 billion in 1997, closing in on spending totals for outdoor 
media ($1.4 billion).168  
The technical characteristics of the web’s communication protocols and HTTP cookies 
were immensely consequential to the rapid expansion of ad targeting and consumer profiling that 
enabled the growth of ad networks in general and DoubleClick’s market leadership in particular. 
Building on the two-way communication structure of HTTP, DoubleClick was able to create a 
centralized advertising system that threaded across the decentralized internet. The structure of 
HTTP enabled web publishers to join and participate in ad networks with minimal effort and 
maintenance. Likewise, because cookies were created as an extension of HTTP’s established 
protocols and were thus supported by web browsers by default, DoubleClick was able to 
integrate them into its ad serving processes without having to augment web server/client 
software. Further still, because cookies were built into HTTP in a manner that operated largely 
behind-the-scenes, DoubleClick was able to implement them widely with little immediate 
awareness, let alone resistance.169  
This particular implementation of cookies therefore not only combined the distinct 
practices of ad serving and consumer profiling into a unified technical process, but also 
conferred significant market power to DoubleClick through network effects and economies of 
scale. These issues are explored further in chapter three. For now, it is enough to note that the 
structure of the web technology appropriated by DoubleClick played a fundamental role in the 
creation of a business model in which every ad served was also an opportunity to gather data 
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about internet users and the efficacy of ad campaigns themselves. In theory, the more ads the 
company delivered, the more accurately targeted each became. The fluidity with which 
DoubleClick was able to integrate its operations into the basic functionality of web serving 
enabled it to grow remarkably fast and solidify market power early on in the industry’s 
development. Moreover, it set up the technical foundations for the increasingly sophisticated 
forms of consumer surveillance that followed in the next few years. 
Articulating the consequences of the technological affordances of web protocols and 
cookies does not imply technological determinism. Some of the most insightful research in this 
area tends to overstate the implications of the third-party cookie “loophole” in “creat[ing] a new 
market” for companies such as DoubleClick.170 While vitally important, the deployment of 
cookies in this manner did not “create” the ad network market. The cookie was appropriated by 
companies acting in accordance with specific economic objectives within a unique financial 
context (as addressed in subsequent chapters). The technological characteristics of online 
advertising’s implementation cannot be abstracted from these social relations. Nevertheless, by 
1997 cookies had become a standard tool for web marketing. The IAB trade group articulated its 
official support for cookies, citing a survey that found them to be “an essential part of member 
companies’ business strategies” for “measuring site users, developing user profiles… and 
advertising targeting.”171 Though still under construction, the contours of what would become a 
“surveillance infrastructure” for online advertising had begun to take shape. 
The next four years saw an expansion and refinement of the business relations and 
technologies of online advertising and consumer surveillance in particular. DoubleClick, 
NetGravity, CMGI and a handful of others emerged as market leaders – a vanguard of the 
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internet advertising sector.172 Although still not profitable, they were earning revenue and 
relentlessly promoting themselves through public relations and their own advertising campaigns. 
And while falling short of fully satisfying the demands of marketers regarding quantification of 
results, the sophistication of their ad serving systems and scope of their reach surpassed 
contemporary alternatives and continued to point to intensified use of the web as an advertising 
medium. As HotWired described it, “The days when the net seemed to exist outside the laws of 
capitalism [were] just about over.”173  
The broader construction of a surveillance infrastructure for online advertising is the 
subject of chapters three and four, which examine the maturation of the sector vis-à-vis the 
dotcom investment bubble and marketers’ fixation with increasingly measurable return-on-
investment. Chapter two sets the stage for these developments by illustrating the bubble’s role in 
creating an influx of well-capitalized dotcom companies that generated supply and demand for 
online advertising and became an important client group for ad service providers such as 
DoubleClick. 
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The Marketing/Finance Feedback Loop: Advertising Demand and the Dotcom Bubble 
Online advertising’s construction was fundamentally linked with a major financial market boom 
and bust that centered on the commercialization of the internet – the dotcom bubble. This chapter 
and the next trace the major vectors of the reflexive interplay between the dotcom bubble and the 
growth of the online advertising industry. Chapter three examines how the bubble directed 
significant amounts of capital to ad services companies such as DoubleClick that deployed it to 
construct an infrastructure for online advertising. Buoyed by speculative investment, these 
infrastructure providers transformed a critical mass of the web into a mainstream advertising 
platform that became centered on consumer surveillance.  
This chapter sets the stage for these developments by tracing a broader process whereby 
finance and marketing became deeply intertwined in the context of rapidly growing internet-
related speculative investment. Borrowing from cybernetics, the metaphor of a feedback loop 
illustrates this integration. In a simple feedback loop actions generate information and outcomes 
that in turn influence subsequent actions within the same system. In this instance, soaring 
investment markets and the growing online advertising sector entered into a pattern of mutual 
reinforcement that began in 1995 and intensified throughout the bubble’s inflation. 
Through venture capital funding and initial public offerings (IPOs), public and private 
investors provided huge sums of operating capital to a host of largely unprofitable “dotcom” 
companies that sought to commercialize the internet. Via these conduits, billions of dollars 
poured into the nascent online advertising sector, generating a surge of demand for ad services 
and helping to legitimize the internet as a marketing channel. These outlays, which would have 
previously been marked as risky, were rationalized through a New Economy ideology that 
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“bundled together mythologies of entrepreneurial risk taking with a promise of ‘prosperity for 
all’” and greatly privileged marketing practices.1 Established measures of financial assessment 
such as profitability were superseded by marketing-based metrics such as “mindshare.” At the 
same time, a Get Big Fast business model premised on rapid expansion and brand recognition 
became normalized among dotcoms looking to commercialize “cyberspace.” In this context, 
advertising and public relations became key competitive weapons in the struggle to not only win 
customers, but to attract essential investment capital as well. 
The Dotcom Bubble and Risk Investment 
The full range of the dotcom bubble’s determinants and outcomes extend well beyond online 
advertising and even the internet at large.2 Financial bubbles have been regular occurrences 
throughout the development of industrial capitalism. Critical scholars have argued that market 
bubbles are manifestations of capitalism’s structural crisis tendencies.3 The purpose here is not to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the dotcom bubble, but to elucidate its close intersection 
with the creation of online advertising. Still, it is worth noting that the magnitude of economic 
destruction left in the bubble’s wake was substantial, even in the age of the $700 billion 
government rescue of the banking system.4 The dotcom collapse is estimated to have produced 
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market losses between $7 and $8.5 trillion; costs which extended well beyond the investor class.5 
As reported by The Nation, the crash wiped out one-third of the total value of all individual 
retirement accounts and cost two million jobs.6 Given this, it makes sense that many accounts of 
the bubble emphasize its devastating consequences. Offering a different perspective, this chapter 
explores the bubble’s generative capacity as it relates to the construction of online advertising 
and the creation of demand for ad services in particular.7 This requires an understanding of the 
bubble’s protagonists, in particular the internet companies that received investment funding and 
the financial institutions that provided it. 
Standard economic theory characterizes a speculative financial bubble by the detachment 
of asset prices from estimations of their value that are grounded in observable “economic 
fundamentals” such as cash flow, earnings, and debt.8 In a bubble scenario prices are not driven 
by these indicators and are instead propelled reflexively by investment itself.9 The speculative 
investment of the dotcom bubble centered on companies who sought to commercialize the 
rapidly growing internet. As such it was closely linked to the Nasdaq stock exchange. 
Established in 1971 as the first system for trading stocks electronically, the Nasdaq became 
known more widely for its composite stock index, a listing of approximately 3,000 publicly 
traded securities. Because of its high concentration of technology companies and dotcoms during 
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1990s, the Nasdaq index became a standard shorthand for quantifying the magnitude of the 
bubble and charting its rise and fall.10 
For the purposes of this analysis, the bubble can be divided into three phases occurring 
between 1995 and 2002. (See figure 2). A run-up period from early 1995 through September 
1998 saw the bubble grow quickly but not uninterrupted.11 From October 1998 to March 2000 
the bubble entered a stage of extreme growth. This frenzy period saw a dramatic growth in the 
number of public stock offerings, the total amount of capital invested, and the value of internet 
stocks. As will be shown, each of these factors contributed significantly to online advertising’s 
development. The bubble’s decline stage began in March 2000 and ended when the Nasdaq 
bottomed out in October 2002. The market’s deflation was even quicker than its expansion.  The 
first year of decline halved the Nasdaq composite and wiped out $4 trillion in market value.12 
Leaving aside the major financial downturn of 2008-9, since 2006 the Nasdaq has traded fairly 
consistently at approximately half of its peak value in 2000. 
 
Figure 2. Nasdaq Composite Index Values (1995-2002). Run-up period in blue. Frenzy period in 
red. Decline period in orange. 
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I use the term risk capital to refer to a form of highly speculative and often short-term 
investment whereby funds are “rapidly deployed” in order to obtain above-average returns.13 
This expression, rather than the more general “finance capital” highlights its volatile nature. Risk 
capital is best conceptualized as a subset of finance capital, which more generally employs 
investment resources via instruments and markets that are detached from the actual production of 
goods and services.14 Where appropriate I differentiate between the two.  
In the context of the dotcom bubble, risk capital was primarily deployed through private 
venture capital firms and public stock markets. It is worth mentioning that institutionalized risk 
investment of this sort is not a particularly new phenomenon. Beginning in the post-war era and 
expanding throughout the 1980s, the heretofore “informal process of risk investing evolved into 
more formalized venture financing institutions.”15 The most notable of these are venture capital 
firms, many of which became closed linked with the technology sector and California’s Silicon 
Valley.16 Venture capital firms form investment vehicles (“funds”) constituted by agreements 
among the firm’s principals (“general partners”) and outside investors (“limited partners”). 
Typical limited partners are public and private pension funds, university endowments, insurance 
companies, and wealthy individuals. Under the management of the general partners, funds are 
invested in portfolio companies in a cascading series of financing rounds that are usually 
conditional upon negotiated growth benchmarks. During the bubble, Silicon Valley venture 
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capital firms (and to a smaller extent, their East Coast counterparts) provided a great deal of 
funding to companies seeking to commercialize the internet.  
Based on the other side of the country in New York’s financial district, public equity 
markets made up the second component of the bubble’s risk investment system. Initial public 
offerings (IPOs) were of singular importance, particularly those listed on the Nasdaq and to a 
lesser degree, the New York Stock Exchange. Stewarded by investment banks and stock 
brokerages, an IPO is the process whereby companies go from private to public by issuing shares 
to investors on an exchange. IPOs are typically held to raise capital against promises of future 
earnings and to give companies the legitimacy of being publicly traded, which can be leveraged 
in business transactions such as securing debt.  
These two components are linked because the IPO is a primary venture capital “exit 
strategy” whereby VCs sell part or all of their ownership stakes in order to realize profits, or 
“cash out.”17 Together venture funding and IPOs constitute the basic two-step investment system 
at the heart of dotcom bubble financing. Venture capital firms funded a hoard of dotcom start-up 
companies in order to guide them to public offerings that would generate windfall returns via 
booming financial markets. Who exactly were these dotcoms? 
For purposes of this analysis, the label dotcom signifies those companies that held an IPO 
between 1995 and 2001 for which some aspect of commercializing the internet was a major 
component of their business activity (i.e. not an afterthought). These include well-known 
companies such as Yahoo (a web publisher and portal), Amazon (an online retailer), and 
E*Trade (an online financial brokerage), as well as lesser known entities such as DoubleClick 
                                                
17 National Venture Capital Association, Venture Impact, 11. There are different time constraint regulations for 
founders and VCs, but this is not material here. The other major VC exit strategy is divestment via merger or 
acquisition (M&A). Venture-backed M&A activity was larger than IPO activity during the period, but my sense is 
that the IPO was the preferred exit strategy for dotcoms because of the internet stock bubble. See Thompson 
Reuters, National Venture Capital Association Yearbook (2011), 49-53. 
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and CMGI (online advertising services providers). Dotcoms can be understood as an elite subset 
of the estimated 50,000 new ventures that were created to commercialize the internet in various 
capacities.18 
The distinction is important to make at the outset because while dotcoms made up a 
minor fraction of the companies that sought to commercialize the internet during the bubble, they 
“represented the lion’s share of assets, market capitalization, and perhaps employment.”19 As the 
best capitalized ventures, dotcoms controlled the majority of business spending in the sector. As 
will be demonstrated, a significant portion of this spending, and in some cases a majority of 
companies’ operational budgets, was allocated to advertising. There is no standard list of dotcom 
companies. Building on separate research by Jay Ritter and John Cassidy, I have identified a 
population of 655 US-based dotcoms that collectively raised approximately $50 billion via IPOs 
during the bubble period.20 Limiting the population to the Nasdaq exchange only, but including a 
wider range of firms in the more broadly defined technology and communications sectors yields 
a larger sample of approximately 900 IPOs that generated a total of $70 billion. A definitive 
accounting of US-based dotcoms most likely sits within the lower range of these samples.  
                                                
18 Goldfarb et al. estimate that about half of this group received business financing (private or public) of some sort. 
This group does not include subsidiaries of established companies such as MSN (part of Microsoft) or NBCi (NBC), 
nor companies from the technology (e.g. IBM) or telecommunications (e.g. AT&T) sectors. Together, newly formed 
companies and online divisions of established companies make up the more broadly defined “internet sector.” See: 
Brent D. Goldfarb, Michael D. Pfarrer, and David Kirsch, “Searching for Ghosts: Business Survival, Unmeasured 
Entrepreneurial Activity and Private Equity Investment in the Dot-Com Era,” Social Science Research Network 
Working Paper No. RHS-06-027, October, 12 2005, 3, http://ssrn.com/abstract=825687. 
19 Goldfarb et al., “Searching for Ghosts,” 3. 
20 Compiled from Bloomberg, Capital IQ, and Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) financial databases and 
cross-referenced with lists from Jay R. Ritter, “A List of Internet IPOs” IPO Data, 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm and Cassidy, Dot.con. It is important to note that these totals include 
only funds raised from IPOs. Investment generated from follow-on equity offerings and common stock shelf 
registrations as well as fixed-income offerings of corporate bonds/notes are excluded, as is all private risk capital 
from venture funds. 
78 
As the bubble progressed, scores of investors netted high returns from dotcom IPOs and 
it became easier and easier for venture firms to raise capital.21 Greater numbers of investors 
looked to venture funds to provide the elevated profit margins attainable through speculation. 
Annual VC investment exploded during the period, growing from $7.3 billion in 1995 to nearly 
$100 billion in 2000, and remaining under $40 billion every year since. 22 Comparing 1990 to 
2000, the number of active VC firms more than doubled from 384 to 861, while the number of 
companies funded in those years grew from 1050 to 6420.23  
It is not surprising that a majority of the risk capital raised during the bubble period was 
invested in companies that sought to commercialize the internet.24 During the frenzy phase (late 
1998-early 2000) this trend accelerated strongly. Between 1995 and 1998 venture capitalists 
invested $22.1 billion in internet companies, representing just under half of total VC investment 
for the period.25 Internet investment in 1999 and 2000 combined increased nearly six fold to 
$127.4 billion and accounted for some 80% of total VC investment. As this capital was deployed 
the population of dotcom companies increased, as did the value of individual funding 
                                                
21 Jeffrey A. Tannenbaum, “Financing Small Business: Venture Capitalists Enjoy Swifter Follow-Up Financing,” 
Wall Street Journal, June 9, 1998, 1. Still some dissenters remained among the investment community and in the 
press, especially during 1998’s third quarter downturn. As Crain’s New York Business remarked about the fund-
raising success of one dotcom company, “What’s most astounding isn’t that Earthweb raised $20 million in private 
equity without generating a dime of profit. Rather, it’s that Earthweb’s story echoes throughout New York’s Silicon 
Alley” and beyond. Certain observers, including some in the ad industry, began forecasting a major market 
correction in late 1998. But predictions such as these proved premature as the dotcom mania vaulted into overdrive. 
See: Jon Birger and Judith Messina, “Up in Smoke,” Crain’s New York Business, November 16, 1998, 1. 
22 National Venture Capital Association, Venture Impact, 5. 
23 Thompson Reuters, National Venture Capital Association Yearbook, 9; National Venture Capital Association, 
Venture Impact, 5 
24 Already in the early 1990s, leaders in media and finance were already aware of the need for mutual endeavor, 
regardless of the specific platform. Investment brokers such as Hambrecht & Quist (and later Allen & Co.) held elite 
gatherings to bring top executives together to grease the wheels for investments, public offerings, mergers, and 
acquisitions. PR Newswire, “Interactive entertainment companies to spotlight dynamic new consumer area at 
Hambrecht & Quist Conference,” March 13, 1995; Michael Liedtke, “Herb Allen’s Sun Valley media summit a-
Twitter about tech,” USA Today, July 5, 2009. 
25 Zook, Geography, 54. PricewaterhouseCoopers defines “internet-specific” as “a discrete classification assigned to 
a company whose business model is fundamentally dependent on the Internet, regardless of the company’s primary 
industry category.” PricewaterhouseCoopers, Money Tree Report (2010), 
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/nav.jsp?page=definitions 
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commitments. Start-ups that only a few years earlier “would have been happy to receive a few 
million in venture funding routinely [received] up to ten times that amount.”26 Dotcom IPO 
funding soared as well. Between 1999 and 2000 nearly 500 dotcoms raised more than $40 billion 
via IPOs compared to just $8.5 billion raised by the 187 dotcoms that went public in the previous 
three years.27 And these data reflect only those companies that held public offerings. Many more 
businesses attracted various forms of financing outside of public markets, and many dotcoms 
continued to raise money beyond the IPO by issuing follow-on offerings.28 All told, an estimated 
24,000 internet-related firms generated over $256 billion from public and private investors 
during the bubble period.29 
Netscape: “The first great internet stock.”30 
The history of Netscape Communications illustrates how one of the first and most influential 
dotcom companies integrated speculative investment and marketing practices into the core of its 
business development strategy. By securing venture funding and holding an early IPO in 1995, 
Netscape pioneered a business strategy called Get Big Fast that became a standard model for 
dotcoms during the bubble. Netscape is widely known as the first entity to popularize the 
graphical web browser. Its Navigator software, based on the Mosaic browser developed at the 
National Center for Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois, spread like 
wildfire among early internet users upon its release in 1994. Millions of copies were distributed 
                                                
26 Debra Aho Williamson and Alice Z. Cuneo, “Flexing VC Influence,” Advertising Age [Interactive Supplement], 
November 11, 1999. 
27 Compiled from Bloomberg, Capital IQ, and Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) financial databases. 
28 Regardless of the bubble, most companies that received venture funding did not make it to the IPO stage. 
29 Data is for 1996-2002. Goldfarb et al., “Searching for Ghosts.” Sector-specific private venture capital data is more 
difficult to obtain than financial data on public companies. Goldfarb et al. have demonstrated the incomplete nature 
of standard financial research databases. Nevertheless, macro-level trends are observable that demonstrate the extent 
to which venture capital poured into dotcom companies during the bubble. 
30 Joe Nocera, interview in “Dot Con [Program #2010],” Frontline, PBS, January 24, 2002, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dotcon/interviews/nocera.html 
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in a matter of months.31 Navigator exploded because it was easy to use, worked on a variety of 
computing platforms, and included support for images and multimedia. But it was also free. 
Netscape’s management chose to distribute the browser to consumers under a free-trial 
license, a payment scheme based essentially on the honor system, while earning revenues by 
charging business users for ancillary web development and server products.32 Citing future 
competitor Microsoft as an inspiration, co-founder Marc Andreessen summarized the rationale: 
“Market share now equals revenue later and if you don’t have market share now, you are not 
going to have revenue later.”33 This Get Big Fast strategy, paired with the company’s “relaxed” 
approach to collecting license fees from consumers, allowed Netscape to control some 70% of 
the web browser market by mid-1995.34  
The basic assumptions of the Get Big Fast strategy are fairly straightforward. Rather than 
pursue incremental growth, the aim is to saturate a given market as quickly as possible in order 
to minimize competition.35 The “Fast” is about gaining so-called “first mover advantages,” while 
the “Big” is about securing them through rapid expansion.36 The rationale is that the first mover 
into a given market has more time to establish business competencies, a better chance to cultivate 
                                                
31 Jim Clark, Netscape Time: The Making of the Billion-Dollar Start-up that Took on Microsoft, with Owen Edwards 
(New York: Saint Martins, 1999), 4. 
32 As described in chapter one, the company was also among the first to sell advertising space on its website. 
33 Cassidy, Dot.con, 64. 
34 Steve Higgins, “Is Sell Now, Profit Later Right Internet Strategy?,” Investor’s Business Daily, October 24, 1995; 
Joshua Quittner and Lawrence Mondi, “Browser madness,” Time, August 21, 1995, 56. Although Netscape was the 
dotcom era’s first major proof-of-concept for the Get Big Fast strategy, Amazon became its poster child. Amazon’s 
founder Jeff Bezos, a former Wall Street executive and computer scientist, made it his company’s mantra, even 
printing the slogan on tee shirts. Cassidy, Dot.con, 144. 
35 David A. Kirsch and Brent Goldfarb, “Small Ideas, Big Ideas, Good Ideas: Get Big Fast and Dot-Com Venture 
Creation,” in The Internet and American Business, ed. William Aspray and Paul E. Ceruzzi (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2008). 
36 First mover advantage is a contested concept among business scholars. See Colin Barrow, “Internet firms: what 
strategic changes have to be managed?,” Strategic Change, 10, no. 2, (2001), 77-85.; Marvin B. Lieberman and 
David B. Montgomery, “First-mover advantages,” Strategic Management Journal, 9, (2007), 41–58; Peter N. 
Golder and Gerard J. Tellis, “Pioneer Advantage: Marketing Logic or Marketing Legend?,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 30, no. 2, (1993), 158-170; Marvin B. Lieberman and David B. Montgomery, “First-mover 
(dis)advantages: retrospective and link with the resource-based view,” Strategic Management Journal, 19 no. 12, 
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premier brand recognition, and thus greater opportunities for customer acquisition and retention. 
Dominant market share (bigness) is central to realizing these benefits and creating barriers to 
entry for competitors. Thus, companies pursuing Get Big Fast prioritize the aggressive expansion 
of their operations and customer bases.  
The key is that growth of this nature requires substantial capital. Speculative investment 
was just beginning to increase in 1995 and was about to become widely available for internet 
companies of all stripes. Netscape took advantage of opportunities to secure funding first from 
venture capital firms, then from established media companies, and finally via the public stock 
market through an IPO and subsequent financing rounds. Initial seed capital was put up by 
Silicon Valley businessman and Netscape co-founder Jim Clark, who then used his connections 
to secure a relatively modest $5 million investment from top tier venture capital firm Kleiner 
Perkins Caufield & Byers.37 Netscape initially used this money to develop improved iterations of 
its Navigator browser, pushing them to market as quickly as possible. 
Within a year, increasing media attention to the rapid growth of the internet and 
concomitant awareness of Navigator’s position as the dominant web browser gave Netscape the 
leverage to raise an additional $20 million by issuing equity to a select group of media and 
telecommunications companies including Hearst, Knight Ridder, Times Mirror, and TCI.38 In 
addition to supplying Netscape with capital and credibility, this “private placement” 
demonstrated that the old guard of the media industry was beginning to show interest in the 
internet. Almost immediately after securing this corporate financing, Netscape initiated the initial 
                                                
37 Michael Peltz, “High tech’s premier venture capitalist,” Institutional Investor, 30, no. 6 (1996), 89. 
38 John Motavalli, Bamboozled at the revolution: How big media lost billions in the battle for the Internet (New 
York: Viking, 2002), 83. 
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public offering process in order to capitalize on an investment market that already seemed “too 
hot not to cool down.”39 
Netscape’s dramatic IPO in August 1995 is often recognized as a signal moment in the 
dotcom bubble’s early development. The company originally intended to issue 3.5 million shares 
at $12 each, but increased the offering to 5 million at $28 on the advice of its underwriters.40 
Trading opened so frantically that the share price was bid up to $71 prior to the open and closed 
the day just over $58, up an unprecedented 108% from the offer price. Netscape earned $140 
million from the deal and saw its valuation, which six months prior had been an estimated $180 
million, instantly jump to over $2.2 billion. 
As PBS’s Frontline would later report, the Netscape IPO was a “historic and prophetic 
moment on Wall Street.”41 It was historic because of the size and frenzied nature of the deal. It 
was prophetic because it had the dual outcome of kick starting widespread speculative internet 
investment and legitimizing the business model that “came to define an entire generation of 
internet technology companies.”42 Two months after Netscape’s IPO, an executive at the 
technology-focused investment bank Hambrecht & Quist explained to a reporter that “It actually 
behooves internet companies to postpone profits and spend as much as they can to grow 
now…The right business model for internet technology companies is Get Big Fast.”43 
For dotcom companies, Get Big Fast crystalized into a strategy of rapid business 
expansion fundamentally sustained and driven by financial capital. Internet companies worked 
feverishly to grow operations and build consumer awareness in order to obtain dominant market 
                                                
39 Clark, Netscape Time, 3. 
40 Cassidy, Dot.con, 83-5. 
41 “Dot Con [Program #2010],” Frontline, PBS, January 24, 2002, 
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share, which required substantial cash outlays. Imbricated in the growing speculative bubble, the 
two-part system of VC/IPO investment became the central means of generating the funds needed 
to pursue Get Big Fast.44 What is important here is that from the very beginning, and indeed 
starting with Netscape, advertising was a fundamental component of the dotcom Get Big Fast 
strategy. 
Flush with risk capital and pursuing Get Big Fast, dotcoms led online advertising 
spending and produced the majority of ad impressions for much of the bubble period. Their 
influence was central to the web’s growth as an ad medium, but the relationship between 
dotcoms and the development of online advertising is more complex than a simple function of 
expenditures. While this demand-creation function will be analyzed in detail, the impetus and 
outcomes of dotcom advertising spending first need to be situated within a broader entanglement 
of marketing and finance that was inseparable from the speculative asset bubble itself. 
Marketing-based asset valuation 
Standard investment theory holds that the value of a company is based on objective indicators of 
business performance and has little to do with marketing practices like advertising and public 
relations. In practice, less measureable factors like brand awareness and public image – heavily 
influenced by advertising but rarely accounted for on financial statements – are among the 
determinants of a company’s fundraising success. Robert Schiller and others have examined this 
relationship from the standpoint of behavioral finance. As Schiller argues in Irrational 
Exuberance: “The role of the news media in the stock market is not, as commonly believed, 
simply as a convenient tool for investors who are reacting directly to the economically 
                                                
44 Netscape’s use of a private placement made it somewhat unique. The more common trajectory by far moved 
directly from venture funding to an IPO. 
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significant news itself. The media actively shape public attention and categories of thought, and 
they create the environment within which the stock market events are played out.”45 
During the dotcom bubble, marketing’s importance within the IPO process grew to epic 
proportions. Specifically, advertising and public relations became core drivers of the essential 
appraisal and pricing measures that precede IPOs and of the valuation of public securities 
thereafter. Let’s return for a moment to Netscape, which was in many ways the master mold for 
the avalanche of dotcoms that followed. A crucial detail of its history is that on the day of its IPO 
the company had not recorded a single dollar of profit.46 It was altogether unproven; a fledgling 
company with just two quarters of sales history, yet its IPO was wildly successful. This set in 
motion a new investment rationality for the dotcom era. In the words of one Silicon Valley 
venture capitalist, Netscape “triggered…a sense that you didn’t have to be profitable to go 
public.”47 It came to symbolize the idea that profitability, a long-standing rule-of-thumb for 
companies seeking IPOs, had become outmoded in the New Economy.48 In 1995, almost two-
thirds of new stock issuers had profitable operations when they held initial public stock 
offerings. By the first quarter of 2000, fewer than one in five companies were profitable at the 
time of their IPO.49 
If Netscape’s IPO was a triggering event, the retreat from the profitability standard was 
formally articulated into a new valuation model by a vanguard of investment professionals 
whose pronouncements were reproduced and enlarged by an uncritical and, in some cases, 
obsequious, media system.50 In February 1996 a highly influential report from Morgan Stanley 
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analysts Mary Meeker and Chris DePuy helped to legitimize speculative dotcom investment by 
framing the internet as an under-explored investment frontier with massive potential for growth. 
In many ways Meeker and DePuy were in uncharted territory. The internet business sector was a 
new phenomenon and many of the companies involved had been recently formed. Established 
practices of valuation based on historical earnings were indeed unavailable.  
Building on the credibility of their institution, Meeker and DePuy articulated a novel 
investment approach that downplayed established economic fundamentals (particularly negative 
cash flow) in favor of different metrics that were argued to be more appropriate for the internet 
market’s huge growth potential.51 These indicators such as market share and the nebulous “mind 
share” were not directly measurable by reading company balance sheets, and in some cases, not 
measurable at all.52 Rather, these were marketing-based asset valuation models that were largely 
functions of advertising, public relations, interwoven with the general mania of dotcom 
investment.53 
Howard Kurtz demonstrates the extent to which investment analysts were given media 
platforms to espouse new marketing-based asset valuation models and the degree to which such 
practices were encouraged by media owners and professionals who often had vested interests in 
market outcomes.54 A new sub-genre of internet investment market news was engendered, 
especially on cable television. The “rhetoric of the New Economy was hot and glamorous; 
internet reporting was everywhere, from the entertainment sections to media pages and IT 
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supplements. Tech stocks began to show up on the radar of the mainstream media,” while 
“business magazines such as Red Herring, Fast Company, The Industry Standard and Business 
2.0 achieved high visibility.”55 This simmering media discourse had material consequences. As 
Nigel Thrift argues, “telling the new economy story worked, and worked to the extent that it 
began to re-describe market fundamentals.”56 In practice, marketing-based assessment models of 
the sort endorsed by new economy analysts and gurus created significant incentives for dotcom 
companies to go after mind and market share, measured perhaps most directly by web site traffic, 
in order to attract investment and increase their valuation.57 In other words, the emerging 
characteristics of the speculative financial bubble encouraged dotcoms to pursue the Get Big 
Fast/risk capital business model through marketing practices. If Get Big Fast was a “single 
prolonged bet on a future state of the world in which a select group of ‘winners’ would dominate 
the e-commerce landscape,” then marketing, already an essential component of business, was the 
key competitive weapon in the struggle.58 On this point, the Morgan Stanley analysts were clear: 
“For now it’s important for companies to nab customers and keep improving product offerings: 
mind share and market share will be crucial.”59 
To explain how this played out, it is necessary to dig deeper into the two-step VC/IPO 
investment process to illustrate precisely how dotcoms used marketing practices to attract 
investment and increase their valuation. Like Netscape, the pattern for most dotcoms was to first 
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57 Brett Wong, M.H. Franco and Xiao-Jun Zhang, “The Eyeballs Have It: Searching for the Value in Internet 
Stocks,” Social Science Research Network, January 2000, http://ssrn.com/abstract=206648; Several studies have 
demonstrated the considerable influence financial analysts wielded over investment decisions during the bubble 
period. Qiao Liu and Frank M. Song, “The Rise and Fall of Internet Stocks: Should Financial Analysts be Blamed?,” 
Social Science Research Network, March 2001, http://ssrn.com/abstract=262807; Patricia C. O’Brien, and Yao Tian, 
“Financial Analysts’ Role in the 1996-2000 Internet Bubble,” Social Science Research Network, July 2006, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=964311; Fox, “Net Stock Rules.” 
58 Kirsch and Goldfarb, “Small Ideas,” 261. 
59 Meeker and DuPuy, “The Internet Report,” 1-20. 
87 
attract seed money from venture capital firms and/or wealthy individuals (“angel investors”) and 
then hold an IPO as soon as possible depending upon market conditions.60 An essential 
component of fundraising at all stages was the promise of market dominance in order to provide 
high returns to investors.61 To this end, it became increasingly necessary to generate positive 
media publicity, or “investment buzz,” across all stages of the investment process, but especially 
when approaching an IPO. 
The run-up to an IPO has three basic components.62 Led by its investment bank 
underwriters, an issuing company must first prepare a financial prospectus, including estimated 
valuation, for potential investors and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Next, the 
company must try to drum up demand for its shares by pitching itself to institutional investors in 
what is called the “road show.” Usually a national tour to major cities, the IPO road show has 
been called “the defining spectacle of the new economy” because of its influence on the third and 
most important component, pricing the shares on offer.63 On the advice of their underwriters, 
issuing companies price their shares based in large part on an assessment of demand gleaned 
from the success of the road show. Lots of investment buzz generally equates to a higher offer 
price, which ultimately nets more capital to the issuing company, the underwriters, and any 
venture investors.  
Netscape’s co-founder Jim Clark understood the “tremendous importance” of the road 
show for “raising the level of interest and reassurance in the investment community.”64 
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Netscape’s road show was successful despite the company’s newness and unprofitability because 
it had rapid growth, dominant market share, and a knack for generating publicity. Of course, 
other factors were at play. The company came of age during a period of significant technological 
change and general economic growth that produced an investment scenario ripe for financial 
speculation. In mid-1995 it was widely reported that the number of websites was doubling every 
month.65 Since 1993 the medium had grown from accounting for one-five hundredth of one 
percent of total internet traffic to leading all categories at 21%.66 For Netscape, it certainly 
helped to be in the right place at the right time. 
Still, it is often overlooked that Netscape’s media acumen was central to its fundraising 
success, although Clark was quite clear on the matter. “Anyone starting a company that doesn’t 
try to influence the press’s impression surrenders the future to fate, a tremendous mistake,” he 
declared.67 Appearing in a bevy of major publications in rapid succession, Netscape leveraged 
the web’s explosive growth by billing itself as the gateway to the internet.68 This shrewd 
deployment of public relations was a critical factor in securing venture capital and holding a 
successful IPO.69 Positive publicity had the twin benefit of raising the company’s investment 
profile directly, while also helping to increase market share. 
Netscape’s IPO was so important in this context because it demonstrated in dramatic 
fashion that financial success could be achieved through advertising and public relations in the 
absence of profitability. This lesson was taken to heart by subsequent dotcoms and investors. 
Branding became “essential for web companies” seeking to attract investment.70 As the journalist 
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and internet entrepreneur Michael Wolff put it, “publicity is the currency of our time.”71 Soon 
after securing the first round of investment funding for his start-up, Wolff admitted wryly that his 
“primary job was now to get the company’s name in the paper.”72 
Dotcoms routinely signed contracts with established advertising agencies and public 
relations firms to launch marketing campaigns in order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of potential 
investors.73 As one internet executive declared, “You’ve got to get an [ad] agency to show VCs 
that you are making progress with your business plan; having an agency is a comfort factor for 
VCs.”74 During one eight-month period in 1999, TBDA/Chiat/Day, an agency known for its 
edgy creative work, reported meeting with no less than 174 dotcoms and signing 13 as clients 
with slated billings of $290 million.75 Retaining ad agency services also became a critical 
method for driving up the value of an impeding IPO. In a common practice, the online music 
retailer CDNow used $10 million of its venture financing to hire an agency and launch a 
“marketing blitz” six months prior to its public offering.76 UK-based online retailer Boo.com 
similarly launched an estimated $25 million campaign even before its website went live.77 By 
some interpretations, using advertising to condition the market in advance of an IPO should have 
attracted scrutiny from the SEC.78 Others argued that regulatory frameworks, at least at the level 
of enforcement, accommodated such marketing practices under the recognition that “you’ve got 
to be able to do business.”79 Still, observers noted that many dotcom ad campaigns seemed to be 
                                                
71 Michael Wolff, Burn Rate: How I Survived the Gold Rush Years on the Internet (New York: Orion, 1999) 51, 54. 
72 Wolff, Burn Rate, 51, 54. 
73 Kurtz, The Fortune Tellers. 
74 Laurie Freeman, “Net slashes time from hello to adios,” Advertising Age October 4, 1999. 
75 Bradley Johnson, “Boom or bust?,” Advertising Age [Interactive Supplement], November 1, 1999. 
76 Snyder, “Pre-IPO Branding Essential.” 
77 Williamson and Cuneo, “Flexing VC Influence.” 
78 Suein L. Hwang, “Growing Pains on the Web: In Web Firms’ Ad Blitz, an Eye on Wall Street,” Wall Street 
Journal, August 19, 1999.  
79 Hwang, “Growing Pains on the Web.” 
90 
“disproportionately skewed” to financial publications in order “generate confidence in the 
market.”80  
After the successful public offering of the online community site iVillage sparked a run 
of IPOs in the spring of 1999, one investment banker took it as “a lesson that the companies with 
the highest profile in the media earn the highest valuations…In the absence of any rational 
metric with which to value a company, investors are betting on the future...that means image and 
brand.”81 iVillage’s income disclosures demonstrate this observation. In the year of its IPO the 
company posted a loss of $93 million on revenues of $36.6 million, yet had an annualized 
advertising budget of $28.5 million, or three quarters of revenues.82  
“It was no secret to anyone, apparently, that marketing was the secret” and the fusion of 
marketing and finance extended to the IPO event itself.83 Few IPOs have historically been 
considered newsworthy for audiences outside the financial sector.84 But during the bubble, IPOs 
were constructed as marketing events in their own right, becoming essential elements of the 
dotcom “image-making apparatus.”85 Again, Netscape’s Clark was forthright remarking that he 
saw the IPO as another method “to get the world’s attention” through “more marketing 
bullshit!”86 For Netscape and most dotcoms thereafter, the IPO’s purpose was to generate two 
windfalls: financial capital and publicity.87 
And again like Netscape, many dotcoms generated significant media attention as a result 
of an explosive first day growth of their share prices. During the bubble’s frenzy period, the 
                                                
80 Hwang, “Growing Pains on the Web.” 
81 Indergaard, Silicon Alley, 81. 
82 “Mad.Av.Dotcom: Special Report,” Advertising Age [Interactive Supplement], November 1, 1999; Data compiled 
from Bloomberg, Capital IQ, and Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) financial databases. 
83 Wolff, Burn Rate, 51; Thrift, “It’s the romance, not the finance,” 425. 
84 Kurtz, The Fortune Tellers, xvii. 
85 Clark, Netscape Time, 8; Indergaard, Silicon Alley, 56. 
86 Cassidy, Dot.con, 81. 
87 Cassidy, Dot.con, 81. 
91 
quantity and magnitude of these price spikes were unprecedented in the history of the stock 
market.88 In the 1980s the average price increase on the first day of trading was six percent.89 In 
1997 and 1998, a total of 14 IPOs doubled in price on the first day of trading.90 At the peak of 
the bubble in 1999 that figure ballooned to 115, with another 87 occurring in the first three 
quarters of 2000. Some dotcoms even saw their stock prices increase by triple-digit percentages. 
In November 1998 shares of web publisher theglobe.com famously closed at $63.50 from a $9 
start for a first day jump of over 600 percent. Since the bubble’s collapse, from the fourth quarter 
of 2000 through 2011, only five companies have doubled their share price on the first day of 
trading. 
First day price spikes became grist for calculated public relations campaigns by dotcoms 
and their advertising/public relations teams.91 On its face, a large price spike implies a highly 
sought after stock and thus a valuable company. A caveat however is that excessive first day 
increases are not strictly in the best financial interest of the issuing company. The difference 
between a stock’s opening and closing price is known on Wall Street as the “pop.”92 The value of 
the pop multiplied by the number of shares issued is “money left on the table” because the 
issuing company only collects the value of the shares sold at the initial offer price.93 All of the 
trading profits (or losses) realized after the actual IPO are reaped by external parties such as 
underwriters and investors, rather than by the issuing company itself. A large pop usually 
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indicates that the demand for shares was underestimated and/or shares were priced too low at 
offer.  
Despite this, dramatic IPO price spikes were repeatedly sought after by dotcoms as 
marketing pseudo-events.94 While theGlobe.com’s record-breaking pop produced a wave of 
publicity, the company walked away with nearly $170 million left on the table. It should be a 
safe assumption that most executives would not consider this a sound long-term business 
decision. While demand for shares cannot be perfectly predicted, investment bankers had been 
able to solidify a 10-15% pop as a de facto industry standard.95 That so many dotcoms agreed to 
underprice their IPOs seemingly in exchange for publicity hints at the extent to which marketing 
became a guiding business strategy.96 Of course the requirement for a positive media profile did 
not cease after the IPO. Pursuing Get Big Fast, many companies needed to raise additional 
capital through follow-on offerings, which depended heavily upon public image.97  
Risk capital and dotcom ad spending 
As has been shown, marketing practices became important indicators of economic value during 
the bubble. Advertising and public relations in particular moved to the heart of the dotcom Get 
Big Fast business strategy as means to secure market share and attract investment. In a parallel 
process, risk capital bankrolled a wave of online advertising spending by dotcoms, catalyzing the 
web’s development as an advertising medium. Advertising thus functioned as a primary 
mechanism by which investors sought to use their resources to reconstitute the internet as a 
means to deliver returns on speculative investment. 
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This second vector of the marketing/finance feedback loop was predicated on the 
explosive growth of the pool of available risk capital during the bubble’s expansion, 
demonstrated above. While propelling the inflation of the bubble at large, the influx risk capital 
into the volatile, winner-take-all internet sector also amplified the centrality of marketing 
practices within business and investment strategy and effectively funneled billions of dollars into 
advertising, online and off. Capitalized, incentivized, and in many cases directed by investors, a 
wave of dotcom companies allocated significant resources to the nascent online advertising 
sector, driving its expansion from the bubble’s earliest stages through its peak. These 
developments helped legitimize the medium for traditional marketers who began to move online 
in earnest during the bubble’s frenzy stage. 
While online advertising represented a small fraction of overall ad spending at the start of 
the bubble, by 2001 it surpassed outdoor media and trade publications on its way to becoming 
the second largest media category in 2010.98 As shown in figure three, throughout the bubble 
period online ad spending grew phenomenally. Annual outlays increased 240% from 1996 to 
1997, 112% from 1997 to 1998, 141% from 1998 to 1999, and 75% from 1999 to 2000.99 By 
comparison, total ad spending averaged about 20% annual growth during the decade of the 2000s 
and did not surpass 35% in any given year.   
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Figure 3. Online ad spending, 1996 – 2004.  
Sources: Interactive Advertising Bureau, 2003 IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report (April 2004), 7; Interactive 
Advertising Bureau, 2004 IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report (April 2005), 7; Advertising Age DataCenter, 
“Top Advertisers By Media,” 100 Leading National Advertisers: 1997-2005 Editions, 
http://adage.com/article/datacenter-advertising-spending/100-leading-national-advertisers-index/106348/ 
 
Dotcoms led this growth as they relied extensively on advertising to drive traffic to their 
websites, increase brand recognition, and expand market share. In 1996, six of the top ten online 
advertising spenders were dotcoms (Excite, Netscape, Infoseek, Yahoo, Lycos, and CNET).100 
Infoseek spent 60% of its advertising budget online that year, while Yahoo spent nearly 100%.101 
In 1997, all but CNET again ranked among the top ten spenders. More generally, dotcoms and 
computer-related technology companies (such as Microsoft) accounted for over 50% of all online 
ad spending in 1996 and 1997 and did not dip below 40% until the first quarter of 1999.102 All of 
these top advertisers save Microsoft received venture financing and/or held IPOs in 1995 or 
1996. By another account, two thirds of online ad spending in the first half of 1996 “came from 
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marketers that [were] either web-based companies, telecommunications companies, or computer 
companies – all of which have nothing to lose and everything to gain by promoting a networked, 
computer-based medium.”103 Mirroring the larger investment bubble, online advertising 
spending entered into a period of strong and sustained quarterly growth in late 1998. Omitting 
the seasonally sluggish first quarter of 1999, quarterly growth from Q4 1998 to Q4 1999 
averaged above 36%.104 The only comparable period surpassing this level of growth was the 
earliest year of measured online ad spending in 1996 when total expenditures were much lower 
and large quarterly gains were thus easier to achieve. 
Part of this trend can be attributed to traditional marketers, who began to take the web 
more seriously than ever before during the bubble’s frenzy period. A reasonable proxy for this 
group is the Association of National Advertisers (ANA), whose membership draws heavily from 
the consumer packaged goods (e.g. Proctor & Gamble) and automobile (e.g. General Motors) 
industries and as such controls a large chunk of annual advertising spending. While a few ANA 
members experimented with online banner advertising and corporate websites as early as 1994, 
most were generally hesitant to move their ad dollars online in any systematic manner during this 
period. However 1999 proved to be a watershed year as online spending among ANA companies 
tripled from 1998 levels.105 Data gathered by Advertising Age shows that while in 1998 just 19 of 
the largest 100 national marketers allocated funds for internet marketing, by 1999 that number 
had jumped to 87.106 
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This trend is not coincidental. There was a partial but growing consensus among 
marketers that the internet was coming into its own as a media channel and that they needed to 
establish online presences. The growing public profile of dotcoms factored into this logic. There 
were also advances in online advertising technologies and services that made it more feasible and 
attractive for traditional marketers to begin to take the online medium more seriously (discussed 
in detail in subsequent chapters). Yet, even as traditional marketers moved online, dotcoms 
extended their leadership within the web advertising market throughout the bubble’s frenzy and 
into its decline. In just one example, Interpublic Group’s Goldberg Moser O’Neill ad agency 
reported that its dotcom clients planned to spend in excess of $1 billion in the fourth quarter of 
1999, roughly equivalent to the annual US ad spending of McDonald’s and Burger King 
combined.107 Total dotcom ad expenditures surged to an estimated $4 billion in 1999 from 
around $650 million in 1998.108 In the first quarter of 2000, dotcoms were on track to spend 
between $7 and $10 billion for the year.109 
One method for gauging a company’s emphasis on marketing for a given time period is 
to calculate sales-and-marketing expenses as a percentage of revenue (SME rate). A study 
commissioned by Advertising Age in 1999 found that the dotcom sector had an SME rate of 
94%, meaning that the average dotcom spent 94 cents on sales and marketing for every incoming 
dollar of revenue.110 The subset of dotcoms classified as e-commerce sites averaged an SME rate 
of 109%.111 While it is common for businesses to have high SME rates while starting out, the 
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internet sector allocated inordinate amounts of resources to sales and marketing efforts compared 
to average estimated SME rates of between 25% to 40% for offline businesses.112  
Average rates can be misleading in that they mask the range of data. SME rates for 
dotcoms varied extremely widely. For example, Amazon’s expansive affiliate marketing system 
enabled it to keep marketing costs down and SME rates near 10%.113 At the same time, other 
dotcoms spent at levels that far exceeded revenues. Postage retailer E-Stamp and home 
improvement solutions provider ImproveNet respectively spent nearly 17 and 15 times revenue 
on marketing.114 Multiples such as these were excessive, but not entirely uncommon. During the 
bubble many dotcoms routinely posted quarterly SME rates of 200% or 300%.115 
SME rates account for a variety of expenses, including the salaries of sales staffs. A more 
precise picture of dedicated advertising spending can be obtained through the advertising-to-
revenue ratio (AR rate), whereby expenses are again expressed as a percentage of revenue. 
Unfortunately, few companies regularly report stand-alone advertising expenditures in public 
securities filings, making it nearly impossible to calculate AR rates for representative samples. 
The 166 Nasdaq-listed dotcoms that reported dedicated ad spending figures in 1999 yielded an 
average advertising-to-revenue ratio of 73%.116 While the sample is imperfect, it represents a 
wide range of companies comprising about one-fourth of the total dotcom population. Yet again, 
the average AR rate of 73% is misleading due to an extremely wide data variance that ranges 
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from an astounding 2857% to less than one percent (standard deviation of 270%). Removing two 
major outliers from the group (QuePasa Corp at 2857% and iBeam Broadcasting at 1759%) 
reduces the average to 46%, but the standard deviation remains very high at 90%.117 
Grouping the sample dotcom AR rates into terciles and comparing them with the same 
year AR rates of other business sectors provides a more accurate representation of the extent to 
which dotcoms used advertising as their primary marketing strategy. The bottom third produced 
a low average AR rate of 2%.118 Many in this group were business-to-business companies, which 
traditionally have lower marketing costs. The middle tercile had an average AR rate of 13%, 
while the top tercile averaged 203%. With two outliers removed the top group’s average fell to 
125%, meaning advertising expenses were still greater than incoming revenues. Indeed, 24 of the 
sampled companies reported advertising costs that exceeded revenues for the year. 
By comparison, offline retail and publishing industries (rough equivalents to the e-
commerce and web publishing dotcoms in the sample) yielded an average AR rate of 
approximately 5%.119 Of the 200 largest advertising spending industries, all but one produced 
AR rates below 15% in 1999.120 These data make clear that the dotcom sector funded marketing 
efforts, and advertising in particular, at rates that far outpaced comparable offline business 
categories. As shown in tables one and two, selected dotcoms outspent selected leading national 
offline marketers by wide margins. 
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TABLE 1 Advertising-to-revenue ratio, selected online and offline retailers (1999). 
 






Sears, Roebuck & Co. (#8 national advertiser, all media) 4% 
Wal-Mart (#55 national advertiser, all media) >1% 
 
Sources: Annual Reports, Capital IQ financial database, and Advertising Age DataCenter, “100 Leading National 
Advertisers,” 100 Leading National Advertisers: 2000 edition, September 25, 2000, 
http://adage.com/article/datacenter-advertising-spending/100-leading-national-advertisers-2000-ed/106405/   
 
TABLE 2 Advertising-to-revenue ratio, selected online and offline publishers (1999). 
 






Walt Disney (#11 national advertiser, all media) 6% 
News Corporation (#34 national advertiser, all media) 4% 
 
Sources: Annual Reports, Capital IQ financial database, and Advertising Age DataCenter, “100 Leading National 
Advertisers,” 100 Leading National Advertisers: 2000 edition, September 25, 2000, 
http://adage.com/article/datacenter-advertising-spending/100-leading-national-advertisers-2000-ed/106405/   
 
High AR rates are partially explained by the fact that during the frenzy period some of 
the best-capitalized dotcoms expanded their marketing efforts into more costly offline media. 
The assumptions of Get Big Fast resonated with large-scale brand-building campaigns via 
established media channels. Prices rose among virtually all offline media as radio, outdoor, 
magazines, newspapers, and event marketing experienced a “mad rush” of dotcom demand for 
ad space.121 This trend was most pronounced in television, where last-minute “scatter” ad 
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inventory was being purchased by dotcoms at premiums reaching 70%.122 Dotcom spending on 
television jumped fivefold from 1998 to 1999, a trajectory that culminated when 17 of them 
purchased spots in the January 2000 Super Bowl at an average cost of $2 million.123 
E-retailers such as WebVan, Value America, Home Grocer, and publishers/portals like 
CNET and AltaVista each announced $100 million plus ad campaigns.124 CNET’s 18-month 
campaign represented nearly 80 times its total advertising expenditures for its entire previous 
seven-year existence.125 Online stockbrokers E*Trade and Ameritrade and the online divisions of 
TD Waterhouse and Charles Schwab all launched campaigns ranging from $100 to $300 
million.126 E*Trade alone increased its ad budget over 400% from 1998 to 1999.127 Even the 
advertising trade press began to question the wisdom of certain dotcoms’ “out of whack” 
advertising budgets.128 Offline media ad buys factored significantly into the largest of these 
campaigns, which certainly drove up advertising-to-revenue ratios. Yet the majority of offline 
media spending came from a select group of the best-capitalized internet companies, many of 
which were the internet divisions of traditional companies such as Microsoft, publisher Ziff 
Davis, and two the aforementioned online brokerages.129  
It might be assumed that the forays of high-profile dotcoms into television and other 
traditional media meant a decreased commitment to online advertising, yet this is not the case. 
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While the trade and business press focused on the lavish offline media spending of select 
dotcoms, the average internet company still spent over one-third of its advertising budget online 
in 1999, which represented its largest media category by far.130 By comparison Microsoft spent 
about 6.5% of its total ad budget online while traditional advertisers like General Motors and 
Procter and Gamble, who led online spending in terms of raw dollars, allocated just 0.6% and 
0.3% respectively.131 
All told, dotcoms contributed more resources to online advertising than any other group 
throughout the bubble period. Despite the growing presence of traditional advertisers, internet 
companies paid for over three-quarters of all internet advertising in early 2000, up from 50% in 
1996.132 And while they figured less prominently among the top ten online advertising spenders 
by 1999, dotcoms still represented over half of the top 200.133 Although only intermittently 
available, ad impressions data demonstrates the extent to which dotcoms dominated online 
advertising, especially during the frenzy period. In the six months between April and September 
1999, the top ten dotcom advertisers collectively purchased over 7.5 billion banner ad 
impressions, more than double the amount bought by the top ten offline advertisers over the 
same period.134 For the full year of 2000, the top ten dotcoms purchased 79 billion ad 
impressions, nearly two-and-a-half times the top ten traditional advertisers’ 33 billion.135 
Dotcoms procured ad space on leading websites such as Yahoo and The New York Times, who 
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often sold portions of their inventory directly. But it was also common for dotcom ad spending to 
flow through intermediaries like ad networks (e.g. DoubleClick) before reaching publishers.136 
Through these channels, dotcom ad spending was filtered down to lesser known web 
destinations, for example, as part of a network-wide ad buy.   
The unprecedented level of dotcom advertising spending can be directly linked to risk 
capital investment. As one journalist observed, dotcoms “shovel[ed] money into advertising as 
fast as investors shovel[ed] it into dotcoms.”137 Public and private risk investors, working within 
the presiding economic rationality of Get Big Fast, provided the financial support and managerial 
leadership that allowed unprofitable and in many cases otherwise unsustainable internet ventures 
to funnel billions of dollars into online advertising. Propped up by risk capital, dotcoms 
maintained robust advertising budgets even as “burn rates” – the amount of money spent in 
excess of income each quarter – skyrocketed.138 Venture capitalists in particular made 
advertising a top strategic priority among portfolio companies.139 In November 1999, Advertising 
Age reported that “as much as 80%” of venture funding given to internet companies was being 
spent on advertising.140 In an anecdotal example, the Silicon Valley VC firm Bessemer Venture 
Partners revealed that its portfolio companies were spending about half of their total budgets on 
advertising in 1999.141 
For venture capitalists, advertising was a means to build valuation prior to exiting 
investments via IPOs or acquisitions. Execution of this strategy was dependent on managerial 
influence. As the Wall Street Journal reported in early 2000, “when it comes to the marketing 
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craze among web-based start-ups, the most powerful advertising executives aren’t in the 
advertising business at all. They are the people of Sand Hill Road, Silicon Valley’s venture-
capitalist enclave.”142 In addition to receiving ownership stakes, venture capital firms typically 
assumed seats on the boards of funded companies and participated actively in business 
operations by “providing strategic counsel regarding development and production, making 
connections to aid sales and marketing efforts, and assisting in hiring key management.”143 The 
influential venture capitalist John Doerr readily acknowledged that his firm Kleiner Perkins 
“rarely participates in a deal unless it is the lead investor and gets a board seat.”144 At the same 
time, high net-worth advertising executives and dotcom entrepreneurs began joining venture 
capital firms in order to leverage their advertising experience to profit from the dotcom 
investment craze. Advertising Age reported in 2000 that at least ten of the magazine’s former 
“digital media masters” – an annual list of internet marketing’s rising stars – had gone on to 
work at VC firms.145  
Venture capital firms exerted enough control over dotcom marketing strategy to provoke 
the ire of some in the advertising industry trade press. “To understand why so much dot-com 
advertising is flat-out bad, look no further than the Sand Hill Road Gang, pistol-hot venture 
capitalists who giddily find themselves with the power to execute their armchair advertising 
opinions. These same people eagerly sign off on marketing budgets that – like an internet 
company’s stock-market valuation – have no relation to revenues or ROI but are pegged entirely 
to potential.”146 The piece went on to sketch the logic underpinning the prevailing VC approach 
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to marketing. “The generous view … has well-intentioned people making misguided marketing 
decisions because they don’t know a thing about branding. The more cynical take … is that 
venture capitalists don’t care a whit about building brands. Their only goal … is to build 
awareness in advance of an IPO. Then they can get their money out and move on.”147 Venture 
investors’ focus on advertising was a rational business decision when understood in relation to 
the IPO exit strategy, Get Big Fast business model, and prevailing marketing-based asset 
valuation. 
A recurring need to secure ever more investment funding and the constant pressure to 
maintain at least the appearance of forward momentum were important factors that reinforced 
publicly traded dotcoms’ emphasis on advertising. Among the dotcoms in the top tercile of 1999 
advertising-to-revenue ratios, over two-thirds held IPOs in that year. As noted, dotcoms 
frequently paired IPOs and major marketing initiatives in order to boost the impact of both.148 
And there is evidence as well that capital generated from IPOs went directly to fund advertising 
campaigns. E-Stamp publicly committed 65% of its $110 million IPO to “ads, marketing and 
brand-building” efforts.149 In the same vein, online insurance peddler HealthExtra used its IPO to 
finance a $25 million ad campaign.150  
The default response to faltering share prices or investor relations problems was often a 
renewed focus on marketing efforts: a rebranding campaign, a series of full-page print ads in 
leading newspapers, etc.151 In some cases, the inflated stock valuations of companies with little 
cash on hand became a kind of transactional currency to finance ad campaigns.152 In what by 
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early 2000 was a “commonplace” practice, Pets.com offered equity to Walt Disney in exchange 
for nearly $12 million in television time on its ABC network.153 Advertising agency GSD&M 
went so far as to form a new division focused solely on bartering marketing services for equity 
stakes in internet start-ups. According to the agency’s president, “The basic premise is we 
provide venture ideas, venture marketing, and venture creative for equity.”154 
In raw dollars, dotcom ad spending retreated abruptly as the Nasdaq made its descent. 
Offline media budgets were slashed as market valuations bottomed out, sources of capital dried 
up, and investment partners and executive boards tightened the reigns on marketing in general. 
Yet even as the bubble began to collapse in 2000, dotcoms accounted for roughly half of online 
advertising spending, while cutting their offline media budgets severely.155 
The New Economy Ideology of Investment and Business Management 
Dotcoms’ tremendous emphasis on advertising was an outgrowth of the broader integration of 
marketing and finance, which had material as well as ideological manifestations. At one level, 
dotcom ad spending was bolstered by changes in concrete practices of financial asset-valuation. 
More generally, it was the outcome of the prevailing New Economy ideology of investment and 
business management. In this regard it becomes important to consider the justifications for 
rampant online ad spending and the “frame of representation” that coordinated the actions of the 
social actors involved.156 Following James Carey and John Quirk, David Nye, Susan Douglas, 
Vincent Mosco and others, it is important to understand the ideologies/discourses/mythologies 
that underpin technological and economic system development.157 For example, Mosco points to 
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the “myth of the digital sublime” as an essential factor in the dotcom bubble’s growth. People 
continued to buy the stocks of unprofitable companies that showed no indication of becoming 
profitable in the future because they “believed, among other things, that ‘.com’ after a firm’s 
name conferred a mythical power that allowed the firm to transcend accepted marketplace 
conventions. … What made the dotcom boom a myth was not that it was false but that it was 
alive, sustained by the collective belief that cyberspace was opening a new world by 
transcending what we once knew about time, space, and economics.”158 Advertising was 
certainly one of the principle forces that animated the myth of the digital sublime and thus the 
bubble’s inflation. 
For publicly traded but unprofitable dotcoms, advertising seemed to be one of the only 
ways to attract new investors and keep current ones appeased (at least in the short term). As 
dotcoms “plaster[ed] ads everywhere consumers might turn,” they hoped “to catch investors’ 
eyes too.”159 They were often as interested in selling stock as in selling products, precisely 
because they required huge amounts of capital to pursue Get Big Fast. They had to focus on 
attracting customers in the traditional sense, while also attending to the demands of a different 
set of clients: investors and stockholders.160 A portfolio manager with the institutional investor 
Neptune Capital Management spelled out what these “new clients” cared about most: “In the 
internet world, you have to look for the dominant player. We’re not looking for profitability. 
Now, we’re only looking for growth.”161  
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Growth can occur across various dimensions such as increasing staff, expanding 
operations, investing in technology, and buying competitors. And while dotcoms pursued these 
methods to varying degrees, their core strategy was to expand sales and marketing efforts, 
particularly through advertising and public relations, even as they lost vast amounts of money 
quarter after quarter. While some industry observers chalked this up to “the topsy-turvy logic of 
the web,” there was clearly a strong ideological dimension at play.162 Spending your last dime on 
advertising was rational in an economic context where mindshare and market share, measured by 
“usage metrics” such as website traffic, were paramount indicators of value and gateways to 
further investment capital.163 As Fortune magazine reported, what mattered were “drivers of 
growth … not pesky little annoyances like quarterly earnings or even revenues. Which means 
that if budget-busting advertising campaigns or product giveaways are what it takes to propel 
your company into the ranks of web giants, well, that’s okay. … Profligacy pays.”164 For 
dotcoms seeking success in the New Economy, advertising was perhaps the sole mandatory 
expense.165  
This history demonstrates the material consequences of business ideology, but we cannot 
discount the opportunities for enormous returns afforded to risk investors once the bubble was 
set in motion. The self-interested risk capital sector was a central engine of dotcom advertising 
expenditures and the bubble at large. Venture capital firms and investment banks propelled and 
exploited the speculative mania as they collected substantial investment payouts and service fees. 
As one journalist noted, “Instead of using the stock market to build companies, venture 
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capitalists and entrepreneurs use[d] companies to create stocks,” a strategy that was remarkably 
profitable and implemented in large part through advertising.166 At the height of the bubble in 
1999, US venture capital firms realized a “staggering return” of 147% in contrast to the average 
return across all sectors of the economy that ranged from a low of 2% in 1990 to a high of 44% 
in 1995.167 Thus, Nigel Thrift’s contention that “it’s the romance, not the finance” requires a 
minor alteration: it’s the romance and the finance.168  
Conclusion 
The financial bubble became a self-perpetuating system in which the most important business 
competency became attracting investment capital. This was achieved to a significant degree 
through marketing practices such as advertising and public relations, whereby companies sought 
to demonstrate their potential to become dominant in a given online market, to Get Big Fast. 
Dotcoms with a strong market position and positive media profile found it much easier to attract 
investors, while securing risk capital through IPOs and other means functioned as public 
relations events in their own right. At the same time, those with investment funding spent heavily 
on advertising to further build market share and enhance brand image, which in turn aided 
fundraising. This powerful feedback loop between marketing and finance had the effect of 
rapidly increasing the scale and scope of online marketing activities during the bubble period. 
Dotcom ad spending in particular drove demand within the emerging online advertising market 
and contributed to medium’s legitimation as a channel for commercial messages. The next 
chapter considers the relationship of the financial bubble and online advertising service providers 
such as DoubleClick. 
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Finally, it is worth briefly noting the impact of this surge of advertising on the financial 
bubble at large. Taking a step back, it is reasonable to conclude that dotcoms’ relentless pursuit 
of “mindshare” helped fuel the bubble itself as widespread media coverage of internet 
investment “success stories” prompted greater speculation. The financial news media and 24-
hour cable news channels in particular played an important role in “pumping and publicizing the 
money machine.”169 Compromised business journalism perpetuated and amplified the bubble as 
coverage of technology stocks became a cultural spectacle that encouraged greater popular 
participation in investment markets.170 As Advertising Age observed, the stock market was being 
propelled by brand names “and since brand names are driven by advertising, advertising is 
driving the stock market.”171 
The new online stock brokerages such as E*Trade and Ameritrade, themselves among the 
largest dotcoms, fueled the bubble even more directly by running massive advertising campaigns 
to persuade individuals to invest in internet stocks via online trading services. As Michael 
Indergaard notes, “It was a linking up of the new media with the financial sector and old media 
in the late 1990s that led large numbers of people to believe that dotcom start-ups were carriers 
of revolutionary change – and worth $100 or more a share.”172 In June 1999, the chairman of the 
SEC, Arthur Levitt, excoriated the online brokerages for producing advertising that “more 
closely [resembled] commercials for the lottery than anything else.”173 Singling out one 
television spot that featured a working class truck driver who had purchased a tropical island 
with proceeds from his securities trading, Levitt argued that such promises of instantaneous 
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wealth were highly disingenuous. Even if the immediate effects of such campaigns on popular 
investment difficult to demonstrate, a culture saturated in such advertising “sets up a new 
background in which investing is a normal practice.”174 This is the same culture in which 
President George W. Bush attempted to rally popular support for privatizing social security 
investment, and the same in which, after massive government bailouts of corrupt investment 
banks, citizens organized to Occupy Wall Street in an altogether different manner. In this sense, 
Get Big Fast and Too Big To Fail are intimately connected in ways that merit further analysis.
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Chapter 3 
The Dotcom Bubble and Online Advertising Infrastructure 
While chapter two focused on the dotcom bubble’s generation of online advertising demand, this 
chapter demonstrates the importance of speculative investment to the development of the two 
most important companies the emerging online advertising sector, DoubleClick and its main 
competitor, CMGI. Case studies are presented that show how these companies’ deep integration 
with financial markets enabled them to pioneer a business model that propelled the medium to a 
new level of growth as an advertising channel. Carrying over the themes of “risk capital” and the 
Get Big Fast business model from chapter two, this chapter delineates how financialization 
operated in the very heart of online advertising’s construction.1   
DoubleClick and CMGI were among the first and most successful online ad companies to 
integrate diversified service offerings into a comprehensive strategy of online advertising 
infrastructure provision. As DoubleClick’s CEO Kevin O’Connor put it, the goal was to become 
“the internal operating system for advertising on the net.”2 Following this model, a core group of 
infrastructure providers improved and expanded their service offerings in an attempt to become 
essential intermediaries within the growing online advertising market. Buoyed by risk capital, 
these companies transformed a critical mass of the web into a mainstream advertising platform 
that became centered on consumer surveillance. 
Deeply entwined in public and private investment markets, DoubleClick and CMGI in 
particular leveraged their outsized financial valuations during the bubble’s upswing to bankroll 
what amounted to an advertising infrastructure arms race. Each company expanded its 
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operations, most notably through stock-based mergers and acquisitions, and dramatically scaled 
up its capabilities to deliver ads and collect consumer data. In the four years since its formation 
in 1996, DoubleClick increased ad serving capacity by more than 450 percent, serving some 621 
billion ads in 2000.3 That same year, both DoubleClick and CMGI estimated that over half of all 
internet users had encountered one of their campaigns.4 The first part of this chapter presents the 
case studies of DoubleClick and CMGI, detailing their growth via financial markets. The second 
situates these cases within the framework of infrastructure provision. Surveillance-based 
advertising practices are addressed in chapter four. 
DoubleClick: “Godfather of the ad services game.”5 
As Michael Indergaard observed in his study of New York City’s Silicon Alley district, 
DoubleClick’s “prowess for developing technology was matched by a knack at raising capital.”6 
The company was formed during the early stages of the dotcom bubble and came of age as it 
reached its most dynamic period, roughly late 1998 to early 2000.7 DoubleClick’s executives 
were skilled fundraisers and online advertising evangelists. Co-founder and CEO Kevin 
O’Connor was an outspoken entrepreneur who saw securing investment capital as essential to 
DoubleClick’s success and understood the value of public relations for fundraising.8 Kevin Ryan, 
hired in 1996 as Chief Financial Officer and later succeeding O’Connor as CEO in 2000, was a 
former investment banker and Senior VP of Business and Finance at United Media, a syndication 
service of newspaper conglomerate E.W. Scripps.9 
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Under O’Connor and Ryan’s leadership DoubleClick embraced a business strategy that 
relied upon persistent risk capital acquisition as the foundation for aggressive expansion; this 
was the dotcom Get Big Fast model of development. In June 1997 DoubleClick secured its first 
private financing in the form of a $40 million venture capital investment.10 The money was used 
in part to buy back a large chunk of ownership from its parent company, the advertising holding 
firm Bozell, Jacobs, Kenyon & Eckardt.11 It also bestowed a seal of approval from the 
investment community, adding cachet to DoubleClick’s brand and to the unproven online 
advertising market more generally. The investment was the largest private financing for a 
dotcom start-up outside of Silicon Valley to date, valuing DoubleClick at over $100 million and 
making it “far and away” the most exciting internet company in the New York area in the eyes of 
the business press.12  
DoubleClick emerged as a pioneer of New York’s burgeoning web start-up scene, 
“setting benchmarks for risk-taking” and catalyzing a wave of dotcom investment from 
traditionally more conservative east coast venture capital firms.13 Capitalizing on the stock 
market’s simmering infatuation with internet companies, DoubleClick held an IPO just eight 
months after receiving venture financing.14 The February 1998 offering provided the company 
with another $62.5 million and generated further positive publicity. In what was described as 
“one of the hottest IPOs of the year,” DoubleClick’s stock rose 57% on the first day of trading, 
valuing the company at more than $400 million.15   
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An investment metric called the price-to-sales ratio (P/S ratio) provides an indication of 
how much Wall Street values every dollar of a given company’s sales.16 It is also a standard 
measure for comparing the value of stocks. To get a sense of the excitement generated by 
DoubleClick, consider that the company’s P/S ratio was around 14 at the time of its IPO (i.e. 
every dollar of annual revenue was represented by 14 dollars of share value). This is far beyond 
the 1.8 average P/S ratio of companies listed on the S&P 500 index at the time.17 
Taking advantage of the dotcom bubble’s growing fervor over the next two years, 
DoubleClick issued three additional follow-on equity offerings (releasing additional stock to 
public markets) and completed a one-time debt offering of short-term bonds.18 These fundraising 
efforts were highly lucrative, netting DoubleClick an additional $1.1 billion in risk capital and 
placing it among the best-capitalized and highest-profile dotcom companies.19 Like many of the 
dotcoms described in chapter two, DoubleClick used public relations and trade advertising as 
fundraising tools.20 As O’Connor told Advertising Age, “clearly the stock market has an 
insatiable appetite for internet stocks, but it’s important to make sure [the investment 
community] know[s] what your company is about and what you do.”21 As such, O’Connor 
promoted DoubleClick in outlets such as the New York Times, Forbes, Fortune, and the CNBC 
cable network.22 In addition to its media prowess, DoubleClick was the technology leader in the 
ad network sector, which proved beneficial for attracting investors. “What makes them unique is 
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their ability to target an audience and deliver volume to advertisers,” remarked a DoubleClick 
auditor.23 “No one else is doing it in nearly as sophisticated a fashion.”24 
“Flush with cash and possessing a highly touted stock,” DoubleClick set out to “dominate 
the internet advertising business” by pursuing the Get Big Fast business model associated with 
New Economy dotcom companies.25 DoubleClick outlined the specifics of its plan for expansion 
in its annual reports, stating repeatedly between 1997 and 2000: “The company expects to 
significantly increase its operating expenses in order to expand its sales and marketing 
operations, to continue to expand internationally, to upgrade and enhance its DART technology, 
and to market and support its solutions.”26 As explained by O’Connor, “It’s clear what the 
market’s telling us. They want to give us a lot of money, so we take it and we invest. … Why? 
Because this is the biggest thing that’s ever hit. Market share is everything.”27 As described in 
chapter two, rapid growth was imperative in the context of the rising financial markets and 
winner-take-all business mentality. The ultimate goal of Get Big Fast was to reap monopoly 
profits by squeezing out competition.  
Risk capital propelled DoubleClick’s growth. When it separated from Poppe Tyson in 
1996, DoubleClick employed 13 people at a single location.28 Shortly after receiving venture 
financing the staff was expanded to over 100 and the company relocated to a high-rise at 
Madison Avenue and 26th Street, the heart of what became known as Silicon Alley.29 Upon its 
IPO DoubleClick began rapidly opening new business locations both domestically and 
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internationally.30 Bolstered by repeated infusions of investment capital, the company established 
offices or formed joint ventures in some 30 overseas locations throughout Europe, Asia, and 
Latin America in a period of about two years.31 At the close of 1998, DoubleClick employed 482 
people, 293 of whom worked in sales.32 By the end of 2000 DoubleClick’s workforce had grown 
to nearly 2,000 with a sales staff of 1,040 people, including 380 working internationally.33 
During this period DoubleClick also directed significant resources to its core technology systems 
for ad serving and consumer profiling, including developing redundant capacity for emergency 
systems failure scenarios and investing in server architecture upgrades.34 By late 1999 the 
company maintained about 650 ad servers across 20 data centers housed in the US and abroad. 
DoubleClick’s most important expansion strategy was the pursuit of mergers, 
acquisitions, and strategic partnerships with direct competitors and companies in related sectors 
of online advertising such as email marketing. Purchasing rivals offered a way to secure 
horizontal market power by limiting competition directly, while expanding into analogous 
business sectors provided opportunities to create vertical market power in the form of barriers to 
entry and lowered operational costs.35 A concurrent wave of mergers and alliances in the media 
and telecommunications industries was ongoing in the wake of the Telecommunications Act of 
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1996.36 A key distinction here is that virtually no money changed hands in the execution of 
DoubleClick’s transactions. Instead, stock was the primary currency.  
As more and more risk capital poured into the dotcom sector during 1998 and 1999, the 
value of individual stocks rose sharply. This was especially true for top-tier companies like 
DoubleClick, whose market capitalization – the total value of its outstanding shares – increased 
dramatically from $424 million at the end of 1997, to $1.9 billion at the end of 1998, to $10.7 
billion at the end of 1999.37 In the context of the bubble’s inflation, market capitalization readily 
translated into purchasing power. Inflated share prices made it easier to conduct stock-based 
mergers and acquisitions. In this manner, rising financial markets contributed directly to 
DoubleClick’s enlargement (and, as will be shown, that of its rivals). In October 1999 
DoubleClick acquired NetGravity, a major competitor, fully financing the transaction an 
exchange of $530 million in stock.38 The takeover increased DoubleClick’s customer base of 
web publishers by 50%, adding 350 new clients including high-profile sites such as CNN.39 It 
also made DoubleClick the ad services provider for more than half of the top 50 web publishers, 
solidifying its status as the dominant player in the market.40 
One month later, despite heavy opposition from privacy advocacy groups, DoubleClick 
finalized a merger with the marketing database company Abacus Direct in another stock deal 
worth $1.7 billion.41 It was DoubleClick’s intention to combine Abacus’ consumer purchasing 
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profiles with its own profile database in order to improve its ad targeting capabilities.42 Stock-
based transactions of this nature were self-perpetuating in the sense that they sent share prices 
upward, providing even greater purchasing power to the combined entity.43 As one dotcom CEO 
told Fortune: “valuation is a sign that investors are actually rewarding us for being aggressive.”44 
In early 2000 DoubleClick again exchanged its stock for a 30% stake in the leading 
discount ad network ValueClick.45 The move was significant because it established “a beachhead 
for DoubleClick in the emerging cost-per-click advertising model,” a market segment in which it 
had previously not maintained a significant presence.46 Other smaller DoubleClick acquisitions 
of the period included Opt-In Email and FloNetwork, providers of e-mail marketing services, 
Flashbase, an online sweepstakes servicer, and @plan, which offered research services for online 
media buyers. Through this series of stock-based transactions, the biggest fish in the online 
advertising pond rapidly grew significantly bigger.  
CMGI: “The web giant nobody knows.”47 
DoubleClick’s leading competitor during this period was the internet holding company CMGI. 
CMGI evolved out of College Marketing Group, Inc., a direct marketer of textbooks that was 
established in the 1960s. Struggling by the mid-1980s, the company was acquired by software 
developer David Wetherell in a leveraged buyout.48 Changing the name to CMG Information 
Services (and later simply CMGI), Wetherell refocused elements of the company upon internet 
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software development and led it through an IPO in 1994. Later that year and four months after 
Netscape released its Navigator browser to much fanfare, CMGI sold an early web browsing 
software product it had been building to the commercial online service provider America 
Online.49 The stock-based deal netted CMGI $75 million on an initial investment of less than $1 
million.50 As a colleague later told a reporter, “That’s when [Wetherell] knew he was on to 
something big.”51 
Wetherell split CMGI into two divisions, an operating group that managed wholly- and 
majority-owned subsidiaries, and an investment group, @Ventures that took minority interests in 
start-ups and functioned much like a traditional venture capital firm. Thus CMGI’s business 
strategy incorporated elements from both the venture capital and holding company models.52 On 
one hand, @Ventures focused on “spinning investments out to the public markets at substantially 
higher multiples than their purchase price.”53 On the other, all of CMGI’s properties followed the 
holding company strategy of creating a portfolio of interlocking companies whose operations 
were meant to enhance one another’s. Management gurus and the business press often described 
this model using labels such as “synergy,” “virtuous circle,” and the Japanese term “keiretsu.”54 
Jargon aside, CMGI’s unique business model embodied the deep assimilation of risk capital into 
the structure of the companies that sought to commercialize the emerging internet medium. 
Beginning in 1995 CMGI made a series of “strategic investments” in internet companies, 
quickly amassing a sizable portfolio across a range of specialties including e-commerce, 
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business-to-business services, publishers of content and community services, and, importantly, 
online advertising.55 Using the proceeds from the AOL deal to fund its first major investment, 
CMGI licensed exclusive rights to web search engine technology developed at Carnegie Mellon 
University to create the internet portal Lycos, of which it owned 80%.56 By the summer of 1996 
CMGI had stewarded Lycos through a successful IPO, monetized the site through the sale of 
banner advertisements, and built up a stable of some 160 advertisers, including IBM, Hilton, 
Ford, and Disney.57 CMGI also took an early stake in the personal homepage community 
GeoCities, which although unprofitable was quickly becoming one of the major online 
aggregators of online audiences.58   
It was during this period in 1996 that CMGI began a sustained push to enter the nascent 
online advertising market, of which DoubleClick was the central player. Building upon his 
experience in direct marketing, software development, and CMGI’s initial success with Lycos, 
Wetherell committed significant resources to develop a number of majority-owned subsidiaries 
and strategic investments in the area. The first of these was AdSmart, an ad network and stand-
alone delivery system to compete with market leaders DoubleClick and NetGravity.59 CMGI also 
invested in Freemark Communications, a provider ad-supported email services.60 
CMGI’s most consequential advertising investment grew out of its own Direct Interactive 
division, closely tied to CMGI’s original area of business, direct marketing services. CMGI had 
been applying technology to marketing problems since it compiled mailing lists for textbook 
publishers in the late 1960s. By the 1990s, CMGI leveraged its expertise in computerized 
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databases to provide customized electronic marketing services including database construction, 
maintenance, analysis, and consultation to companies in variety of sectors.61 Building on this 
foundation, CMGI launched Engage Technologies to focus exclusively on developing database 
technology for consumer profiling and targeted advertising on the web.  
As noted, one of CMGI’s principal investment strategies centered on forging alliances 
among its various holdings and it placed particular emphasis on creating so-called “synergies” 
among its advertising interests.62 Its first notable attempt was a venture called Planet Direct that 
offered a suite of portal-like services such as email to small market internet service providers 
(ISPs). The ISPs could make Planet Direct’s services available to their subscribers while giving 
CMGI the access and means to aggregate a sizable base of online consumers in order to deliver 
targeted ads using its AdSmart and Engage systems.63 The service went live in March 1997 with 
39 participating ISPs, a total pool of 560,000 subscribers, and advertising commitments from 
American Express, Maytag, and Lexmark.64 In a similar manner, AdSmart and Engage were also 
used to deliver ads on the Lycos portal and other CMGI web properties.65  
CMGI, like DoubleClick, utilized risk capital to fuel its growth and deployed marketing 
practices in order to attract investment. “Troll through the firm’s press clippings and you’ll see 
that CMGI’s PR department has scored innumerable hits in publications as integral as Upside 
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and The Red Herring, as well as in/on Time and CNBC,” marveled one business analyst.66 “Most 
tech and business publications cover their every move, and CEO David Wetherell seems to be on 
everybody’s list of the top tech CEOs. The Industry Standard recently named him the second 
most influential tech investor behind only Bill Gates.”67 
In March 1998 CMGI was profiled in the Wall Street Journal. The piece highlighted the 
success of the company’s internet investment portfolio, which had grown to include full or 
partial ownership of 22 businesses.68 By this time CMGI had streamlined its strategy of buying 
dotcoms, priming them for acquisition, and bringing “an aggressive schedule of public offerings 
to market.”69 The company also attracted high-profile outside investors including Microsoft, 
which took a 4.9% ownership stake as part of a deal to purchase a small CMGI-owned web 
software development company.70 Shortly thereafter Intel made a similar investment in CMGI 
for about $10 million.71 Despite the fact that CMGI and its entire portfolio save Lycos were 
“racking up losses,” CMGI’s stock was up 58% on the year, during which the company 
continued to invest in online advertising, expanding the capacities of Engage and AdSmart and 
announcing plans to acquire yet another ad serving technology company, Accipiter.72 
Like many dotcoms, CMGI’s fortunes rose and fell along the trajectory of the larger 
internet stock bubble. As the market reached a fever pitch in 1999, the value of CMGI’s portfolio 
soared. Wetherell continued to promote his companies “with the passion of a true zealot,” even 
purchasing the naming rights to the newly constructed New England Patriots football stadium.73 
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CMGI was featured on the covers of BusinessWeek and Fortune, the latter of which dubbed it the 
“Berkshire Hathaway of internet investing.”74 Two investments in particular stood above the rest. 
CMGI’s initial $4 million stake in Lycos was now worth $900 million, while GeoCities was in 
the process of being acquired by Yahoo, one of the premier dotcoms of the era.75 That buyout 
turned CMGI’s $6 million investment into $1.2 billion of Yahoo’s shares.76  
By October, the total value of CMGI’s investments had swelled to $3 billion, up from 
just $160 million one year earlier.77 These gains were reflected in the value of CMGI’s own 
stock and that of its publicly traded subsidiaries. Drawn to Wetherell’s track record, investors 
drove up CMGI’s shares 700% on the year, shattering the gains of even Amazon (342%) and 
Yahoo (166%).78 The “toast of both the Street and the Valley,” CMGI’s market capitalization 
approximated $10 billion, nearly matching its rival DoubleClick.79 And like DoubleClick, CMGI 
threw the full weight of its financial valuation behind a push to become a “powerhouse in the 
rapidly emerging market for targeted advertising.”80 The company’s primary tactic: leveraging 
its highly valued stock to make strategic acquisitions. In 1999 alone CMGI announced or 
finalized seven acquisitions of online advertising companies, all of which were financed through 
stock trades valued at nearly $2 billion.81 The deals included a $700 million stock trade for the 
FlyCast media buying platform, $500 million in stock for the AdForce ad network, $518 million 
in stock for Yesmail, an email marketer, and $193 million in stock for AdKnowledge, a provider 
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of ad targeting systems.82 As the CEO of AdForce told BusinessWeek upon its acquisition: 
“CMGI wants to become one of the cornerstone players of internet advertising, and they are 
investing in the backbone pieces to do that.”83 
In the midst of these advertising-focused investments and acquisitions, CMGI put up an 
unprecedented $2.3 billion in stock to take an 83% controlling stake in the web portal 
AltaVista.84 The purchase was widely seen as a direct assault on DoubleClick, which counted 
AltaVista as its most important client. Wetherell’s intention was to end AltaVista’s relationship 
with DoubleClick and provide the portal with ad targeting and profiling services from CMGI’s 
own subsidiaries.85 All told, CMGI’s growth over the bubble’s frenzy period was meteoric. In 
March 1998 CMGI’s investment portfolio consisted of 22 companies.86 By late 2000 it had 
grown to 70.87 Likewise, the number of employees across all divisions grew from 505 at the end 
of its fiscal year 1996, to 1,024 in fiscal year 1998, to 6,000 in fiscal year 2000.88 
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The Consequence of Risk Capital 
The centrally important caveat underpinning the growth of DoubleClick and CMGI is that both 
companies were consistently unprofitable throughout this period. And not only were they losing 
money, but increasingly so. Here the parallels between the present case studies and the larger 
dotcom sector discussed in the previous chapter start to crystalize. Like the dotcom companies 
that utilized risk capital to spend lavishly on advertising, DoubleClick and CMGI fundamentally 
relied upon the bubble’s inflation to power their own expansions. 
While DoubleClick posted steady revenue growth throughout the bubble period, its losses 
grew at a much faster rate. Revenue increases stemmed from the absorption of clients from 
acquired companies and greatly expanded sales efforts, but these income sources were not 
enough to make the company profitable. Warnings regarding its “history of losses and 
anticipated continued losses” appeared consistently among the mandatory disclosures of risk 
factors contained in annual SEC filings.89 Digging deeper, financial documents reveal that losses 
in 1999 more than doubled those from the prior year, while revenue grew at a significantly 
slower rate.90 Indeed throughout the period DoubleClick’s losses as a percentage of revenue 
climbed significantly, growing from 11% in 1997 to over 30% in 2000. CMGI too remained 
unprofitable during the period and by 2000 maintained a “burn rate” – industry jargon for 
negative cash flow – of around $50 million a month.91 More revealing still, the company’s two 
largest operations, AltaVista and Engage, were its loss leaders.92 
Like many dotcoms, CMGI and DoubleClick maintained balance sheets that contrasted 
sharply with their stock market performances and attendant market capitalizations. By 1999 
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certain skeptical industry observers began to point out such discrepancies, although the fact 
remained for most investors that “no experience could get in the way of their enthusiasm.”93 
“Even with the tremendous prospects for business on the internet,” wrote BusinessWeek, “it’s 
still hard at first glance to grasp what’s driving CMGI’s heavenly valuation” considering that its 
$10 billion market capitalization rested “on a minuscule base of $176 million in revenues and an 
operating loss of $127 million.”94 How was this possible? 
At this point the answer should be no mystery. Risk capital functioned as an essential 
prop, a life-support system for an “industry without income.”95 Rising investment markets were 
sustained by the overriding speculative New Economy ideology that placed marketing practices 
at the center of asset valuation. This was a common thread that bound the dotcom web publishers 
and retailers that drove demand for online advertising and the companies like DoubleClick and 
CMGI that provided services within this market.  
The fact that so many dotcoms perished in the bubble’s collapse provides a measure of 
evidence regarding their overall reliance on investment capital. More concretely, CMGI directly 
applied funds from the sales of its appreciated investments in Lycos and GeoCities to finance its 
money-losing advertising operations such as Engage.96 Likewise, DoubleClick used proceeds 
from its venture capital investments and public offerings for “general corporate purposes,” 
including supplying “working capital” to maintain business operations.97 Amazon’s founder Jeff 
Bezos clarified the extent of the relationship, remarking that if “ecommerce had been subject to 
the regular discipline of the market, early set backs would have been fatal. But consumers were 
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not driving online commerce, Wall Street was.”98 While Bezos was talking specifically about 
online retailing, his observations hold true for the nascent web advertising market, and indeed the 
dotcom sector at large that, not incidentally, produced the greatest portion of demand for online 
advertising.99 Risk capital kept the lights on. 
Of course, more than simply shoring up otherwise bloody balance sheets, risk capital was 
the enabling factor that allowed DoubleClick and CMGI to aggressively expand despite the 
burden of sustained losses. While DoubleClick raised funds by repeatedly offering pieces of 
itself at the trough of the public stock market, CMGI primarily took the approach of engaging 
directly in speculative investment. Regardless of these tactical differences, the goal was the 
same: Get Big Fast. As the influential venture capitalist John Doerr noted, a major upshot of 
going public is that it provides an immediate boost to liquidity in order to pursue acquisitions.100 
Similarly, Candice Carpenter, CEO of web publisher iVillage, admitted that because investors 
“will accept losses at this juncture, we are able to rapidly acquire other companies and really 
build market share. This is a land grab.”101 
Again, DoubleClick’s SEC filings provide evidence of the direct connection between 
speculative investment funding and growth. As reported in 1999, DoubleClick applied the $62.5 
million raised via its initial public offering “toward the expansion of international operations and 
sales and marketing capabilities” in addition to financing general operating costs.102 It is 
reasonable to conclude that subsequent risk capital infusions beyond the IPO were applied to 
similar purposes. How else could the company “significantly increase its operating expenses” 
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year after year while continually losing money?103 Recall also that DoubleClick raised roughly 
ten times more capital via follow-on offerings than it did in its IPO. Likewise, CMGI’s core 
business model was “built on the stock market’s enormous expectations for the internet.”104 As 
BusinessWeek put it: “As long as investors keep paying high prices for shares in his companies, 
[CEO] Wetherell will have the currency he needs to keep doing deals.”105 During the bubble’s 
rise, CMGI held such currency in spades. Between 1999 and 2001, CMGI spent “a staggering 
$13 billion on acquisitions, nearly all paid for with its own stock,” on an array of internet 
business including the advertising concerns discussed above.106 What it did not do was turn a 
profit of any kind. 
Reciting a mantra of New Economy ideology, Wetherell shrugged off concerns regarding 
profitability, maintaining that “it would be sinful to be making money on the internet right now, 
when it’s growing this fast.”107 Interpreting this disregard for profits requires a nuanced 
consideration of the context. It was late 1999, the height of the bubble’s frenzy period, and even 
with a $50 million monthly burn rate CMGI could afford to fund its businesses for another three 
years by digging into its war chest of roughly $2 billion in cash and marketable securities.108 
Pending market conditions, the safety net of risk capital was wide indeed.109 
  A critique of the argument presented thus far might contend that it is normal for 
companies to lose money to some degree when they are starting out. While this is true, in the 
past this unprofitable phase has normally occurred in advance of an IPO and subsequent stock 
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market investment. Likewise, using investment capital to fund operations and expansion is a 
common business practice and in this respect the activities of DoubleClick and CMGI were not 
particularly noteworthy. Again, this is true to an extent, but what is important here is not the 
mere presence of risk capital. Rather, it is the massive scale at which it was integrated into the 
dotcom sector (see chapter two for data), the conditions of its accumulation and deployment (i.e. 
funding the growth a money-losing industry whose success was by no means preordained), and 
its central importance in the broader construction of an infrastructural mode of online advertising 
service provision, to which our attention now turns. 
An Infrastructure for Advertising 
DoubleClick and CMGI’s expansion and investment binge cemented their joint status as the 
undisputed leaders of the growing online advertising services market. It also made them central 
protagonists in the grand New Economy experiment that hinged upon the Get Big Fast model of 
business development. As described in chapter two, the premise of Get Big Fast was to pursue 
rapid growth in order to secure dominant market share and build up barriers to entry while 
internet technology was still evolving. A useful way to understand the implications of this 
growth is to employ the concept of infrastructure, which in a general sense refers to the enabling 
or foundational components of some higher order system. There are two primary reasons why 
infrastructure is an appropriate lens. An emerging body of scholarship in “infrastructure studies” 
offers a set of analytics for thinking through the linkages between online advertising and the 
“context-specific” enabling technologies, business practices, and market relationships that have 
facilitated and shaped its development.110 For example, the invisible nature of infrastructure is 
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framed as an important site of scholarly examination. Infrastructure studies directs attention 
beyond what is most immediate (e.g. pervasive web banner ads) to ask the question: “what does 
this activity depend on?”111  
Secondly, as the bubble progressed the concept of infrastructure provision became a new 
touchstone around which DoubleClick and others explicitly reorganized their business models 
and publicity efforts.112 This model built upon earlier ad network business practices and 
technologies such as centralized ad serving systems, but expanded beyond primarily serving web 
publishers to reach into all facets of the internet ad market. As DoubleClick’s CFO Kevin Ryan 
put it: “We’re an advertising infrastructure player. We sell internet advertising, deliver internet 
advertising, and provide direct marketing services for internet companies. We work with 
publishers and advertisers and try to make advertising work on the internet.”113 In this more 
concrete sense, the question raised by infrastructure studies is again useful: “what does this 
activity depend on?” 
In addition to risk capital, the enabling and interrelated components of the infrastructure 
model were massive capacity for ad delivery and consumer profiling, diversification of services, 
and what DoubleClick CEO Kevin O’Connor called the process of “re-intermediation.”114 
O’Connor coined the phrase to reappropriate the New Economy rhetoric of disintermediation, 
which promised to create “friction free” markets by connecting buyers and sellers directly.115 By 
contrast, re-intermediation described DoubleClick’s attempt to leverage its market position and 
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technology expertise in order to act as a “highly efficient” and effectively ubiquitous middleman 
in the online ad market.116 At one level this was a rhetorical defense of DoubleClick’s business 
model, but it also raised the stakes for ad service providers by articulating their function as 
essential intermediaries for the broadest possible range of ad-related transactions. Re-
intermediation was about market building, exploiting the spoils of Get Big Fast. The goal was 
not only to “deliver every ad in the world to every consumer,” but to broker all forms of 
marketing data exchange at every possible point of access.117 O’Connor’s articulation of the 
strategy was characteristically grandiose; true monopoly control was never achievable for 
DoubleClick or any other company. Nevertheless, infrastructure provision dovetailed with Get 
Big Fast to become a consequential guiding principle of online advertising development. 
The infrastructure model was premised on applying technology-based efficiencies to all 
aspects of online advertising management and it encompassed services offered to ad agencies 
and marketers in addition to web publishers. These included consumer profiling and ad targeting 
as well as campaign planning, measurement, and analysis. For example, software-based tools for 
ad management quickly became far more efficient than manual ad placement. As early as 1996 
Yahoo reported using NetGravity’s system to go from a three-person staff managing five ad 
campaigns on 20 webpages to a team of two managing 70 campaigns on 16,000 pages.118 As ad 
serving and management technology improved, the time delay for executing ad placements and 
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making campaign adjustments was effectively reduced to zero. Likewise, continued efforts were 
directed towards making it easier for publishers and ad agencies to integrate centralized ad 
services into their own local web servers and internal account management systems. 
A persistent concern among marketers was that the online advertising market lacked 
standard processes and evaluative metrics. Services were disjointed and difficult to reconcile 
when procured from different providers. With a rapidly increasing range of options, “the 
challenge facing media planners” shifted from “finding sites on which to advertise to knowing 
which tools to use for help.”119 DoubleClick, CMGI, and others sought to meet these challenges 
in order to establish the legitimacy of the online ad medium and secure their places at the center 
of its market structure. This was a move to greatly expand upon their foundations as mere ad 
networks in order to become essential intermediaries for all online ad services – infrastructure 
providers. The infrastructure studies perspective would understand these developments as efforts 
towards standardization, a central facet of infrastructure and a key source of market power for 
the “strategic intermediaries” that preside over them.120 One of DoubleClick’s often-stated 
business objectives was to develop a standard toolkit for online advertising. Rather than simply 
serving targeted ads, DoubleClick positioned itself as “building the infrastructure that makes 
marketing work in the digital world.”121 
The finance-fueled mergers and acquisitions outlined above enabled DoubleClick and 
CMGI to grow their market share and broaden their service offerings in pursuit of these goals. 
Starting in late 1997, DoubleClick began to move beyond ad network sales representation, 
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adapting its service model and expanding the offerings of its DART system.122 The company had 
recently lost important early clients such as Netscape, Playboy, and Excite to rivals who licensed 
ad serving technology directly to publishers who wanted more control over their ad sales and 
operations. At the same time, DoubleClick saw more and more publishers inquire about “using 
its technology without its outside sales representation,” prompting management to “begin 
rethinking its core business.”123 O’Connor was compelled to license DART as a stand-alone ad 
management tool to unaffiliated publishers while also relaxing the contractual terms for joining 
the DoubleClick network.124 As O’Connor later stated, the decision to “split the technology out 
and sell it to our main competitors [e.g. publishers outside the DoubleClick network], almost 
ripped the company apart. It was like selling nuclear weapons to China.”125 
Once this process began, DoubleClick broadened its network to include new content 
areas and introduced greater flexibility into its services, offering generous revenue sharing terms 
with web publishers and experimenting with alternative pricing formats other than the traditional 
CPM.126 Buffered by investment capital, DoubleClick could afford to pilot such programs at a 
loss. As one industry analyst put it: “DoubleClick wants to be in all those different spots, so it 
needed more flexibility. They wanted to be able to sell ad space from both the higher-end, site-
specific approach as well as from the run-of-network, broad-reach approach.”127 Unsatisfied with 
serving mainly supply side markets (i.e. web publishers), DoubleClick developed a suite of 
services for advertising agencies and marketers called Closed Loop Marketing Solutions.128 It 
                                                
122 Kim Cleland, “New deals give rise to NetGravity,” Advertising Age, June 17, 1996, 37. 
123 Jane Hodges, “DoubleClick Takes Standalone Route for Targeting Tools,” Advertising Age, December 16, 1996  
124 Hodges, “DoubleClick Takes.”  
125 O’Connor also likened the split to “throwing a turd in the punch bowl.” Kevin O’Connor, “I am Kevin 
O’Connor, the co-founder and former CEO of DoubleClick, and now CEO of FindTheBest-AMA,” Reddit, October 
9 2012, http://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/117mtc/i_am_kevin_oconnor_the_cofounder_and_former_ceo/ 
126 E.g. “DoubleClick Direct” experimented with cost-per-click pricing. O’Connor. The Map of Innovation, 192.  
127 Jennifer Gilbert, “DoubleClick Boosts Reach and Courts Media Buyers,” Advertising Age, January 25, 1999.  
128 DoubleClick, 1998 Annual Report, 6. 
134 
also created new internal divisions to focus on email marketing, promotions, sweepstakes, and 
sponsorships.  
Likewise, CMGI placed the development of integrated and increasingly sophisticated 
online advertising services at the center of its “virtuous circle” investment strategy, which began 
to mirror DoubleClick’s model of ad infrastructure provision. The company rolled many of its 
advertising concerns, including its AdSmart network, into its Engage Technologies subsidiary in 
order to expand the latter’s service and technology offerings.129 Rivaling DoubleClick in 
technological sophistication if not size, Engage provided ad services for CMGI-affiliated sites 
and, increasingly, outside clients.130 
Through mergers and acquisitions and the strategy of infrastructure provision, 
DoubleClick and CMGI dramatically increased their web publisher and marketer client bases 
during the bubble period. As described in chapter one, DoubleClick launched its ad network in 
1996 with approximately 30 participating web publishers.131 At the end of 1998 DoubleClick 
delivered ads for or licensed its DART serving technology to over 570 publishers and by 2000 
that figure was 1,600, including the Wall Street Journal, NBC, CBS, and eBay.132 As to be 
expected, the number of marketers using DoubleClick’s services increased as well, growing from 
900 in the fourth quarter of 1997, to 2,300 in the fourth quarter of 1998, to 4,300 in the fourth 
quarter of 1999.133 Marketers employing DoubleClick’s services ranged from dotcom start-ups to 
major companies such as AT&T, Charles Schwab, IBM, Intel, and Microsoft.134  
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The total number of ad impressions served by DoubleClick grew exponentially as well.135 
In its first thirteen months the company delivered a billion and a half ads to more than 26 million 
unique users.136 This was during the bubble’s early stages and before DoubleClick received any 
risk financing. In 1998, the year of DoubleClick’s IPO, the company served a total of 34 billion 
ads and reached 46 million web users worldwide in December alone.137 While this initial upward 
trajectory is strong, it pales in comparison to the growth that occurred during the final two years 
of the bubble period, when DoubleClick’s risk capital-fueled expansion enabled it to deliver a 
remarkable 621 billion advertisements in 2000.138 In other words, it served about 200,000 more 
ads on the average day in 2000 than it delivered in its entire first year of existence, some four 
years earlier. Although not operating at the same massive scale, CMGI expanded its ad serving 
capacity as well. A significant portion of its growth came from within as CMGI invested heavily 
in various online publishers and retailers throughout 1998 and 1999, bringing new companies 
into the fold. By mid-1999 its AdSmart network comprised 300 websites and delivered over 2 
billion monthly impressions.139 A year later CMGI’s ad properties combined served some 8.6 
billion ads a month.140 Building out this scale of delivery capacity was an essential component of 
these companies’ transition from ad networks to infrastructure providers. 
Impressions were important most obviously because they generated revenue directly; 
however, scale also factored into the ability to deliver ads to ever more precisely targeted 
audience segments. Without sufficient reach it was difficult to target highly specific types of 
consumers. As DoubleClick’s O’Connor put it: “The great paradox with targeting ads is that the 
                                                
135 As the largest ad infrastructure provider, DoubleClick regularly reported its impressions volume in its annual 
reports, while smaller competitors did not. 
136 DoubleClick, “Dynamically Targeted Advertising,” [advertisement], Adweek, March 6, 1997. 
137 DoubleClick, 1998 Annual Report, 1-2. 
138 DoubleClick, 2000 Annual Report, 4. The number of unique users is unknown, as are totals for 1999. 
139 CMGI, 1999 Annual Report, 3. 
140 Federal Trade Commission, Online Profiling: A Report to Congress (June 2000), 2. 
136 
more you are micro-targeting, the more reach you have to have.”141 Beyond this however was 
another impetus for expanding ad serving capacity: consumer profiling. As outlined in chapter 
one, DoubleClick’s major technological breakthrough was to construct targeted ad serving and 
consumer profiling as reciprocal processes.142 In this regard, increasing scale is about more than 
simply delivering as many ads as possible across as many sites as possible. It is also 
fundamentally about facilitating online data collection that can be leveraged to expand and 
improve consumer profiling systems and other database-driven marketing practices. 
DoubleClick’s Kevin Ryan hinted at this as early as 1997, telling Crain’s New York Business: 
“Critical mass is important. The bigger your [profile] database, the more targeted you can be.”143 
As another DoubleClick executive put it: “This whole business is about scale.”144 But scale is not 
just about impressions. This understanding opens another dimension of the expansionary 
activities of our case study subjects and their implementation of Get Big Fast vis-à-vis the 
strategy of infrastructure provision. For DoubleClick and CMGI – the archetypal ad services 
providers – the tactic of pursuing mergers and acquisitions and developing networks of affiliated 
web companies was as much about profiling consumers as it was about delivering ads.  
The reciprocity of ad serving and consumer profiling is essential to re-intermediation and 
to the broader model of infrastructure provision. Chapter one explained the significance of web 
communication protocols and web serving technology to this functionality. At the same time, 
implementations of technology are bound together by specific arrangements of social practices 
and organizational structures; “infrastructure is a relation and not a set of things.”145 Whereas 
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chapter one examined technical features, the focus here is on the market relationships that 
enabled ad serving and consumer profiling to operate as reciprocal processes across great 
expanses of the web.  
To get a picture of how this played out, let’s revisit some of the mergers and acquisitions 
outlined above. CMGI’s controlling investment in AltaVista “vaulted [it] into the number three 
spot among advertising networks” in terms of reach, but it also provided an abundant new source 
of consumer data.146 The portal’s ten million monthly visitors not only presented increased 
opportunities to serve ads, but also fed a steady stream of profile information into the databases 
of CMGI’s Engage subsidiary. Likewise, DoubleClick’s mergers with NetGravity and Abacus 
and its investment in ValueClick not only gave access to their existing profile databases, but also 
provided significant additional profiling capacity.147 ValueClick’s network alone gave 
DoubleClick entree to over 10,000 sites from which to collect consumer information.148 As 
Adweek noted, “data” became an increasingly central factor in “dictating merger and acquisition 
strategy for the industry’s leading players.” 149 
At CMGI, extensive consumer profiling became the lynchpin of its infrastructure 
strategy. Our “vision is to have the largest reach on the web and monetize that reach better than 
anyone else,” said a CMGI executive.150 The goal was to “build interactive marketing services 
and infrastructure to generate revenue across that reach.”151 Portals like AltaVista and Lycos 
were positioned as hubs to funnel consumers amongst CMGI’s roster of internet properties such 
as the financial information site Raging Bull, retailer Furniture.com, and genealogy site 
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Ancestry.com.152 Undergirding these connections were CMGI’s advertising operations, Engage 
and AdSmart, which delivered ads for and collected consumer information from all CMGI-
affiliated sites in addition to outside clients. As one journalist observed, “If CMGI has a core 
technology that weaves through its patchwork portfolio, it’s the ability to track computer users 
through their every browser click.”153  
After the flurry of acquisitions and investments by CMGI in 1999 and 2000, Engage had 
stockpiled a profile database containing over 70 million entries, which it used to develop new ad 
targeting methods.154 This emphasis on profiling and targeting was manifested in CMGI’s 
balance sheets. In the third quarter of fiscal 2000, the proportion of CMGI revenues derived from 
online advertising reached an all-time high of 48%.155 Yet even this dramatic growth could not 
match DoubleClick, which through its much larger network and own spate of acquisitions, had 
amassed a collection of 120 million user profiles, twelve times what it had at the start of 1997.156 
Web publishers began to collect their own consumer information during this period as well, but 
in many cases had to contract technology from an outside firm in order to do so.157 And while 
infra providers had access to ad networks that monitored individuals across a multitude of sites, 
even the largest publishers were limited to their immediate affiliates. As a result, publisher’s 
home-grown databases were far inferior to those of dedicated infrastructure providers.158  
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Although DoubleClick and CMGI were market leaders by significant margins, they were 
not the only ones in the field. A number of other companies began to attract risk capital in order 
to expand their service offerings in pursuit of a comprehensive infrastructure model.159 Notable 
among these were ValueClick, AdForce, 24/7 Media, MatchLogic, and Real Media. The first two 
were incorporated into DoubleClick and CMGI to varying degrees.160 The latter three remained 
independent, achieving significant stature through their own series of mergers.161 
These challengers were spurred on by DoubleClick and CMGI’s successes in the 
financial markets, which attracted risk capital investment to the broader online advertising sector 
and to the emerging market for ad infrastructure provision in particular. As the perpetual market 
leader, DoubleClick functioned as a kind of proof of concept for investors. By securing its initial 
investment from top-tier venture capital firms Greylock Partners and Bain Capital, DoubleClick 
earned a seal of approval from the finance capital community. This legitimacy brought five 
additional VCs to the table for DoubleClick’s first round of financing and ignited a broader 
interest in online advertising among risk investors.162 More broadly, DoubleClick was a founding 
company and the literal poster child of New York’s Silicon Alley district, the formation of which 
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helped unleash east coast venture capital upon the nascent internet sector, previously financed 
almost exclusively by Silicon Valley firms.163 
Clearly, investment begat investment on the broader stock market as well and, as one of 
the New Economy’s most exalted firms, CMGI’s focus on the advertising sector greatly boosted 
the latter’s legitimacy. “The financial types and techies may hog the glory for the rise of the net, 
but thanks in part to CMGI, marketing is winning the day,” noted one journalist.164 In this 
environment, infrastructure providers raised more risk capital than other groups within the online 
advertising sector. As shown in table three, between 1998 and 2000 at least 11 infra providers 
held IPOs, raising a combined total of over $685 million. This is greater than the combined IPO 
values of the five “interactive” ad agencies ($480 million), two third-party audience 
measurement companies ($119 million), and one affiliate marketer ($67 million) that went public 
during the same period (table four).165 
Table 3 Infrastructure Provider IPOs (1998-2000) 
 
Company (Date) Capital Raised ($ millions) 
DoubleClick (Feb. 1998) 62.5 
NetGravity (June 1998) 27 
24/7 Media (Aug. 1998) 45.5 
Flycast (May 1999) 75 
AdForce (May 1999) 67.5 
@Plan (May 1999) 35 
Engage (July 1999) 90 
Yesmail (Sept. 1999) 37.4 
MediaPlex (Nov. 1999) 72 
L90 (Jan. 2000) 97.5 
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Table 4 Other Online Advertising IPOs (1998-2000) 
 
Company (Date) Capital Raised ($ millions) 
Online Advertising Agencies 
Modem Media (Feb. 1999) 41.6 
Razorfish (April 1999) 49 
Agency.com (Dec. 1999) 153.4 
Organic (Feb. 2000) 110 
Avenue A (Dec. 2000) 126 
Third-Party Audience Measurement Firms 
Media Metrix (May 1999) 51 
NetRatings (Dec. 1999) 68 
Affiliate Marketing Firms 
Be Free (Nov. 1999) 67.2 
Combined Total: 666.2 
 
The introduction of “second tier” players in conjunction with DoubleClick and CMGI’s 
continued expansion resulted in the solidification of a model for online advertising infrastructure 
provision and a concentration of power in the ad services market. This proved to be a boon for 
larger online advertising market. By one estimate, some 80% of the internet’s available 
advertising inventory went unsold in 1997.166 By 1999, the growing scale and accessibility of ad 
infrastructure services had drastically reduced the amount of vacant advertising space.  
At the market periphery, so-called “mass networks” were created in order to facilitate the 
placement of ads on sites with smaller audiences that could not attract advertisers on their own, 
could not afford sales personnel, or were otherwise unable to join major networks such as 
DoubleClick. Whereas DoubleClick’s primary network was selective, mass networks brought 
together as many sites as possible in order to maximize reach and bring “big brand advertising to 
websites too small to solicit their own.”167 The most successful of these was LinkExchange. By 
implementing a clever system that combined barter with paid ad placements, LinkExchange 
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compiled a massive network of more than 400,000 websites before being acquired by Microsoft 
in late 1998.168 
On the opposite end of the spectrum were ad networks designed to reach highly focused 
niche audiences. For example, two networks that promised to deliver such audiences, one 
representing “the largest gay and lesbian online community” and the other “Christian and 
church-related web publishers” were announced within days of each other in February 1998.169 
Not to be outdone, DoubleClick separated its growing stable of sites into multiple tiers to 
represent various demographic and interest-based markets, while preserving its “Select” network 
for premier web properties. Similarly, CMGI’s AdSmart classified every page of each the 90 
sites in its network according to a matrix of some 450 content categories in order to enable more 
precise segmenting.170 DoubleClick also created a system for swapping remnant (unsold) ad 
inventory among publishers on a one-to-one exchange basis.171 In the event that DoubleClick 
could not deliver a targeted ad – for example if no appropriate consumer profile could be located 
– it would simply serve a default banner representing itself or one of its affiliates.172 In 
O’Connor’s words, the goal of re-intermediation was to ensure there was “never an unused ad 
space.”173 Likewise, the CMGI property FlyCast developed a market niche by auctioning off 
remnant inventory at reduced prices across a network of 1,000 sites that included premier 
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publishers such as Yahoo.174 Other companies in the remnant auction market included Adauction 
and Adbot.175 As explained by Adauction’s CEO:  
The online auction works for publishers because it complements existing sales programs 
without creating channel conflict. Unlike other outlets that essentially replace the 
publisher’s direct sales of advertising, the auction is similar to the inventory yield and 
management system that airlines use to sell off empty seats to brokers, travel agents and 
other companies. Ad availability and media are as perishable as an airplane reservation. 
The auction format helps efficiently sell advertising late in the sales cycle or, to complete 
the metaphor, just before the plane takes off.176 
Again, the most readily identifiable outcome of the crystallization of the infrastructure 
model was a vast expansion of ad serving capacity, even among “second tier” companies. By 
1999 multiple firms including AdForce, ValueClick, and FlyCast had reached the milestone of 
serving over one billion ads per month, while 24/7 Media was delivering 3 billion and Real 
Media, 10 billion.177 No data on aggregate impressions are available, but some observers put the 
figure well into the hundreds of billions per month by late 1999.178 Such estimates appear to be 
credible considering that DoubleClick alone was delivering approximately 50 billion monthly 
impressions. Moreover, intermittent data reveals dramatic growth from 1999 to 2000, when the 
total number of banner ad impressions purchased by the top twenty dotcom and traditional 
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marketers increased some 416%.179 In any case, the sheer volume of advertising on the web grew 
by an order of magnitude from 1998 to 1999 and again from 1999 to 2000, at which point three 
different companies – DoubleClick, CMGI’s Engage, and 24/7 Media – wielded the capacity to 
reach over half of global internet users.180 
It bears repeating that banner ad impressions are just one measure of infrastructure 
development. The strategy was an attempt to dominate online advertising by “re-intermediating” 
every possible advertising transaction, regardless of any specific ad format or technology. 
Responding to an interviewer’s accusation that DoubleClick was simply “peddling banners,” 
O’Connor articulated the agnosticism of the infrastructure model as such: “You’re fixating on a 
single piece of real estate that happens to be shaped like a banner. Our business is, we take bytes. 
… whether they’re shaped like a banner or a pop-up or a sponsorship… It could be a video, it 
doesn’t matter. We take those bytes and we target them at consumers, and we watch how 
consumers react.”181 
DoubleClick and its rivals achieved a significant level of success not in perfecting 
internet advertising practices per se, but in facilitating the growth of the medium as an 
advertising channel and positioning themselves at the center of that market. Here especially, the 
frame of infrastructure adds an important element of understanding and sets this research apart 
from a primarily descriptive business history. Infrastructure studies highlights the technological 
and “infrastructural inertia” that can occur within complex systems whereby the “economics of 
path dependence” can ensure that established trajectories “tend to continue in particular 
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directions, making reversals or wholesale leaps to alternative approaches costly, difficult, and in 
some cases impossible.”182 In this case, the technology appropriation and business investments 
made by DoubleClick and CMGI yielded an inertia that granted them significant market power 
and put them in a position to shape the particulars of online advertising’s construction. As this 
chapter has illustrated, these investments were heavily dependent upon the dotcom financial 
bubble, which presented its own set of consequential logics such as the Get Big Fast model of 
growth and the centrality of marketing practices within modes of financial assessment. 
By directing risk capital to fund mergers and acquisitions, labor force expansions, and 
technology development, DoubleClick and CMGI increased their capacity to serve ads and 
profile consumers, broadened their service offerings, and came to “re-intermediate” a broadening 
range of advertising-related transactions. Their model of infrastructure provision became an 
archetype among the largest ad services companies, which lowered the barriers to entry for 
marketers that had previously exhibited reluctance to spend money on web advertising. Contrary 
to popular mythologies of the period regarding the internet’s capacity to engender “friction free” 
competitive markets, the online advertising sector rapidly consolidated via the ascension of a 
small of group of infrastructure firms that provided a sweeping array of services. Strategies such 
as Get Big Fast and re-intermediation were about eliminating competition as quickly as possible 
and the dominant players indeed took home the lion’s share of revenues. In mid 1999, 
Advertising Age characterized DoubleClick as “the closest thing to a de facto standard as 
anything in the market.”183 By 2000, half of the Fortune 100 companies were DoubleClick 
clients.184   
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Responding to marketer demands, DoubleClick and CMGI constructed a particular form 
of online advertising that centered on consumer surveillance. This chapter has primarily 
addressed consumer surveillance at the level of charting the capacity of companies like 
DoubleClick to profile internet users. The next chapter provides an extended analysis of the 
specific practices of consumer surveillance that were constructed during this period. For now it is 
sufficient to note that in the hands of infrastructure providers, consumer surveillance became an 
industry standard that has displayed powerful “infrastructural inertia.”185 
Conclusion: Taking “stock” of the dotcom investment bubble 
This chapter concludes by tying together themes from the first three chapters in order to 
reinterpret the dotcom bubble’s status within the history online advertising’s construction. 
Scholarship addressing internet advertising has generally underestimated or ignored entirely the 
interlocking roles of risk capital investment, dotcom companies, and ad infrastructure 
providers.186 One tendency has been to gloss over the 1990s as a prosaic era of banners and pop-
ups, a false start in the development of online advertising that was swept away in the financial 
collapse of the dotcom bubble. The real action begins in the early 2000s, essentially with 
Google’s refinement of keyword advertising and implementation of the auction-based pay-per-
click model, so the story goes. 
The counter-argument presented here is that the banner era is better conceived of as the 
surveillance infrastructure era, which has had a profound impact not only on the development of 
the internet, but also the marketing complex at large. While the dotcom crash was highly 
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destructive in financial terms, it was not some kind of extinction event for online advertising. 
The “collapse of the online advertising market” in the wake of the bust has been overstated even 
among its most incisive critics.187 Aggregate spending totals are the most readily apparent source 
of evidence for an alleged collapse. According to the Interactive Advertising Bureau, total online 
ad spending declined by approximately 12% from 2000 to 2001 and 16% from 2001 to 2002, 
before resuming growth in 2003.188 Advertising Age data shows an increase of 8% followed by a 
decrease of 14% for respective periods.189 For perspective, aggregate ad spending across all 
media dropped about 6.5% from 2000 to 2001 and increased 2.4% from 2001 to 2002.190 
This evidence is somewhat mixed, but it is reasonable to surmise that online ad spending 
did indeed decline in the aftermath of the crash. Yet this does not presuppose a failure of the 
online advertising market. Certain trends related to the bust dragged overall spending downward. 
Many dotcom companies – a major source of demand – perished in the crash.191 Those that 
survived still spent significant amounts of their marketing budgets online, but these budgets were 
smaller in an absolute sense, constricted by the sudden vacancy of risk capital and the decimation 
of puffed up market capitalizations.192 This abrupt drop in demand – DoubleClick reportedly lost 
70% of its clients – as well as the erasure of the aura of confidence that once surrounded the New 
Economy caused ad rates, previously buoyed by dotcom hype, to fall precipitously.193 
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Other factors mitigated the ad market’s decline. Taking advantage of lowered prices and 
improved services, many marketers began to include the web in their media mixes for the first 
time, while those that had already been online began to spend more.194 As one journalist 
described, the financial collapse “that saw dotcom stock prices plummet and is still shaking out 
in the form of dotcom bankruptcies and failures, has not slowed online advertising.”195 Pointing 
toward continued growth, nearly 5,500 companies tried internet advertising for the first time in 
the third quarter of 2000 compared to about 3,900 companies in the second quarter.196 Likewise, 
CNET News reported that the aggregate number of marketers purchasing online advertising 
quadrupled in 2000 from 1999 levels.197 As a Forrester Research analyst put it: “The dotcoms 
were the hare. Traditional companies have been the tortoise … plodding along” but on track to 
become “the backbone of internet spending.”198 This trend was reflected at DoubleClick, where 
the proportion of revenues from traditional advertisers grew to over 70% in the fourth quarter of 
2001 compared to 44% in the fourth quarter of 2000.199 
The result is that although aggregate online ad spending decreased, it is highly likely that 
volume did not. No comprehensive data is available, but the influx of new marketers coupled 
with the enormous delivery capacity of the leading ad infrastructure providers likely served to 
maintain or even increase the scale of online advertising compared to pre-crash levels.200 For 
instance, DoubleClick delivered more ads annually in 2001 and 2002 than it did in the years 
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leading up the crash, while the much smaller 24/7 Media reported a decline.201 Moreover, the 
market’s downturn did not halt the steadily increasing population of internet users.202 
In many respects the bust served to reinforce the infrastructure model that DoubleClick 
and its rivals were developing. Dotcoms with stunted marketing budgets placed a renewed 
emphasis on targeting and accountability.203 Those that previously spent lavishly on brand-
building campaigns in television, radio, billboards, and print turned back to the internet, where 
lowered CPMs and cost-per-action models helped to stretch ad dollars. Said one industry analyst 
in late 2000, “You’re going to see online advertising is extremely targeted this year because 
every cent has to count.”204 As Rich LeFurgy, chairman of the Internet Advertising Bureau told 
Advertising Age: “A lot of the budgets that were going into traditional media and not into online, 
ironically, are now being deployed in online advertising. … In a sense, it’s online advertising’s 
renaissance.”205 
The revitalized focus on targeting and accountability among dotcoms as well as the larger 
influx of traditional marketers were facilitated by the development of the very online advertising 
infrastructure services described herein. The relatively moderate fall in aggregate spending 
precipitated by the crash caused only a limited disruption of online advertising’s expansion 
precisely because underlying infrastructural capacities had already been established with the 
essential support of financial markets. Contrary to claims that the dotcom crash killed online 
advertising, the ironic truth is that risk capital was its most important benefactor and, in a way, 
its saving grace. This understanding allowed a sanguine Advertising Age to editorialize: 
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The dot-com debacle is in full force, but the future of the internet – of e-marketing, of e-
commerce – has never been better. The marketing community, far from mourning the 
loss of easy billings or writing off the field, should focus instead on the opportunity that 
lies ahead and the stronger surviving players that will lead the way. … The dot-com 
shakeout came as no surprise. But too much focus on its financial and marketing disasters 
misses the important point that the business-to-consumer internet market is wide open, 
with growth and profits ahead. There’s never been a better time to be optimistic about 
opportunities in the consumer internet space. It’s a good time to be a contrarian.206 
While the collapse of the New Economy momentarily stalled online ad spending (and ad 
spending in general), the larger consideration is that in the short period of the bubble, a core 
group of companies were empowered to provide a robust infrastructure for online advertising 
that included a massive capacity to deliver targeted advertising and profile consumers. This 
“surveillance infrastructure” is the real legacy of the dotcom era and is examined in detail in the 
next chapter. Responding to marketer demands, infrastructure providers placed consumer 
surveillance at heart of the web’s technical composition and everyday practice, and laid the 
groundwork for the reshaping of the political economy of the marketing complex carried on 
today by contemporary market leaders such as Google and Microsoft. 
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Chapter 4 
Surveillance Infrastructure and Marketing Convergence 
Chapter three described how online advertising market leaders began to reconfigure the ad 
network business strategy into a model of infrastructure provision via the engine of the dotcom 
investment bubble. This chapter examines how a widespread regime of consumer surveillance 
came to occupy the center of this development and addresses some of the social challenges that 
have emerged as a result. Throughout 1998 and 1999 major marketers increasingly began to 
adopt the internet as an advertising channel and sought to use their influence to control the 
medium to the greatest extent possible. Facing pressure from marketers to justify expenditures, 
online advertising infrastructure providers such as DoubleClick and CMGI initiated advances in 
behavioral profiling and expanded forms of data exchange among their publisher and marketer 
clients in order to increase the “relevance” of targeted ads.  
These practices hinged upon increasingly invasive and often surreptitious practices of 
data collection, whereby information was gathered about internet users for the express purpose of 
cataloguing them for differential engagement. Although these systems often remained ungainly, 
the developing surveillance infrastructure facilitated a growing convergence among the actors 
and practices within the marketing complex. Linking up with historical trends in the marketing 
sector, marketing convergence became a hallmark of online advertising’s construction and 
remains a pivot around which contemporary marketing practices are being reformulated. This 
chapter situates this history within larger processes of accelerating commodification around 
information and communication technologies and concludes by exploring the ways in which 
surveillance-based advertising reproduces social discrimination and inequality in online contexts. 
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Discrimination of this kind is facilitated by processes of “digital enclosure” whereby submission 
to surveillance increasingly becomes a condition of internet access. 
The Marketer Imperative: Return-on-investment 
As the infrastructure business model took shape, ambivalence regarding the web as an ad 
medium and unease about standards of audience measurement remained inhibiting factors for 
some marketers. For those that were already committing portions of their advertising budgets 
online, these general anxieties had crystallized into a fixation upon “return-on-investment” 
(ROI). As the trade press debated whether the internet was inherently a direct response medium 
or better suited for brand building, marketers on the whole demanded increased measurement of 
consumer responses for every ad campaign, regardless of its particulars. Even as more marketers 
moved online, a 1999 poll by Forrester Research found that only 16% were “satisfied with online 
ad measurement capabilities,” while 68% of member companies surveyed by the Association of 
National Advertisers reported that insufficient ROI metrics were a “key barrier to online 
advertising.”1 
Marketers continued to lament the oversaturation of banner ads and dwindling click-
through rates, which fell from an average of 2 percent in 1997 to half a percent or lower by 
1999.2 As summarized by the New York Times: “Like the magazine scent strip and the television 
infomercial, the banner has sparked revulsion – from advertisers as well as from consumers. Web 
users have long protested about screens crowded with ugly come-ons that … grow more 
intrusive each day. Advertisers complain about low and declining click-through rates, an 
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indication to many that their brand messages aren’t getting through.”3 Although the average cost 
of web advertising had fallen since its early period of novelty, it was often still “more expensive 
per impression than any other medium.”4 In any case, rates were steep enough that traditional 
marketers pushed relentlessly for increasingly quantifiable metrics to assess return-on-
investment.5 
In August 1998 Procter & Gamble organized a multi-industry gathering of marketers and 
advertising agencies – including its archrival Unilever and other competitors – branded as the 
Future of Advertising Stakeholders Summit (FAST).6 The assembly’s purpose was to catalyze 
the marketing complex and the online advertising sector in particular to address perceived 
deficiencies of the internet as an ad medium. Chief among their concerns were improving ROI 
by establishing measurement standards and streamlining media buying processes. Task forces 
were convened to confront these issues. Recapitulating the goals articulated by P&G CEO Edwin 
Artzt in 1994, these specific campaigns fell under the broader mission of creating “an 
environment where advertising revenue is the key funding source for the large majority of 
information and entertainment sources in the evolving world of media.”7 
“Holding a $3 billion carrot over the hungry heads of the online media world,” P&G’s 
vice-president of advertising, Denis Beausejour, was strategic in his framing of these issues.8 “In 
the short term, it’s unlikely that interactive media will make or break the marketing plans for 
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very many traditional package goods brands,” he said. “However, if you extend the timeline just 
a few years, we see the potential for a digital media disruption that will rapidly reshape not only 
our advertising and marketing efforts, but perhaps our entire business model.”9 It was clear that 
traditional marketers (with advertising agencies in tow) were beginning to awaken to the internet 
medium and that they would intervene to mold its development to suit their interests. Despite the 
short-term safety net provided by dotcom bubble risk capital, the young online advertising 
industry understood that it ultimately needed to make itself indispensible to major marketers in 
order to prosper in the long run. One estimate put the combined ad-buying power of the FAST 
alliance at more than $50 billion a year.10 In 1998, total internet ad spending was a fraction of 
that, approximately $1.9 billion.11  
Online advertising infrastructure providers (infra providers) in particular recognized the 
stakes. As one executive reportedly told a group of marketers at the summit: “Just tell us what 
you want us to do, and we’ll do it.”12 Web publishers too had little choice but to get on board 
with efforts to improve ROI. Martin Nisenholtz, president of New York Times online division, 
articulated this realization from the publisher perspective: “We are struggling every day to sell 
advertising in an environment where advertisers, quite frankly, still don’t know quite what this 
does for them. … The internet is only going to work as an advertising forum if the advertisers 
see it as a more efficient vehicle than mass marketing.”13 
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The Stages of Surveillance: Infrastructure, Behavioral Profiling, and Data Exchange  
Continuing a trajectory that began as early as 1996, some within the industry tried to ameliorate 
marketer concerns by augmenting banner ads with what became known as “rich media” 
capabilities such as animation, video, and advanced interactivity.14 Web publishers also 
entertained increasingly intrusive ad placements such as full-screen ads and interstitials, which 
loaded in browsers before users could reach their expected destinations. Yet another trend was 
the incremental blurring of the distinction between editorial and advertising messages. In efforts 
to go beyond the banner, publishers began to experiment with new forms of “advertorial” content 
that fell beyond the accepted norms of offline media.15 “If the money is right, many online 
publishers are willing to strike whatever sort of partnerships an advertiser might want,” reported 
the Wall Street Journal.16 
Yet flashier banners and advertorial content did not address the core problem of 
“relevance.” The industry wagered that dismal click-through rates owed to insufficiently targeted 
ads. On the web, interactions such as clicks were understood as real-time registers of intent or 
interest. Unless marketers could reach consumers with the “right message at the right time,” they 
would simply be ignored.17 Ads had to be made more relevant and relevancy required increased 
knowledge about consumers. Ever greater personalization of advertising was positioned as the 
solution for reigning in the chaos of the web medium that seemed to give consumers more 
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control over their experiences. While the web’s unruliness contributed to an increasing scarcity 
of consumer attention to commercial messages, marketers and infra providers also saw potential 
in utilizing internet technology to learn about consumers in order to better tailor marketing 
interactions. 
The notion of personalized ads represented “a new twist on a late twentieth-century 
understanding of customer relationship management (CRM).”18 In the early 1990s, marketing 
gurus such as Don Peppers and Martha Rogers promoted the concept of “one-to-one” or 
“relationship” marketing as a method of maintaining engagement with a company’s most 
important customers and prospects.19 A mantra of CRM was that a majority of profits stem from 
the repeat business of a select group of loyal customers. As such, marketers needed to cultivate 
relationships with this group and seek out others who would “act like best customers once they 
are brought into the fold.”20 The goal was to engage such targets in conversation – to speak to 
consumers, but also to watch and listen. This is the context in which the advertising 
infrastructure arms race between DoubleClick and CMGI described in the previous chapter took 
a sharp turn towards the development of more sophisticated and expansive mechanisms of 
consumer surveillance, defined here as the systematic collection, analysis, and exchange of 
consumer data for advertising purposes.  
Increasing “relevance” became a new organizing principle for the online ad industry and 
infra providers in particular. Building on their ad network foundations, DoubleClick and CMGI 
created increasingly refined and far-reaching systems of user profiling and ad targeting. The goal 
was to enable marketers to reach receptive consumers as efficiently as possible and to provide 
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easily identifiable measures of return-on-investment.21 As CMGI CEO David Wetherell told 
BusinessWeek, his “single most important revelation” was coming to understand consumer 
surveillance as the central business proposition of online advertising.22 The upshot was that 
infrastructure providers sought to position themselves as invaluable intermediaries within this 
market and to entice more traditional advertisers to hire their services. In these efforts, selling the 
promise of exactitude was key.  
Beginning roughly in 1998, surveillance-based ad targeting emerged as the online ad 
industry’s “biggest driver of change.”23 While early forms of consumer profiling had been under 
construction by ad networks and others since 1996, this period marked a significant new stage of 
development. The initial period, outlined in chapter one, was premised on the appropriation of 
HTML cookie technology into ad serving processes in order to enable what might be called local 
surveillance. In this sense local means occurring within a restricted area such as a given website 
or network of sites. It does not necessarily mean limited in size; DoubleClick and other ad 
networks were quite large even in 1997, but they engaged in local surveillance in the sense that 
their profiling and targeting activities were more-or-less bounded by affiliations with a single 
business entity.  
This second stage involved extending the capacity for surveillance across many 
unaffiliated websites and beyond the web itself in order to improve ad targeting processes. These 
practices have sometimes been grouped under headings such as “dataveillance” or “database 
marketing.”24 I use the term surveillance infrastructure to make explicit the connection to the 
trend of infrastructure provision discussed in chapter three, which emphasized a broadening of 
                                                
21 Michael Schrage, “Kevin O’Connor,” Adweek, January 18, 1999. 
22 Paul C. Judge, “Internet Evangelist,” BusinessWeek, October 25, 1999, 140-148. 
23 Steven Vonder Haar, “Data chase,” Adweek, September 6, 1999. 
24 For a discussion of the history of the term dataveillance see Greg Elmer, Profiling Machines: Mapping the 
Personal Information Economy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 36. 
158 
services (“re-intermediation”) throughout the online advertising market and precipitated 
sustained investment in hardware, software, and labor to support surveillance on a massive scale. 
I do not mean to suggest the creation of some Orwellian apparatus of “total information 
awareness.”25 The development and implementation of new surveillance practices and 
technologies was and remains accretive, disjointed, and often criticized for its clumsiness. 
However, despite real and perceived shortcomings, consumer surveillance rapidly became the 
leading edge of online advertising’s growth and remains so today. As will be demonstrated, these 
efforts have been far from perfect, but they were good enough and are getting better. 
Surveillance infrastructure depended on extending both the technological capabilities and 
market relationships that facilitated the collection and exchange of consumer information. Data 
collection and ad targeting were improved and expanded through advances in behavioral and 
externally sourced profiling. These processes were enhanced and extended further via a surge in 
the exchange of consumer information among ad service providers, web publishers, and 
marketers themselves. 
Improving ad relevance required a level of immediacy that demographic or IP address 
data could not provide. Behavioral profiling was an attempt to gather and analyze information 
that could help marketers determine the intentions of consumers in real-time in order to serve 
them more relevant ads. DoubleClick and others used HTML cookies to develop basic local 
behavioral profiling applications as early as 1996.26 Some early techniques were simple 
clickstream analysis (tracking users as they went from site to site within a given ad network) and 
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ad frequency monitoring (tracking the number of ad exposures for a given consumer). Pressure 
from marketers produced a constant drive to measure and synthesize a broader range of data 
inputs. For example, in addition to cataloging the addresses and time stamps of the sites visited 
by a user in a given ad network, clickstream analysis was revised to collect data pertaining to 
frequency and duration of visits over time.27 This helped construct more detailed profiles related 
to consumer interests and browsing habits.  
Along these lines, infrastructure providers developed novel data collection methods such 
as monitoring the ads that users hovered over with their computer mouse, but did not click. How 
long did they linger? What was clicked immediately after hovering on a given ad? Did the user 
visit the sponsoring site at a later time via an email link or a search engine? These types of 
behavioral data were input into algorithms designed to deduce consumer attributes from an 
expanding array of sources, among which observed behaviors became the most important. The 
result was the construction of increasingly finely grained consumer profiles that were 
continuously updated to reflect new information. These “black box” processes were considered 
trade secrets, so limited information exists regarding their operational details.28 However, it is 
illustrative that CMGI’s Engage reportedly categorized “user affinities” based upon a matrix of 
some 800 sub-characteristics.29 The product description for Engage’s “Next Generation 
Profiling” service provides further insight: 
Next Generation Profiling techniques used by Engage.Knowledge are based on observed 
behavior of anonymous visitors across multiple websites. As a visitor browses through an 
Engage-enabled website, the Engage Suite software builds individual profiles based on 
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the type of content viewed, the time spent viewing, and other factors including their 
frequency and recency of visits to a particular interest category. This information is 
processed by a patent-pending algorithm into profiles that include a user identification 
number, an interest category code, and an interest score to indicate a level of interest in a 
particular category. A single visitor can have several entries in the database – one for 
each observed interest category. As the number of recorded visits of a single visitor 
grows, the accuracy and depth of the profile is improved. Unlike static registration 
information, Engage.Knowledge profiles are constantly changing to more accurately 
reflect the current interests of an individual.30 
This type of behavioral profiling was extended through post-click analysis. The term is 
straightforward; in order to help marketers gauge ROI, post-click analysis aims to measure the 
actions taken by web users after they click on an ad and are transported to a destination site such 
as an online retailer or corporate home page. DoubleClick’s Spotlight was one such service 
designed to “show a true relationship between advertising and sales” by continuing to collect 
behavioral data after the user had reached a marketer’s site.31 In this way DoubleClick could link 
transactions such as purchases or registrations to specific users (cookies) and banner campaigns. 
Similarly, the CMGI subsidiary AdKnowledge offered post-click analysis that calculated 
“conversion rates” based on factors such as downloads, purchases, or time spent on a marketer’s 
site.32 Seeking to prove their value, ad infrastructure providers went to great lengths to make 
post-click and other ROI data readily available and modifiable. Spotlight offered marketers 
“customizable metrics, such as the number of registrations, number of sales, number of units 
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purchased, type of service purchased, and actual sales revenue that has been generated as a result 
of a campaign.”33 Likewise, Engage allowed marketers to “manipulate [ad campaign] results, 
rerun the query to drill down into more detail, and even customize the bars on a graph or the 
slices in a pie chart.”34 
In order to implement post-click analysis, marketers had to give infrastructure providers 
high-level access to their own sites. For example, DoubleClick had to place a tracking code (via 
an invisible image called a web bug that worked in conjunction with cookies) on clients’ sites in 
order to enable Spotlight’s post-click analysis functionality. More in-depth forms of post-click 
analysis involved giving infrastructure providers access to the guts of primary web applications 
such as shopping, payment, and user registration systems. In this way, many versions of post-
click analysis presupposed the exchange of data between infrastructure providers and their 
marketer clients. Before further considering this important trend, another component of 
surveillance infrastructure must be introduced: externally sourced profiling. 
If advances in behavioral profiling provided a new level of immediacy to surveillance, 
externally sourced profiling provided a greatly expanded scope. Some forms of consumer data 
could simply not be obtained online, no matter the sophistication of surveillance technology. 
Moreover, individual infrastructure providers possessed differing levels of profiling capability 
and expertise. One way to gain competitive advantage was to augment existing profile databases 
by purchasing access to data that could not be produced in-house, including potentially sensitive 
data such as personally identifiable information (PII). This market opportunity was largely met 
by third party data providers that hailed from the already well-established offline consumer 
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information services industry.35 Like behavioral profiling, external data had been employed by 
ad networks and others since at least 1996. DoubleClick was among the first to augment its IP 
address databases with third-party data obtained from the US census and commercial sources. 
Indeed this was one of the distinctions that set the company apart from other early ad networks 
and helped it achieve immediate success.  
Again, what changed in this second phase of surveillance was the extent to which third 
party data was utilized and the nature of the information itself. A major trend was the integration 
of increasingly sensitive forms of consumer information. AdKnowledge’s MarketMatch media 
buying service integrated an array of such data, including “audience demographics from [online 
ratings services] MediaMetrix and NetRatings; psychographic data from SRI Consulting; website 
ratings and descriptions from NetGuide; and web traffic audit data from BPA Interactive.”36 
Across the board, these external data sources offered infrastructure providers opportunities to 
improve the “relevance” of their ad targeting apparatuses. A trajectory developed whereby 
providers sought to integrate increasingly sensitive consumer information in order to better target 
ads and boost ROI. CMGI’s AdForce secured an exclusive partnership with the global 
information services conglomerate Experian to provide aggregated data for ad targeting 
purposes.37 Although the specific nature of their transactions remains unknown, it is reasonable 
to assume that the data was 1) difficult if not impossible to obtain via “normal methods” of 
online surveillance and 2) of a potentially sensitive nature. Some context is provided by the fact 
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that during this period Experian was transitioning from primarily a provider of financial 
information services to a much broader range of activity including consumer credit reporting and 
database marketing services.38 
Historical records of offline purchasing behavior, thought by many marketers to be an 
accurate predictor of future purchases, were another elusive data source for ad infrastructure 
providers. DoubleClick’s 1999 acquisition of the marketing information company Abacus Direct 
was primarily motivated by a desire to access Abacus’ consumer profile databases containing the 
offline buying habits of some 88 million US households.39 “Advertisers rely on demographic 
information to target ads when they don’t have anything else,” said DoubleClick’s Kevin Ryan, 
talking up the significance of the acquisition. “Transaction information is much better.”40 
Running up against growing public concern over online privacy issues and a consumer 
advocacy campaign, DoubleClick’s move to integrate Abacus’ databases, which included basic 
PII such as names, addresses, and telephone numbers, caused a public relations debacle and 
spurred a larger public policy battle. To merge Abacus’ information with its own database, 
DoubleClick reversed its privacy policy and began to “collect personally identifiable information 
… through an alliance of undisclosed, data-sharing sites,” in order to match online and offline 
profiles.41 Explained in more detail in chapter five, it is sufficient to note here that although 
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DoubleClick’s intention to integrate Abacus’s data with its own was the most prominent example 
of the increasing intrusiveness of consumer profiling, it was by no means an outlier.42  
By 2000 the leading ad infrastructure providers had amassed profile databases of 
unprecedented size: DoubleClick’s contained 120 million entries, CMGI’s Engage’s contained 
70 million, MatchLogic’s 65 million, and 24/7 Media’s 60 million.43 The trend was pervasive 
throughout the sector to the extent that the data systems provider Oracle reported a 30% increase 
in companies looking to build enterprise-class data warehouses during the period and explicitly 
linked the demand to internet companies looking to store hundreds of terabytes of data collected 
from the web.44 At the time only the largest “bricks-and-mortar” businesses had compiled 
databases in the terabyte range, and even then only after years of data collection. DoubleClick 
alone forecasted that it would be “pulling in about a terabyte of data every day” by the end of 
2000.45 The significantly smaller MatchLogic collected clickstream data from over 1 billion 
daily transactions and maintained 15 data warehouse locations.46 Sustaining this level of 
consumer surveillance required advanced technical architecture and expertise.47 DoubleClick 
possessed a standing army of some 725 ad and media servers, while Engage recruited a “VLDB” 
(very large database) expert from Fidelity Investments to serve as chief technology officer.48  
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The enlargement of these surveillance practices was directly linked to marketer 
uncertainty concerning ROI. As Adweek reported: 
No one really knows just what data matters in predicting what consumer will respond 
positively to an ad. Since nobody knows the answers to the big questions, companies are 
tracking everything they can now, with the idea of figuring out what’s important later.49 
“People are erring on the side of collecting too much data rather than too little,” admitted 
a dotcom executive.50 One outgrowth of this development (again, taken up fully in chapter five) 
was a race to the bottom concerning consumer data collection practices that inflamed public 
concerns over online privacy issues, bringing them to the national public policy stage. Within the 
logic of the marketing complex however, these practices were accepted as necessary “for 
mainstream advertisers to do more than kick the tires of online advertising.”51 The 
implementation of externally sourced profiling was heralded as “a huge step forward in 
targeting” while combining offline and online behavioral data was viewed as “the ultimate home 
run.”52 As “our master’s voice” was augmented by “our master’s eyes and ears,” industry 
rationalized surveillance as beneficial to consumers.53 “Not only do users receive more relevant 
content, but such targeting prevents them from having to see the same ads repeated.”54 Privacy 
concerns were largely shrugged off until advocates mounted a credible challenge by putting 
pressure on Congress and the Federal Trade Commission.  
If restricted to their own local networks of affiliated sites, the sheer magnitude of these 
consumer information hoards alone would represent a major advance in online profiling and ad 
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targeting. However, the second fundamental component of the construction of a surveillance 
infrastructure was based on the wider distribution and deployment of these data beyond any 
single company or ad network. During this period the consumer profile was incrementally 
unshackled from its proprietary confines via practices of data exchange that were implemented 
broadly among otherwise competing entities. These arrangements took various forms, but most 
configurations integrated behavioral and externally sourced profiling to some extent. As noted 
above, behavioral profiling services like post-click analysis (e.g. DoubleClick’s Spotlight 
service) were dependent upon data exchange among ad services providers and their marketer 
clients. 
One example is found in what Engage called “Real-Time Visitor Intelligence,” an 
application of behavioral targeting and data exchange that gave any web publisher the ability to 
deliver targeted ads to first-time visitors.55 While data capture was still limited to sites within the 
Engage network, the company sold the capacity to personalize ads (and content) based on its 
profile database to non-affiliated sites, thus allowing them to achieve “first-time relevance.” As 
promoted on the Engage website: “As soon as a visitor clicks on your website, you can use 
information about their previous internet activities to provide them with customized web pages, 
targeted ads, promotions, products and services – even if it’s their first visit to your site.”56 
NetGravity’s Global Profile Service advanced this trend one step further by combining 
profile information from entirely separate infrastructure providers using a shared database and 
“global cookie system.” Prior to its acquisition by DoubleClick, NetGravity announced the 
service in partnership with competitors Aptex Software and MatchLogic. The model was 
premised on the anonymous integration of the three companies’ profile databases into a single 
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shared system that could provide “comprehensive summaries of web viewers’ demographics and 
lifestyles.”57 Though seemingly never fully implemented, the service was a prototypical version 
of the “cookie-matching” model for sharing consumer data across websites that has come to 
fruition today.58 
Perhaps the most illustrative example of the surveillance infrastructure’s integrative 
potential was the introduction of what is now known as “behavioral remarketing” or 
“retargeting.” This strategy demonstrates the cumulative character of infrastructure development 
through its incorporation of behavioral profiling, externally-sourced information, and data 
exchange. Geared toward online merchants, the basic principle of remarketing is to engage 
individuals who have previously “shown interest in a product or service category by following 
them and showing ads for the product or service they initially eyed as they surf elsewhere on the 
web.”59 In 1999 DoubleClick introduced Boomerang, one of the first branded remarketing 
services. DoubleClick claimed the service would enable marketers to target “precisely the 
individuals who have displayed an explicit interest” in their products or services and offered the 
capability to reach these consumers across the expansive DoubleClick network.60 A range of 
behavioral profiling variables was made available to Boomerang subscribers. According to 
promotional materials: “With this powerful new capability, you [a marketer] can now target 
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customized lists of your prospects and customers based on their activity on your site and 
encourage them to come back. … For example, you can target consumers who have: visited your 
site, visited a specific section or product page on your site, purchased products on your site, 
visited your site but not made a purchase.”61 Externally sourced profile information was 
available for integration as well: “In addition to web behavior, off-line purchase history data and 
demographic data can be appended to create lists for the most precisely targeted campaigns.”62  
Of course, in order for remarketing to work, data had to be continuously exchanged 
between ad service providers and marketers. Once properly configured, marketers could deploy 
highly targeted ad messages with the capacity to follow specific users or specific categories of 
users as they traversed the web. It was the online equivalent of a mattress salesperson getting in 
the backseat of your car as you left the showroom, quietly riding along with you to the movie 
theater, and then tapping your shoulder during the show to remind you of the upcoming 
President’s Day Sale Extravaganza. Or, in a different iteration, the salesperson might also 
approach other theater patrons who have displayed browsing patterns or offline purchasing 
activities similar to your own under the working hypothesis that they too, might be in the market 
for in a new box-spring. Despite its considerable “ick factor,” remarketing is widely used today 
and is considered among the most effective forms of contemporary online advertising. 
The practices and technologies of surveillance infrastructure were applied more broadly 
to areas of marketing beyond advertising. One such trend saw online retailers begin to outsource 
the collection and analysis of their customer data to companies such as Coremetrics, now a part 
of IBM.63 Using the same basic technologies and market relationships employed by ad infra 
                                                
61 DoubleClick, “Boomerang.” 
62 DoubleClick, “Boomerang.” 
63 IBM, “IBM closes acquisition of Coremetrics,” August 2, 2010, http://www-
03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/32248.wss 
169 
providers, Coremetrics compiled information about online shoppers in order to aid retailers’ 
customer relations efforts. Given access to retailers online storefronts, Coremetrics was able to 
“extract personally identifiable information such as names, addresses and phone numbers from 
online forms filled out during the checkout process.”64 In theory, this gave the company the 
ability to easily combine customer profiles from its entire roster of 40 clients, including Wal-
Mart and Toys “R” Us. Though Coremetrics argued that doing so would violate the terms of its 
contracts, data exchange of this nature opened possibilities for such practices going forward.   
While contemporary observers are now beginning to examine surveillance infrastructure-
enabled marketing – sometimes referred to as “Big Data” – the roots of these practices in the 
dotcom era have been widely overlooked. In 1999, marketing information broker Acxiom 
debuted a service that enabled companies to consolidate their own stores of customer 
information into an optimization system designed to unlock various uses of the data and combine 
it with Acxiom’s own massive Data Network.65 Through alliances with other data brokers, 
Acxiom made these combined marketing profiles available a la carte to many more companies 
for real-time integration with internet applications from advertising to e-commerce. The types of 
services offered by Acxiom and Coremetrics signal a broader appropriation of surveillance 
across various industries and the concomitant reorientation of business strategy around the 
collection and exchange of consumer information.   
The Rhetoric and Reality of Surveillance Infrastructure 
Throughout this period, marketers continued to push for more rationalized forms of advertising 
and sought to use their influence to control the internet medium to the greatest extent possible. 
Even with better targeting and rich media augmentations, the banner ad format proved limited in 
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its ability to capture consumer attention and failed to produce results that met the expectations of 
transcendent visions of “one-to-one” marketing.66 Still in 1998, major packaged goods 
advertisers such as Proctor & Gamble hesitated to pay for brokered banner ads, preferring to 
invest in creating their own branded websites.67 Marketers also partnered with media 
conglomerates and others to develop ill-fated “push” content systems that attempted to replicate 
the broadcast method of media delivery. Moreover, despite their advancements, ad targeting 
systems remained far from perfect. Much was made of instances of targeting gone wrong – 
flogging home mortgages on sites aimed at children, for example – that undermined the rhetoric 
of precision put forth by ad infrastructure providers.68 Even for well-executed targeting services, 
click-through rates might increase as new programs were implemented, but would often dissipate 
as novelty wore thin.69  
Fully aware of the importance of positive publicity and the appearance of forward 
momentum for attracting marketers as well as investors, online ad executives often oversold the 
capabilities of their services and technologies in the media and especially the advertising trade 
press. As such, there was a heavy dose of irony in statements like those by Paul Schaut, CEO of 
Engage Technologies, who told Adweek in 1999: “Now, we don’t have to wave our arms to talk 
about the promise of profiling. We have arrived.”70 Infrastructure providers, and Engage in 
particular, had indeed greatly improved and expanded their profiling capacities, but they had not 
“arrived” in the sense of fulfilling any “promise of profiling.” Claiming that the waving of arms 
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was no longer necessary was in fact a clear example of vigorous industry arm waving. In this 
respect a critical distance must be maintained when interpreting the words of online ad 
companies and industry analysts. 
It might be expected that the gap between the rhetoric and reality of surveillance 
infrastructure’s execution might have curtailed marketer spending throughout the dotcom period. 
After all, some among them, especially big brand advertisers, had been complaining about the 
medium’s shortcomings from the start. But ignoring the internet was never truly on the table for 
marketers. As Dan Schiller has argued, confronted by the net’s exploding popularity and 
uncertain commercial development, “individual companies and whole industries … had little 
choice but to spring into action.”71 Matt McAllister frames the situation as a love/hate 
relationship that centered around the issue of marketer control.72 Marketers loved the prospect of 
more control over consumer information in order to target messages to specific markets, but 
were deeply concerned about extending the economic control they have historically wielded over 
media systems to the emerging internet. Writing in 1995, McAllister argued: “If advertisers 
sense that computers [and the internet] offer them more control than they had before, then they 
will exploit these digitized opportunities to the hilt. If advertisers sense that computers offer less 
control than they had before, then they will do everything they can to turn that around.”73 
Thus, while pushing for increasingly sophisticated targeting and profiling, traditional 
marketers simultaneously began to adopt the internet as an advertising channel – imperfect as it 
was – in earnest during the latter stages of the dotcom bubble. The total value of online ad 
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spending among a sample of ANA companies tripled from 1998 to 1999.74 Data compiled from 
Advertising Age showed that while in 1998 just 19 of the largest 100 national marketers 
advertised on the internet, by 1999 that number had jumped to 87.75 The total number of ad 
impressions purchased by the top ten traditional marketers increased by a factor of five from 
1999 to 2000, while aggregate online ad spending more than doubled from 1998 to 1999 and 
nearly did so again from 1999 to 2000.76 
Again, the example of Procter & Gamble is illustrative. In 1994, P&G was among the 
first to articulate the marketing complex’s collective need to ensure that the new interactive 
media would serve advertisers’ interests. Thereafter it quickly became one of online 
advertising’s most strident critics, explicating the medium’s deficiencies regarding brand 
advertising, while engaging in experimental outlays to test the waters.77 In 1998 it hosted the 
FAST Summit as a forum to address marketer concerns, again publicly denouncing the internet’s 
usefulness. “The current state of web advertising just isn’t effective enough to warrant any truly 
meaningful investment from us,” said P&G’s vice-president of advertising.78 A year later 
however, P&G was named Advertising Age’s interactive marketer of the year. The trade 
publication lauded the company’s “tremendous influence in leading the industry, along with its 
own real commitment to the medium in ad spending and creation of innovative, successful 
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campaigns.”79 The very same executive quoted above explained the reversal of course in these 
terms: “The interactive world is where consumers are going, where it’s happening, and we need 
to be there.”80 
This was of course the very period of transition from online advertising’s first phase of 
local surveillance to the more robust and dynamic surveillance infrastructure. And as infra 
providers developed more comprehensive arrays of ROI-centric services, they won business 
from some of their biggest detractors: advertising agencies. The trade press described an 
accelerating trend in which agencies turned to “outsiders possessing technological muscle or 
centralized in-house staffs to serve their ads.”81 Of course this was no act of benevolence; 
agencies partnered with infra providers in response to marketers’ requests for “proof that their 
online campaigns [were] paying off.”82 Those that did not have the ability to meet these 
expectations were forced to contract outside help. In many respects, agencies and their media 
buying components held the keys to marketer ad spending and in 1999 they began to unlock the 
floodgates. A significant portion of this money went to the ad infra market leaders, which 
contributed further to the sector’s ongoing consolidation. By 2000 DoubleClick alone managed 
ad campaigns for over half of the Fortune 100 companies.83   
Forced to enter the game, marketers focused their energies on shaping the web’s 
commercial development to serve their needs. And in these efforts they were unmistakably 
successful, collectively setting the agenda for the burgeoning online ad industry. As the CEO of 
Engage put it: “We’ve always thought the marketer is the one with the power, so we are 
                                                
79 Kate Maddox, “P&G: Interactive marketer of the year,” Advertising Age, May 3, 1999. The company doubled its 
online ad spending from the year prior, though the figures still represented less than 1% of its total ad budget. 
80 Maddox, “P&G: Interactive marketer of the year.” Emphasis added. 
81 Jennifer Gilbert, “Agencies centralize web serving,” Advertising Age, March 1, 1999. 
82 Gilbert, “Agencies centralize web serving.” 
83 DoubleClick, 2000 Annual Report, 6. 
174 
innovating for them.”84 This is unsurprising given that even as the top tier of ad infra providers 
grew into giants, they betrayed persistent fragility. At the height of its power, DoubleClick 
remained heavily dependent upon risk capital and just a handful of major clients. For an 
extended period, AltaVista alone accounted for nearly half of all its revenues.85  
Taking all of this into consideration allows for a nuanced interpretation of Adweek’s 
heralding in late 1999 of the arrival of a “golden age of online data,” in which “more than ever 
before, publishers, marketers and advertising service companies [were] racing to compile 
mounds of information that help them track where people go on the web, who clicks on ads, and 
who ultimately winds up buying.”86 The “golden age” bit falls somewhere between sensationalist 
reporting and the gloss of an industry flack, but the basic description of surveillance 
infrastructure development was right on the mark.  
Marketing Convergence & the Political Economy of Internet Advertising 
To summarize, this history can be boiled down to a parallel set of trajectories. Fueled by finance 
capital and responding to marketer demands, ad infrastructure providers scaled up their capacity 
to serve ads and conduct consumer surveillance, which made online advertising more extensive 
and invasive (if not more effective), and more readily available to marketers than ever before. 
Though remaining unsatisfied with their level of control over advertising processes and the 
effectiveness of campaign results, traditional marketers nevertheless began to embrace the 
internet as an ad medium and exerted their influence to steward the development of the 
surveillance infrastructure in particular. 
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These events signaled an acceleration of an ongoing reconfiguration within the marketing 
complex whereby consumer data was placed at the heart of marketing practices.87 This trend 
applied across the board among publishers, advertising agencies, consumer information 
providers (e.g. Experian), marketers themselves, and the new online ad infra providers like 
DoubleClick. Established roles shifted as these actors “jockeyed” for control “over what 
suddenly appeared to comprise shared turf.”88 Even as new practices of surveillance and ad 
targeting were implemented on a competitive and ad hoc basis, elements of the marketing 
complex began to converge around the notion of the centrality of consumer data. 
A 2003 letter to shareholders by the new CEO of DoubleClick, Kevin Ryan, articulated 
the essence of this marketing convergence. With his company emerging from the dotcom 
collapse leaner and finally profitable, Ryan emphasized that the key to making surveillance 
infrastructure work was to be found in new forms of cooperative business arrangements and the 
crossing of established industry boundaries concerning the collection, analysis, and deployment 
of marketing data. His remarks are worth quoting at length: 
“It has become clear that the old business silos of direct marketing versus brand 
advertising, or offline versus online media development, or the marketing area versus the 
IT department, no longer make sense. The common trait possessed by the most effective 
marketers and advertisers is that they have broken down these walls and allowed the 
groups to learn from each other’s experiences. Successful companies must aggregate 
customer data from various channels in order to have a holistic view of their customers. 
They need the ability to measure the effectiveness of their campaigns across these various 
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media. They also need technology to integrate their sales, customer service, IT, 
marketing, and advertising efforts.”89 
Marketing convergence is the corollary to surveillance infrastructure. Consumer data 
became the focal point in the perpetual struggle to increase efficiency and maximize investment 
returns, which demanded “breaking down the walls” that separated marketers and their 
intermediaries. The evolution of ad infrastructure providers epitomized these developments. 
Thus, as DoubleClick’s NetGravity subsidiary began to pursue the surveillance infrastructure 
model, its former identity as an ad server hardware provider converged with other marketing 
functions. The company began to work not only with publishers, but also with marketers and 
merchants, and its services became increasingly integrated with its clients’ own customer 
databases. “Is the business consulting or hardware?” asked Advertising Age. “Once the server is 
installed, there’s a lot of time, resources and intellectual property that gets shared among clients, 
agencies and third-party ad servers.”90 Distinctions among these parties blurred as formerly 
separate activities came together to facilitate the emerging surveillance infrastructure and assert 
the marketing function online. “All this means vendors such as NetGravity will be working even 
more closely with advertisers, agencies and publishers in the future,” said a company executive. 
“It’s not a piecemeal approach.”91 
It is important to note that “working closely” did not foreclose all forms of competition. 
Although companies like DoubleClick had achieved early dominance in some areas, battles for 
control over the processes and outputs of the surveillance infrastructure were ongoing and 
contributed fundamentally to its progression. Major marketers especially sought to overpower ad 
infra providers whenever possible. As early as 1997 General Motors dabbled in creating its own 
                                                
89 DoubleClick, 2003 Annual Report, iii. 
90 Dana Blankenhorn, “NetGravity puts emphasis on solutions,” Advertising Age, March 1, 1999. 
91 Blankenhorn, “NetGravity puts emphasis on solutions.” 
177 
web ad servers, seeking to bypass ad infra providers and interface with publishers directly.92 
Later, Procter & Gamble, IBM, Ford, and others claimed ownership over data gathered from 
their ad campaigns and moved to restrict its distribution and use.93 Ford prohibited its partners 
from selling its campaign data or using it to offer ancillary services, while other marketers 
mandated that their data be segregated from the bigger pools used to create web-spanning user 
profiles. 
Ultimately though, the majority of the marketing complex – including the upstart infra 
providers – shared an overriding common interest in stewarding the internet’s transformation 
into a commercial media system dependent upon their patronage. This interest was manifested 
through the parallel advance of surveillance infrastructure and marketing convergence and 
explicitly expressed in gatherings such as P&G’s FAST Summit and the formation of trade 
groups such as the Networking Advertising Initiative.94 As Advertising Age observed: “While 
industry leaders may disagree about the mechanics of developing internet ads and whether the 
internet is better for branding or e-commerce, the most important aspect to come out of FAST is 
that parties who used to sit at opposite sides of the table are now working together to figure out 
how to make the internet work as an ad medium.”95 
Surveillance infrastructure development was driven by marketers’ overarching needs to 
bring the internet into the marketing complex and, to the greatest extent possible, maximize its 
utility for purposes of selling. These needs are expressions of more general dynamics of 
capitalism – the driving force of commodification and the problem of overproduction. 
Commodification is the dynamo within capitalist economies that drives profit making and brings 
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relations of exchange to new areas of social action (the “accumulation of capital”).96 As Schiller 
argues, the long history of capitalism has been “sustained by ceaseless enlargement of markets 
for commodities and this trend continues today in information and culture.”97 Since the latest 
period of general economic stagnation that began in the 1970s, capitalists have been forced to 
aggressively seek out new markets, incorporating information and communication technologies 
into the heart of these efforts. This has taken a range of forms including movements to expand 
transnational market relations, extend intellectual property regimes, and create advertising-
supported media systems.  
These developments have been characterized as responses to the recurrent problem 
(“internal contradiction”) of overproduction, which is manifested in part by the relentless need to 
create and maintain consumer demand for the torrent of products and services created by a 
capitalist economy dependent upon perpetual growth.98 Framing the issue in this way provides a 
particular understanding of advertising’s historical basis as the “pan-corporate need to harness 
consumption to production … whether or not it succeeds efficiently in any given instance.”99 
Processes of commodification have been deeply intertwined with the advance of information and 
communication technologies, of which the internet and the world wide web are among the most 
public-facing components.100 
The construction of an advertising-focused surveillance infrastructure on the internet is 
thereby an expression of the acceleration of commodification and a mechanism whereby 
capitalist social relations are reproduced anew. Increasingly, engaging in consumer surveillance 
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is “simply the price of entry” for marketers within a global capitalist system struggling to 
overcome barriers to growth.101 Marketers make designs upon the internet “not because of some 
peripheral momentary whim to test unknown waters. They act, rather, as the representatives of a 
generative social force.”102 With this understanding, critical media studies can offer an analysis 
of what are perhaps some of the unintended social outcomes of this generative capacity. 
Social Challenges of Surveillance Infrastructure 
“The real winner in all of this will be the consumer.” –Kevin O’Connor.103 
This section outlines some of the contemporary social challenges that have arisen from the 
development of an internet-based surveillance infrastructure and makes connections to relevant 
literature in the area. Discussion is limited to two interlocking issues: marketing-based 
discrimination and the problem of “digital enclosure.” In 1993 Oscar Gandy wrote a sobering 
book called The Panoptic Sort, which articulated a theory of information technology-based 
surveillance through which individuals and groups are “sorted according to their presumed 
economic or political value.”104 Looking at a range of examples from credit reporting to the data 
collection of the US Census Bureau, Gandy warned of an emerging system of classification that 
enabled “organized interests, whether they are selling shoes, toothpaste, or political platforms, to 
identify, isolate, and communicate differentially with individuals in order to increase their 
influence over how consumers make selections among these options.”105 Gandy’s work not only 
draws attention to the longer history of consumer surveillance, but the contours of his general 
critique apply to modern online advertising practices. 
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Gandy’s overarching concern was that information technology-based sorting engenders 
forms of discrimination in accordance with institutionalized biases of “race, gender, age, class, 
culture, and consciousness.”106 With the advent of the surveillance infrastructure era, sorting 
practices of this exact nature have moved to the forefront of the marketing agenda. Joseph Turow 
has documented the progression of this trend whereby marketers increasingly use profile 
databases “to determine whether to consider particular Americans to be targets or waste.”107 
These are not Turow’s terms; they are part of a marketing vernacular used to describe potential 
and current customers. The point is to differentiate between the two groups in order to engage 
them differently, or in some cases, not at all.   
While practices of tailoring ad messages to specific audiences are not new, they are 
greatly intensified online where the decades-old transition from “mass to class marketing” 
achieves new magnitudes of realization.108 Behavioral and externally sourced profiling of 
individuals is of a qualitatively different character than the probability-based methods used to 
analyze and target mass media audiences.109 For instance, the classification of individuals and 
groups based on social class is greatly enhanced by practices of dynamic consumer profiling that 
combine past purchasing records with behavioral and demographic information. The shift is 
significant: “For decades, marketing and media firms learned as much as they could about social 
groups and then tried to target people they thought were members of these groups. The emerging 
process is almost the opposite: They learn enormous amounts about individuals, consign them to 
various groups, and then determine whether and how they want to deal with them.”110 
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The issue is amplified considerably when personalization extends beyond commercial 
messages to media content, interactive service offerings, and beyond. According to Turow, the 
potential for such personalization occurs via a shift in media relations whereby the power of 
publishers/content producers declines vis-à-vis other groups within the marketing complex.111 
Although he does not describe it in these terms, Turow is signaling a disruption of the 20th 
century audience commodity model of commercial media production.112 This well-established 
business structure is premised on a basic relationship whereby content created by media 
companies serves as a proxy for audiences. Seeking direct links to consumers, marketers reach 
them through commercial media conduits. Audiences, or more accurately, representations of 
audience attention, thereby become commodities produced by media companies, who then 
broker them to marketers.113   
Media content becomes less important as a proxy for audiences when marketers can 
reach consumers directly via targeted advertising across a range of web destinations and 
interactive platforms. On the internet, marketers still purchase access to consumers as they have 
on other media platforms. What the surveillance infrastructure makes possible is an alternative 
formulation of this process that can be considerably distanced from any specific publisher or 
instance of media content. A vivid example is found in the emergence of consumer data 
exchanges, which function as stand-alone marketplaces for buying and selling audience 
impressions. Companies such as eXelate and BlueKai enable “publishers to auction and media 
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agencies to ‘buy’ individuals with particular characteristics, often in real time.”114 As explained 
on BlueKai’s website: 
“BlueKai manages the largest online intent data exchange that gives marketers, 
publishers and ad networks access to valuable data a-la-carte to impact in-market 
audience targeting. Our technology is based on aggregating anonymous behaviors from 
top tier ecommerce sites, which then goes through a classification process. It is then made 
available in our exchange for bidding, purchase, and immediate influence on real-time 
campaign targeting. We do not own [advertising] inventory and do not serve ads – we 
simply enable our partners to use our quality data to deliver better targeting across their 
media.”115 
Consumer data exchanges are contemporary extensions of the “re-intermediary” strategy 
developed by DoubleClick in the dotcom period. Marketers are presented with a qualitatively 
different kind of access when companies such as BlueKai or DoubleClick claim to be able to 
reach not just a particular type of consumer, but a particular individual, through a media-neutral 
distribution system that spans the web. In this system, media buying becomes somewhat of a 
misnomer and web publishers, no longer the primary arbiters of access to consumer attention, 
experience a loss of market power.  
One outcome of this development is the acceleration of the historical undercutting of 
journalistic institutions. As Robert McChesney and John Nichols have shown, the most 
important of these by far, newspapers, have unfortunately also been the most seriously injured by 
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their inability to replicate the print-based audience commodity model online.116 Even while 
acknowledging the deep flaws systemic to commercial modes of news production, the collapse 
of newspapers in particular is deeply troubling, especially in the short term when the news 
vacuum is increasingly populated by public relations content. For some time now, companies 
such as Federated Media have provided marketers with opportunities to “sponsor independent 
publishers” to develop content about their brands in ways that “appeal to readers and spark 
conversation.”117 These types of “branded content” or “native advertising” are exploding on the 
web.118 In just one example, Forbes Magazine’s “BrandVoice” product allows marketers to 
“connect directly with the Forbes audience by enabling them to create content – and participate 
in the conversation – on the Forbes digital publishing platform.”119 
The next phase of the erosion of publisher market power, already underway, involves a 
growing tailoring of media content beyond advertising messages. Publishers, increasingly at the 
mercy of their advertisers, have few alternatives outside of facilitating such personalization. 
Marketers seeking the greatest advertising efficiency demand to follow users throughout the 
entire “funnel” of their media engagement. When it becomes possible to “trace a purchase all the 
way back to click-throughs on news stories, it doesn’t take a whole lot of thinking to say let’s 
change the content to maximize the opportunity for that person to click.”120  
The implications of these kinds of “mass customization” go beyond the increased 
willingness of publishers to break the “church-and-state” barrier that has historically (and 
imperfectly) separated media content from advertising. A general critique is that the trend 
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promotes a culture of individualism and consumption. Some observers argue that sustained 
exposure to highly personalized media threatens to create “echo chamber” or “filter bubble” 
effects that limit contact with contradictory viewpoints and information beyond the orbit of self-
interest.121 Another liberal-democratic critique laments the loss of privacy engendered by such 
surveillance, but as Jeff Chester points out, “beyond the loss of privacy, we all should be alarmed 
about how interactive advertising is shaping the kind of programming and content available to us 
in the future.”122  Turow frames the issue in terms of the “reputation silos” constructed by 
marketers and media so that they might “present people who have been assigned specific 
reputations in the marketplace with preconceived views of the world and with opportunities 
based on those reputations.”123  
Along these lines, what other forms of marketing-based personalization might be 
rendered, and at what social costs? It is one thing when extensive profiles, compiled from 
disparate offline and online sources over which individuals have little knowledge or control, 
become the basis for the commercial messages they encounter on the internet. It is perhaps 
another when these processes dictate the availability of broader social opportunities or even 
material necessities. As Lori Andrews asks: “When young people in poor neighborhoods are 
bombarded with advertisements for trade schools, will they be more likely than others their age 
to forgo college? And when women are shown articles about celebrities rather than stock market 
trends, will they be less likely to develop financial savvy?”124 Assessing these outcomes, Turow 
laments the dissolution of a media landscape that, while flawed, offered a pluralistic balance of 
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society-making mass media and segment-making niche media.125 But even this critique 
underestimates the social costs of marketing-based discrimination.  
As early as 2000, critics employed the term “weblining” to describe the practice of 
denying people opportunities on the internet based on their marketing profiles.126 The label is a 
play on “redlining,” a descriptor of older discriminatory practices based on geography whereby 
the boundaries of poor, often minority, neighborhoods were mapped in red to indicate that 
services such as banking or telecommunications need not be offered. This notion gets to the root 
of the issue, which is a hardening of social class along lines of difference whereby marketing 
practices reproduce social discrimination and economic exploitation on the internet and beyond. 
In this scenario, the marketing complex is doing more than just sorting profiles according to 
differential consumer typologies. It is creating a system that when functioning optimally 
catalogues individuals as either valuable or worthless to highly specific processes of profit 
maximization.   
Keeping with the theme of finance in this study, I want to point to one example on the 
present-day frontier of marketing-based discrimination in the form of short-term consumer 
lending. In early 2013 The Economist reported that small market banks and short-term lending 
institutions – in conjunction with specialized consumer research companies – were beginning to 
use various marketing profile data to assess creditworthiness and adjust interest rates.127 In 
addition to normal loan application information, these lenders create consumer profiles by 
analyzing thousands of internet-based indicators such as location data, behavioral information, 
purchasing records, device data, and information culled from social networking sites like 
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Facebook. A startup called ZestFinance claims to examine 70,000 “signals” that are input into 
various underwriting algorithms to assess credit risk.128 Unsurprisingly, many of these startups 
have been funded by the same venture capitalists that financed the development of the 
surveillance infrastructure during the dotcom bubble.129   
Proponents argue that profiling of this nature optimizes credit markets, reduces risk for 
lenders, and opens up opportunities to borrowers who may have flawed credit scores according 
to conventional measures. The budding industry identifies those who qualify for loans but are 
unable to access them as “under-banked,” a population estimated to be in the many millions. 
When in need of cash, those among the under-banked resort to exorbitantly priced cash advances 
(“payday loans”) or go without. “Our mission [is] to use big data to save the under-banked 
billions of dollars in high fees,” said ZestFinance’s founder (and former Google executive) 
Douglas Merill .130   
What do claims of optimizing credit markets signify in relation to the themes presented in 
this chapter? Clearly profile-based lending relies on an upgraded surveillance infrastructure that 
operates through practices of marketing convergence, as evidenced when social networking sites 
become arbiters of creditworthiness. Clearly, the mission of ZestFinance and others is not simply 
to provide credit opportunities to greater numbers of “under-banked” individuals. It is about 
selling loans to the “right kinds” of borrowers by dramatically expanding the informational 
terrain from which such classifications are made. In Merill’s words, “We feel like all data is 
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credit data.”131 As Evgeny Morozov notes, if all data is credit data, then is not all data marketing 
data as well?132 There are already instances of profile-based lenders using consumer data to 
market additional financial products and other goods and services to existing customers. One 
UK-based lender entered into a sales partnership with a furniture retailer whereby its customers 
were given an exclusive opportunity to pay for furniture purchases via credit installments 
provided by the lender, high fees and interest rates notwithstanding.133  
Of course, sorting is as much a practice of exclusion as inclusion, and the broader and 
more integrated the sorting becomes, the greater the potential for discriminatory practices. As 
early as 1999 Acxiom offered a service called InfoBase Ethnicity System that provided a “broad 
and precise breakdown of ethnic, religious, and minority classifications” that could be matched 
with name, income, housing information, and other demographic data.134 According promotional 
materials, the service enabled marketers to reach, or perhaps ignore, categories of consumers as 
specific as “full-figured African American women.” Neo, another start-up in the lending sector, 
collects “evidence to determine if making racist comments on Facebook is correlated with a lack 
of creditworthiness.”135 If lenders are currently building automated systems that purport to 
interpret racist remarks on the internet, it does not require a great imagination to envision how 
algorithmic constructions of race might factor into many more applications of surveillance-based 
marketing. A 2012 investigation by the Wall Street Journal showed that internet retailers 
routinely engage in price discrimination based on information obtained from consumer 
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surveillance.136 What does it mean when different classifications of bodies, neighborhoods, and 
other markers of difference are indexed to creditworthiness and pricing? What about education 
or healthcare? Marketing-based surveillance of this nature extends beyond merely mapping the 
social territory as it is apprehended and begins to “dictate it along the segregated lines it reveals 
and then reinforces.”137 
Thinking through these questions returns us to the prescience of Gandy’s work in this 
area. To illustrate the prejudicial capacity of the panoptic sort, Gandy recounted the systematic 
denying of mortgage credit opportunities to qualified minority applications based upon a 
discriminatory index of race that had been generated by pre-web automated loan processing 
systems.138 As Tamara Shepherd argues, “target marketing does not just reflect user desires, it 
produces them in ways that are differential according to already existing structures of 
privilege.”139 In other words, discrimination is most likely to be exercised against lower income 
groups, non-whites, and women, who might be variously ascertained as “waste” by an inhuman 
and increasingly inhumane marketing apparatus.  
Finally, and from a different register, this example bears mentioning the broader 
relationship of debt to consumption. For decades, exploding consumer debt has functioned as an 
essential prop to demand in the US economy as wages for most earners have stagnated.140 In 
these circumstances, marketing-based discrimination in lending expresses a broader shift in 
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advertising’s historical role as a generator of demand. The mass marketing strategy was in many 
cases about selling as much as possible to as many as possible. While this model is by no means 
extinguished, it has been offset by changes in the marketing complex throughout in the latter part 
of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. As described in this dissertation, this is the 
shifting ground upon which targeted advertising was developed in part to mitigate the dissolution 
of the mass audiences of the network television era. Surveillance-based marketing is about 
boosting profits by selling more to the right people, the flipside of which entails eliminating 
efforts to reach undesirable customers and even pruning existing customers that are deemed 
unworthy. These efforts are economically justifiable if efficiency gains compensate for the loss 
of customers, while increased adoption of surveillance-based marketing enables businesses to 
target only those prospects of value in the future. Clearly, this undermines the notion of the 
marketplace as a democratic space where sellers and buyers conduct mutually beneficial 
transactions on a more or less even playing field. Wherever exclusion can be implemented more 
profitably than inclusion, we should expect increasingly stratified and discriminatory markets 
within an increasingly stratified and discriminatory capitalism.  
Industry is quick to point out that these surveillance systems are still under construction. 
An Advertising Age piece in March 2013 warned that the “Brutal Truth About ‘Big Data’” was 
that marketers are haphazardly rushing to compile “bigger data haystacks without necessarily 
getting any better at figuring out how to find the needle, or what to do with the needle when they 
find it.”141 Likewise, casual observers of targeted advertising often dismiss it due to the 
inaccuracy of certain implementations. I would posit that these are very much a secondary issues. 
When Gandy was writing about the panoptic sort, the state of the art marketing surveillance tools 
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were credit score reporting, consumer surveys, and customer loyalty programs like frequent flyer 
programs. Even if data collection and analysis perpetually fall short of marketers’ expectations, 
the socio-technical foundations of consumer surveillance are cemented within the prevailing 
system of capitalist development. As long as a surveillance infrastructure is animated by the 
desires of its operators, it will continue to identify, classify, and assign value. 
Digital Enclosure and the Asymmetry of Data Control: Yours is ours, but ours is not yours 
Revisiting themes introduced in the first chapter, the concept of “digital enclosure” offers a 
framework for evaluating the implications of an internet medium upon which surveillance has 
become a default setting.142 Beginning with the appropriation of cookies for advertising purposes 
in 1996, the means for consumer data collection were effectively embedded within the web’s 
technical architecture. Because this was still early in the web’s evolution, and because cookies in 
particular were easy to implement within HTTP, they quickly became a standard tool of web 
development. Cookies had a variety of applications in online commerce and elsewhere, but in the 
hands of ad networks they became a staple of targeted advertising.  
Soon after the appropriation of cookies by DoubleClick and others, industry observers 
anticipated their broad implementation and recognized the pressure web publishers would face to 
employ them for ad targeting purposes. “I don’t see how any site can not use cookies. 
Advertisers will demand it,” said one marketing executive.143 By 2000 the Wall Street Journal 
surmised that it was “too late to tinker with cookies now. They power practically every online 
shopping cart and every paid advertisement. In less than six years, they’ve become part of the 
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fabric of the web.”144 Corroborating the Journal’s claims, a series of studies by the Federal Trade 
Commission found the use of cookies for profiling web users to be “nearly ubiquitous.”145 The 
agency predicted “a 99% chance that, during a one-month period, a consumer surfing the busiest 
sites on the web will visit a site that collects personal identifying information.”146 
What was true in 2000 remains so today. Although the range of surveillance technologies 
has increased, cookies persist as a mainstay. A 2010 investigation revealed that the nation’s 50 
largest traffic-generating websites installed “on average 64 pieces of tracking technology onto 
the computers of visitors, usually with no warning.”147 Dictionary.com, owned by digital media 
conglomerate IAC/InterActive Corp, led the pack depositing some 234 tracking files.148 Many 
websites and applications provide limited functionality with cookies disabled. Some are entirely 
unusable. At the time of this writing, attempting to login to the Facebook social networking site 
with cookies disabled produces the following message: “Cookies Required: Cookies are not 
enabled on your browser. Please adjust this in your security preferences before continuing.”149  
From an infrastructure studies perspective, this development can be understood as an 
outcome of “technological momentum,” or “path dependence.”150 As Langdon Winner argued: 
“Because choices tend to become strongly fixed in material equipment, economic investment, 
and social habit, the original flexibility vanishes for all practical purposes once the initial 
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commitments are made.”151 In this manner the implementation of surveillance infrastructure has 
“fundamentally altered the nature of surfing the web from being a relatively anonymous activity, 
like wandering the streets of a large city, to the kind of environment where records of one’s 
transactions, movements and even desires could be stored, sorted, mined and sold.”152 This use 
of spatial metaphor, from no less radical an observer than the New York Times, evokes Mark 
Andrejevic’s concept of “digital enclosure,” described as the ongoing construction of an 
“interactive realm where every action generates information about itself.”153 The persistent 
monitoring of enclosed spaces forms the basis for the production of “secondary information 
commodities,” (e.g. behavioral data) which become the property of those conducting the 
surveillance and over which subjects of monitoring have little knowledge or control.154  
For Andrejevic, the digital enclosure concept signifies an important shift in media 
relations whereby participation in interactive spaces such as the internet is made to carry the 
conditions of surveillance. “Interactivity is not necessarily a two way street; more often than not 
it amounts to the offer of convenience in exchange for willing and unwilling submission to 
increasingly detailed forms of information gathering.”155 The term explicitly references a Marxist 
understanding of the land enclosure movements associated with the historical transition from 
feudalism to capitalism, which led to the formation of distinct social classes. Andrejevic argues 
that similar divisions have formed in privatized interactive spaces between those who control 
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them and those who submit to surveillance in order to gain access. The ironic outcome is an 
“asymmetrical loss of privacy” as individuals grow “increasingly transparent to both public and 
private monitoring agencies, even as the actions of these agencies remain stubbornly opaque in 
the face of technologies that make collecting, sharing, and analyzing large amounts of 
information easier than ever before.”156 Digital enclosure is thus an underlying condition of 
surveillance-based data collection that makes marketing-based discriminatory practices all the 
more injurious. Submission to surveillance is more than the price for the convenience of 
interactive media; it is increasingly the condition of access. Returning to the example of profile-
based consumer lending, those who might wish to “take advantage” of such credit opportunities 
are required to submit to broad forms of surveillance in order to pursue social mobility, or 
perhaps to simply make ends meet.  
A haphazard array of ad-blocking software and marketer “opt-out” mechanisms provides 
a veneer of individual autonomy and choice, but a majority of users lack the combination of 
awareness, technical savvy, and time required to direct their labor towards extricating themselves 
from digital enclosures. This claim is substantiated by surveys that indicate widespread disdain 
for profile-based advertising among internet users, but low levels of ad-blocking.157 If people 
were truly empowered to opt out, it seems most would have done so already. In any case, those 
equipped to try risk giving up the applications and services for which submission to surveillance 
is a condition of access.  
We do not own the information that is collected about us. In limited cases such as 
consumer credit reports, we may be entitled to review our profiles, for a small fee of course. In 
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others, consumers are granted no rights of access. Such is the circumstance with Acxiom, again, 
one of the country’s largest marketing information companies and a major supplier of consumer 
data for online advertising. The company holds information about some 500 million consumers 
worldwide, with over 1,500 data points per person.158 After a somewhat opaque process of 
requesting access to my own consumer profile via an online form and follow-up phone 
conversation, a representative from the company’s Privacy Compliance Team informed me that 
Acxiom does not make marketing information available for individuals to review under any 
circumstances. I could however review my basic demographic information to check for errors. 
The present discussion of individual awareness and choice, or the lack thereof, regarding 
marketing surveillance sets up the final chapter of the dissertation, which addresses the conflicts 
among corporate lobbyists, civil sector privacy advocates, and government regulators regarding 
online data collection and privacy policy in the late 1990s. 
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Chapter 5 
Internet Data Collection, Privacy Policy & Industry Self-Regulation 
This chapter switches gears to examine public policy, focusing on issues of internet data 
collection, disclosure, and consent, which were framed as matters of online privacy in the late 
1990s. Media systems are structured by government laws, regulations, and subsidies, behind 
which are various policy-making processes.1 In assessing the implications of media policies, it is 
important to consider not only those that have been enacted, but also those that have been 
proposed and ultimately rejected. In addition to the creation of favorable tax codes and 
establishment of a legal basis for online transactions and signatures, the commercialization of the 
internet and the development of online advertising in particular required that certain public 
interest efforts be thwarted, namely consumer protections in the form of online privacy laws. 
This chapter chronicles the defeat of meaningful privacy policy measures by private sector 
coalitions and explains how federal support for advertising industry “self-regulation” was 
maintained on the internet despite growing public concern over commercial data collection 
practices. Public interest activism is a big part of this history as privacy issues were one of the 
few entry points for organized civic intervention into online advertising’s development and 
indeed, commercial internet development at large.  
The flashpoint of this conflict was a controversy surrounding DoubleClick’s acquisition 
of the marketing database company Abacus Direct in 1999. At issue was whether the merged 
entities would combine anonymous online profile data with personally identifiable information 
obtained from offline sources. DoubleClick sought to merge its web-based profiles with Abacus’ 
consumer purchasing records that contained names, addresses, and other personally identifying 
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information. A number of privacy advocacy groups organized in opposition and applied 
significant pressure on legislators and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to halt the merger. 
However, this “focusing event” was merely the highest profile incident in an extended 
confrontation regarding what privacy advocates saw as an extended pattern of privacy violation 
perpetrated by the online advertising industry. 
The stakes were high for the marketing complex. Privacy issues resonated with the public 
and crosscut political party lines. At the height of the skirmish, Congress considering adopting 
“opt-in” legislation mandating that companies obtain prior consent from web users regarding 
data collection practices. This threatened to undermine the developing surveillance infrastructure 
business model that relied on pervasive surveillance as a default practice of internet use. Facing 
negative publicity, pending legislation, and regulatory scrutiny, a broad coalition of marketing 
trade associations and newly formed online ad industry groups fought to maintain the status quo 
of advertising self-regulation by exerting their influence over a policy-making system unfit to 
withstand concentrated commercial power. 
Privacy advocates achieved some successes, including stewarding the passage of the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) in 1998, pressuring DoubleClick to halt its 
plans for merging anonymous and personally identifiable profile information, and laboriously 
convincing the FTC to switch its stance from supporting industry self-regulation to 
recommending privacy legislation to Congress in 2000. Yet despite these public interest 
victories, industry won the war. While COPPA’s passage was a significant achievement, its 
protections were limited. The DoubleClick/Abacus merger was completed as intended, greatly 
expanding the company’s market power and profiling capacities. Most importantly, Congress did 
not act upon the FTC’s recommendation for broader online privacy legislation of any kind. 
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Flouting widespread public concern, a deeply flawed regime of industry self-regulation prevailed 
and remains the standard today. These political struggles stand among “the most historic events 
on the [United States] privacy timeline.”2 The policy regime that was enacted established a 
framework for data collection and consumer privacy on the internet at the start of the 21st 
century. It enabled commercial entities to freely conduct pervasive and surreptitious consumer 
surveillance in the absence of any governmental authority to enforce basic codes of conduct or 
provide mechanisms for redress. This chapter examines these events in detail and assesses the 
outcomes. 
Internet Policy in Context 
Online privacy lies at the intersection of two broader regulatory and legislative contexts: the 
fairly well delimited general policy framework that governs telecommunications, media, and 
advertising and the more nebulous set of policies that address privacy in various contexts. Unlike 
many other “developed countries,” the US has no federal agency devoted to implementing 
privacy policy. Instead privacy policy is enacted through an “incomplete patchwork of federal 
and state provisions that are inadequately enforced.”3 Apart from the Fourth Amendment’s 
restrictions on illegal search and seizure, the foundational privacy legislation is the Privacy Act 
of 1974, which requires federal agencies to apply a set of “fair information principles” to 
operations that involve the collection and use of personally identifiable information about 
individuals. Beyond these general guidelines, a range of privacy laws and regulations pertain to 
the uses of certain categories of information (e.g. educational and medical records), while 
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leaving out others (e.g. behavioral profiling data).4 As Colin Bennett argues, the general 
approach to privacy policy-making in the US is “reactive rather than anticipatory, incremental 
rather than comprehensive, and fragmented rather than coherent. There may be a lot of laws, but 
there is not much protection.”5 
Since the 1970s, telecommunications and media policy have followed a strong trajectory 
of what has been called “neo-liberalism,” whereby the US has led a sustained effort to open 
domestic and international markets to “free trade” and foreign investment and to privatize public 
telecommunications and media services.6 Implementation of neoliberal policy has often taken the 
form of so-called “deregulation,” which involves dismantling public interest protections in order 
to allow for “market-led” development. The power of the marketing complex to influence public 
policy has been a foundational element of the US commercial media system since the early 
decades of the 20th century.7 Wielding this power in the political system through lobbying, public 
relations, and litigation is, as they say, as American as apple pie and baseball, and the media and 
telecommunications sectors have long been among the nation’s most powerful private lobbies.8 
Over the last 80 years or so, the marketing complex “became part of the power structure in 
Washington politics, armed with a full arsenal of political weapons designed to deflect, disarm, 
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and undermine outside criticism.”9 And “like other powerful interests, the lobby enjoyed easy 
access to regulatory agencies, Congress, and the White House.”10  
The neoliberal trajectory within telecommunications and media policy is the antecedent 
to the zeitgeist of free market liberalism that permeated internet policy-making (among other 
areas) in the 1990s. As Karen Gustafson argues, during this period “dominant conceptualizations 
of the government and its proper regulatory role shifted substantially” while the public interest 
was “increasingly defined in terms of consumer opportunities, technological innovation, and 
national economic strength.”11 The booming financial markets were deployed to legitimize free 
market liberalism as a guiding policy principle, while the risk of undermining economic growth 
was commonly invoked as an argument against any regulation whatsoever of the internet. 
Undergirding this rationale was a technological utopianism, the sense that the internet inherently 
resists control, creates market efficiencies, and promotes democracy. As Robert McChesney 
points out, these mythologies are enticing because they hold certain elements of truth, but the 
larger consideration is that such discourses ideologically serve the dominant interests in society 
by dissuading public intervention and favoring the status quo.12 This is the context in which 
privacy advocates mounted a challenge to the emerging regime of consumer surveillance on the 
internet. Given the historical evolution and inertia of media policy-making, they had their work 
cut out for them.  
The dotcom era is rife with examples of neoliberal internet policy from the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 to the Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998 to President Clinton’s 
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Framework for Global Electronic Commerce. Released in 1997, the Framework was a landmark 
articulation of U.S. policy concerning the commercialization of the internet. Covering a wide 
range of issues, the Framework laid out a stringent market-led path for internet development that 
became a standard guideline for government and industry internet relations in the U.S. and 
among many of its trading partners. Within the broad scope of this document, the Clinton 
administration explicitly laid out a non-interventionist stance relating to online advertising and 
privacy issues, which set the stage for subsequent policy debates discussed herein. My ongoing 
archival research reveals that the policy positions advanced in Framework were the outcome of 
sustained collaboration with a core group of private sector interests including representatives of 
the advertising and direct marketing industries.13 
In the advertising sector, market-led policy development has gone hand in hand with so-
called industry “self-regulation,” whereby business organizations such as the Advertising Self-
Regulatory Council (formerly the National Advertising Review Council) set their own standards 
of conduct and enforcement mechanisms independently of government. Critical scholars have 
argued that terms such as deregulation and self-regulation are euphemistic, often resulting not in 
the erasure of public policy, but rather its reconfiguration to better serve commercial interests. As 
Inger Stole and Molly Niesen have each demonstrated, marketers and the advertising industry 
have been particularly effective in shaping advertising policy to favor self-regulation, defeating 
consumer movements that sought greater government protection against commercial abuse.14 
The conflict over online privacy and data collection was in many ways a continuation and 
recapitulation of these prior struggles.  
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It is useful to briefly outline the major actors before exploring the privacy narrative in 
detail. The field can be carved into three blocs: institutions of government, coalitions of 
companies from the marketing complex, and a network of privacy advocacy groups. Although 
there were points of internal dispute and competition within each of these groups, the marketers 
and the advocates consistently lined up opposite of each other regarding substantive online 
privacy issues. While individual states were active regarding online privacy issues, the present 
focus is upon national policy, specifically mediated through the institutions of the Federal Trade 
Commission, Congress, and the White House. The FTC has historically been the main policy 
arena for advertising regulation and was the most important agency involved in dotcom era 
privacy policy.15 Congress became involved in the latter part of the debate and played a crucial 
role as a legislative body. The White House was a secondary but consequential actor in that its 
support for self-regulation through the Framework for Global Economic Commerce and its 
concurrent negotiations with the European Union over trade agreements involving data 
protection/disclosure in many ways delimited the canvas for domestic privacy deliberations.  
A variety of overlapping collations of marketers, web publishers, and ad services 
providers were formed during this period to shape internet privacy policy. Two of the largest and 
most consequential were created expressly to promote advertising industry self-regulation and 
defeat proposed operational guidelines: the Online Privacy Alliance (OPA) and Network 
Advertising Initiative (NAI).16 Representing major companies from a broad spectrum of business 
sectors, these groups sought to “instill more confidence in private sector leadership on privacy 
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issues and head off government regulation.”17 The OPA and NAI were comprised not only of 
individual businesses, but also of trade groups such as the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB), 
which bills itself as the “the first organization devoted exclusively to maximizing the use and 
effectiveness of internet advertising.”18 While the IAB was formed to set industry standards for 
ad buying processes, audience measurement, and to tabulate overall ad spending, it soon adapted 
its mission to include public policy, marking as the first of its six core objectives to “fend off 
adverse legislation and regulation.”19 The Direct Marketing Association (DMA), which at the 
time represented some 3,600 companies, was also highly active on privacy issues.20 
I employ Bennett’s notion of privacy advocacy networks to describe the community of 
largely non-profit civil society groups that organized to “challenge the development of the 
increasingly intrusive ways by which personal information [was] captured and processed” on the 
internet medium.21 Here civil society refers to the social field that is outside the direct control of 
both the state and private sector. Among the most important organizations within this network 
were the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Center for Media Education (CME), and 
Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT). EPIC and CDT were each established in 1994 to 
“focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First 
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Amendment, and constitutional values” in the area of communications technologies.22 More 
liberal and less libertarian, CME’s mission was “improving the quality of electronic media, 
especially on the behalf of children and families.”23 Other important groups were the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, JunkBusters, Privacy International, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, and the 
editors of two newsletters, Evan Hendricks of Privacy Times and Alan F. Westin of Privacy and 
American Business.24 
Examining the various motivations and rationales behind the policy engagement of these 
groups is beyond the scope of this study.25 The present focus is primarily on their collective 
actions to confront what they perceived as corporate over-reaching regarding online data 
collection for marketing purposes. Nowhere was this over-reaching more strident than in the case 
of DoubleClick’s merger with Abacus in 1999; however, the merger represented the peak of a 
more protracted confrontation with the online advertising industry that began in the mid-1990s.  
Politicizing Online Data Collection and Privacy 
While data collection began to be addressed in public policy in the late 1960s and 70s as a result 
of growing government and corporate capacity for surveillance, it did not become a broad issue 
of political salience until the 1990s.26 Prior to the popularization of the internet and the world 
wide web, there was some recognition among elites of potential privacy implications regarding 
the Clinton administration’s plan to create a National Information Infrastructure (NII). As early 
as 1993, the White House identified privacy as a goal of the NII and the issue was nominally on 
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the agenda of the Telecommunications Policy Roundtable, a coalition of public interest groups 
concerned about telecommunications and interactive media.27 
Worries relating to internet privacy protection were aired in 1994 when Representative 
Edward Markey, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, 
publicly chastised the commercial online service provider America Online for selling lists of its 
subscribers to marketing information firms.28 Earlier that year, Markey sponsored legislation that 
would have “required that companies amassing customer databases tell consumers that such 
information was being collected and allow them to prohibit their names and data from being 
sold.”29 In this early stage, some online service providers and web publishers bristled at the 
negative publicity and remained cautious about committing the resources needed to build and 
sell databases of their users. As shown in previous chapters, inhibitions among holdouts quickly 
vanished as more commercial online services, web publishers, and early ad networks such as 
DoubleClick began experimenting with forms of online consumer surveillance.  
Media advocacy groups such as the Center for Media Education (CME) were well aware 
of the marketing complex’s determination to influence the development of interactive media. 
The advertising trade press was abuzz about new media’s potential for personalized “one-to-one” 
relationship marketing.30 Searching for a point of intervention, the CME began a study of the 
website Kids.com in 1995. While basic corporate websites were becoming more common by that 
time, Kids.com was one of the first popular sites with the primary function of collecting 
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marketing data. As the name suggests, the site was geared towards children ages 4-15. For media 
advocates “children’s issues were a good starting point,” as they were “harder to argue against” 
and presented better opportunities to attract much needed funding.31 
CME discovered that Kids.com hosted product offers, sweepstakes, and contests in the 
form of a digital playground of interactive entertainment and games. Access was dependent upon 
user registration that included a lengthy questionnaire designed to collect marketing data. 
Children were asked to give their names, gender identities, media preferences, even to divulge 
their “hopes and dreams” in order to populate profile databases that could be sold to marketers of 
cereal and soft drinks.32 Upon these initial results CME broadened its study to include sites 
created by major children’s marketers such as Disney, Kellogg, and Pepsi. 
In March 1996 CME released its findings in a report titled Web of Deception. The 
document made strong accusations of prevalent “invasion of children’s privacy through 
solicitation of personal information and tracking of online computer use and exploitation of 
vulnerable, young computer users through new unfair and deceptive forms of advertising.”33 It 
called for an immediate end to the collection of children’s personal information and for clear 
separation between commercial messages and content directed to young audiences on the 
internet. The report generated exposure in major newspapers at a time when there was little 
public knowledge about online marketing in general, let alone that geared toward children. Much 
of the prior attention paid to children’s internet use regarded issues of access to “indecent” 
content.34 The CME report effectively placed online advertising and data collection practices on 
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the civic advocacy agenda. It also initiated a “public shaming” of the companies involved, 
marshaling enough negative publicity such that General Foods postponed the launch of its new 
website for children.35  
Equally important, the CME’s efforts turned some heads in Washington. The group deftly 
briefed the Federal Trade Commission prior to the report’s release and shortly thereafter filed a 
formal complaint against Kids.com alleging deceptive advertising practices.36 Though the agency 
had limited authority to regulate online marketing in any broad sense, it was empowered to act 
on individual complaints about deceptive and fraudulent advertising practices and it began an 
investigation of Kids.com. As the report was making headlines, a concurrent story broke in the 
press regarding the use of HTML cookies as online tracking devices. The San Jose Mercury 
News was among the first to run the story under the headline “Leading Web Browsers May 
Violate Privacy of Users’ Computers, Activities.”37 A media narrative centering on internet 
privacy was beginning to take shape. 
While the Web of Deception report framed the issue of in terms of surreptitious data 
collection, deceptive marketing practices, exploitation of children, and privacy violations, the 
media tended to highlight only the technology and privacy elements of the story. In this way, the 
issue began to be defined as primarily about threats to privacy, rather than data collection more 
broadly. Nevertheless, coverage by major media outlets provided an important publicity boost to 
advocates who were beginning to build more coherent networks around these issues. They 
tapped into the ongoing mobilization of activists in opposition to the Telecommunications Act of 
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1996, but this parallel campaign also thinned their resources.38 As they organized, advocates 
embraced the privacy frame as well, as it helped to broaden their coalition by bringing in groups 
like EPIC and was seen to have wider public appeal. 
Meanwhile, the Clinton administration was negotiating with the European Union over the 
harmonization of international data transfer privacy protections and data collection standards. 
The EU’s recently enacted “Directive on the Protection of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data” contained strong privacy guidelines for EU member states that 
disallowed “data transfer” with countries that failed to provide an “adequate level of 
protection.”39 Set to take effect in October 1998, the EU Directive posed a hazard to US 
transnational corporations and to the administration’s strident “hands-off” approach to internet 
regulation. Specifically, it threatened to impede the estimated $120 billion “personal 
information” market between the US and EU that operated according to laissez faire principles.40 
To deal with this problem, Clinton employed the Department of Commerce and the FTC to more 
or less steward the development of industry self-regulation regarding online privacy in order to 
appease the concerns of EU policy-makers over US data practices.41 
This confluence of events forced a reluctant FTC to place online privacy at the center of 
its regulatory agenda, where it would remain for the next four years. The agency’s Bureau of 
Consumer Protection had actually begun a “Consumer Privacy Initiative” in 1995, but it was not 
until mid-1996 that it began to address online privacy in a sustained way. In June the FTC 
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convened the first of what became a string of hearings about online privacy issues. A Public 
Workshop on Consumer Privacy on the Global Information Infrastructure invited testimony and 
discussion from a mix of private companies and coalitions from the marketing complex, 
advocacy groups, and government. Through the Workshop, the FTC adopted what Kathryn 
Montgomery calls a “softball approach to prodding the industry” to take online privacy matters 
into its own hands.42 FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky reportedly opened the proceedings by 
assuring participants (and no doubt the White House) that the commission was “not here to lay 
the groundwork for any government rules, guidelines, or otherwise.”43 
Participants representing the marketing complex included CASIE, ANA, AAAA, DMA, 
Netscape, and the online service provider Prodigy, while CME, EPIC, Privacy Times, and CDT 
represented privacy advocates. A range of alternatives to regulation were discussed, including 
technology-based solutions, consumer and business education, and industry self-regulation. As 
summarized in an FTC staff report: 
Industry representatives and trade associations took the position that it would be both 
inappropriate and counterproductive to mandate particular privacy protections. According 
to these participants, regulation would stifle the creativity and innovation that have 
marked the development of interactive media to date, could infringe important First 
Amendment rights, and might force marketers off the internet entirely. Government 
should step back, it was argued, and permit industry to develop privacy protection 
models. Privacy advocates argued that the technologies demonstrated during the 
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Workshop are not a substitute for an enforceable code of fair information practices, and 
that they are not likely to flourish without government enforcement of privacy rights.44 
The FTC determined that the marketing complex needed additional time to implement a self-
regulatory framework and recommended convening a follow-up workshop. 
Prior to the CME report and FTC gathering, the marketing complex had shown little 
concern for online privacy issues.45 What scant recognition had occurred was largely empty 
rhetoric. In February 1996 CASIE formulated a general list of “goals for protecting consumer 
privacy in interactive media,” but included no plans for implementation.46 At the time the 
internet was still an untested advertising medium with a small, but rapidly growing user base. 
Marketers were largely ambivalent about its future, although many had committed resources to 
building corporate home pages, including those profiled in the CME’s Web of Deception report. 
Reacting to the report, Advertising Age called the proposed limits on children’s marketing “a 
chilly prospect for responsible marketers who value the ability to innovate and experiment in this 
medium, free of detailed do’s and don’ts,” and warned that such restrictions would “stifle 
promising experiments.”47 Arguments of this nature became a mantra for the marketing complex 
as it slowly began to awaken to the need to extend the regime of self-regulation to online media.  
After the FTC workshop, the trade press began to address the issue more forcefully. In a 
single issue at the end of 1996, Advertising Age published no less than six articles celebrating the 
25th anniversary of the “organized self-regulation of national advertising” and linking its history 
to present concerns. The publication called for efforts to ensure that self-regulation would remain 
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standard practice on the internet.48 “Twenty-five years ago, self-regulation rescued advertising 
from a credibility crisis. It can do the same for the new controversies facing the industry today if 
the industry displays the courage and foresight it did in 1971,” declared one editorial.49 “Self-
regulation is a success story in which businessmen, by accepting responsibility for their actions, 
have gotten the government off their backs,” stated another.50 Although Advertising Age was 
sounding the alarm (no doubt in part to drum up controversial headlines on its own behalf), 
industry had few reasons to perceive government regulation as a credible threat. Indeed, one of 
the editorials mentioned above included a quote from FTC Chairman Pitofsky regarding his 
opinion of advertising self-regulation: “I’ve often said it’s the best and most reliable industry 
self-regulation program I’m aware of. From my point of view it was well conceived in the first 
place and is a first-class operation today.”51 
In June 1997 the FTC held a series of follow-up hearings where privacy advocates and 
marketing complex representatives faced off once again over children’s advertising and internet 
privacy more generally. “Last year we examined the issues and the industry said, ‘Let us take a 
crack at self-regulation.’ Now, one year later, we are examining whether they were able to create 
self-regulatory or technological tools to protect consumers’ privacy,” said FTC Commissioner 
Christine Varney.52 This time around industry took the issue more seriously, but only marginally 
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so.53 In cooperation with CASIE, the Children’s Advertising Review Unit of the Council of 
Better Business Bureaus (CARU) developed guidelines regarding children’s online marketing 
that involved obtaining parental consent and labeling advertising as such.54 The Direct Marketing 
Association (DMA) spoke of a Privacy Action Campaign aimed at persuading marketers to 
create and adopt their own standards for protecting consumer privacy.55 These non-binding and 
sparsely implemented programs were little more than public relations efforts aimed to preempt 
the mild threat of FTC regulation. 
At the hearings various marketing complex coalitions including CARU, DMA, ISA, and 
an ad hoc group of database companies led by Lexis-Nexis and major credit information 
providers repeated the declaration that the rapid advancement of internet technologies eliminated 
any need for governmental action concerning online privacy.56 Companies had economic 
incentives to build the trust and confidence of internet consumers, they argued. As DMA 
President H. Robert Wientzen argued, regulation threatened to “easily disrupt the development of 
a very useful tool for consumers, and, indeed, a useful tool for business, which is going to have a 
significant impact on the US and on global economies.”57 
Technology-based solutions were proposed as well, although most were in nascent stages 
of development. Microsoft, Netscape, and more than 60 other companies threw their support 
behind the creation of an Open Profiling Standard (OPS), a method for “users to give their 
consent before their personal information is handed off to a website.”58 OPS was part of a wider 
proposal by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) called the Platform for Privacy 
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Preferences (P3P), backed by a group of companies including AOL and IBM. The creator of the 
web, Tim Berners-Lee, himself showcased a prototype of how P3P might enable users to ensure 
that the websites they visit would fall within a range of chosen privacy practices. Among the 
supporters of P3P was the Clinton Administration, which, favoring extra-governmental solutions, 
installed an early version of the system on the White House website as a show of good faith.59 
The privacy seal program TRUSTe (formerly eTrust) was presented as well. Created as a 
partnership among the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and various private sector entities, 
TRUSTe was a certification program whereby participating sites would display “third-party” 
verified privacy seals that were meant to indicate their data collection practices. Such 
technological solutions were meant to provide web users with the tools to negotiate with web 
publishers and marketers over specific levels of data collection and privacy protection. As such 
they relied not only on active participation by the marketing complex, but were heavily 
dependent upon consumer awareness and labor. As Esther Dyson, chairman of the libertarian-
leaning EFF and TRUSTe put it without a trace of irony: “we believe that the alternative to 
government regulation is not really [industry] self-regulation but it is customer regulation.”60  
Many within the marketing complex were enthusiastic about such technological fixes to 
the extent that they “might stave off government regulation,” though some prickled at the 
impracticality of such measures, arguing that consumers should simply accept data collection in 
exchange for content that was personalized and free of charge.61 “Most of the millions of 
Americans that flocked to the web in recent years know and accept a big dose of commercialism 
                                                
59 David P. Baron, “DoubleClick and Internet Privacy [Stanford Graduate School of Business Case no. P-32],” 
August, 2000, 8. 
60 Federal Trade Commission, Public Workshop on Consumer Information Privacy, Session Two: Consumer Online 
Privacy, Testimony of Esther Dyson, June 11, 1997, 106. 
61 Ira Teinowitz, “Net privacy debate spurs self-regulation,” Advertising Age, June 9, 1997; Debra Aho Williamson, 
“Neteffect: Privacy and ad revenue issues impede growth,” Advertising Age, June 16, 1997. 
213 
in their media,” huffed Advertising Age.62  Law scholar Janlori Goldman of the CDT countered 
that privacy should be treated as a basic right and that internet participation should not hinge 
upon “trading your privacy for some kind of benefit.”63 Along these lines, EPIC’s Marc 
Rotenberg referred to P3P as “pretty poor privacy,” criticizing it as a technology meant not to 
protect privacy, but “to enable the disclosure of personal information.”64  
More generally, privacy advocates critiqued industry proposals as insufficient and 
contended that self-regulation lacked the necessary enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
meaningful privacy protection. They also criticized the lack of transparency in data collection 
practices, arguing that “average consumers did not know their activity was being tracked let 
alone how the information was being used.”65 They claimed that consumers should be granted 
access to information collected about them and have some measure of control over it, including 
the right to “opt-out” of data collection entirely.66 EPIC in particular argued that consumers 
should have the option to retain total anonymity online while preserving the freedom to do what 
they wish, including engaging in business transactions.67 
Shortly after this second hearing the FTC issued a ruling in support of CME’s complaint 
against Kids.com. The agency found that the site’s data-collection practices violated rules on 
deceptive advertising, but did not pursue punitive action as the company had agreed to provide 
better notice of its activities through a privacy policy declaration. Montgomery argued that this 
still represented a victory for privacy advocates because it laid out a framework for how sites 
should handle children’s data collection in the future, i.e. posting privacy policies and obtaining 
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parental permission before releasing information to third parties.68 However, despite the finding 
of wrongdoing on behalf of Kids.com and the general disarray of industry self-regulation efforts, 
FTC Chairman Pitofsky announced that the agency would yet again refrain from pursuing any 
regulatory actions and instead “give new industry initiatives more time to take effect.”69 The 
announcement coincided with the Clinton administration’s release of its Framework for Global 
Electronic Commerce, which strongly articulated that the “private sector should lead” internet 
development – a process that was steadily underway by 1997. 
By the end of that year it was increasingly clear that industry was not implementing 
meaningful self-regulation, even at the basic level of providing notice of data collection practices 
via privacy policies. In November, a survey by TRUSTe found that 80 of the 100 most popular 
websites had not yet posted a privacy policy of any kind.70 Around this time journalists revealed 
a plan by AOL to match its subscribers’ online information with offline records purchased from 
direct marketing companies such as Polk and MetroMail.71 The goal was to create better profiles 
for targeted advertising. Consent to these practices was buried deep within AOL’s terms of 
service agreement, but not explicitly articulated in any privacy policy. Susan Scott, executive 
director of TRUSTe called the move “a gross violation of privacy,” explaining that consumers 
gave AOL their credit card numbers and addresses for billing purposes, not to be matched with 
marketing profiles sold by marketing database companies.72 
Still, government regulation did not appear to be a genuine threat to certain thought-
leaders within the marketing complex. While stressing the importance of self-regulation, on the 
whole Advertising Age remained highly dismissive of the concerns of so-called “privacy 
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freak[s]”: “What does it matter that my local Jewel grocery store knows I buy three bagels every 
week: two plain and one cinnamon-raisin? Or that the DoubleClick ad network knows how many 
times I’ve seen an ad on one of the sites they rep? … When it comes to private data, most 
consumers either won’t know what’s going on, or won’t care.”73 
At the same time, public anxiety over privacy issues was becoming increasingly difficult 
to ignore, especially concerning children. One survey showed that a majority of online 
consumers attempted to “steer away from data gathering sites,” were “worr[ied] about child 
exploitation,” and did not believe that new technologies would solve such problems.74 Another 
found that 80 percent of consumers believed that policies or legislation would be necessary to 
protect internet privacy.75 Ira Magaziner, President Clinton’s top policy advisor on electronic 
commerce issues and one of the principle negotiators with the EU regarding data collection, 
began to publicly support children’s online privacy legislation in late 1997.76 Considering the 
White House’s support for private sector led internet development, this was somewhat of an 
about face, which some observers saw as an attempt to provoke industry action toward more 
concrete self-regulation. However, Magaziner had been in contact with CME regarding 
children’s privacy since at least 1996 and said in an interview that the administration had 
intended to support legislation in this area from the beginning.77 These details notwithstanding, 
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The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
As the web became more of a mainstream advertising platform, the stakes regarding privacy 
policy were raised. The number of internet users was rapidly expanding, as was the dotcom 
bubble. Flush with finance capital, ad services providers like DoubleClick and CMGI were 
creating more advanced and more expansive forms of consumer surveillance. Under lobby by 
privacy advocates, the FTC launched a detailed survey of web privacy practices and industry 
self-regulation efforts early in 1998. The plan was to assess industry’s progress since the 1997 
workshops in order to make recommendations to Congress by the summer. It was the 
Commission’s first hint that it would consider advocating for legislation. As EPIC’s Marc 
Rotenberg told the press: It was “time to move beyond public relations and get on with the hard 
work of privacy protection.”78 
There was a renewed sense of urgency within the marketing complex and a growing 
realization that regulation was no longer an empty threat. “It’s a massive mistake to ignore 
Washington,” warned one marketing consultant.79 “The industry is maturing, and we have to act 
like grown-ups.”80 Trade associations and individual companies formed new ad hoc groups to 
coordinate self-regulatory efforts and lobby government officials. The most prominent of the 
newly formed coalitions was the Online Privacy Alliance (OPA), a broad collective of over 85 
companies whose core mission was to advance self-regulation for the internet advertising sector. 
The OPA was comprised of industry leaders from all components of the marketing complex (e.g. 
Disney, Procter & Gamble, the DMA, and DoubleClick) as well as ancillary sectors such as 
information technology and computing (e.g. Intel and Apple) and telecommunications (e.g. 
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AT&T).81 In addition to mustering a multi-faceted lobbying campaign (outlined below), the OPA 
created privacy policy templates for member companies to modify to suit their needs. In related 
efforts, the Better Business Bureau announced its own privacy certification program called BBB 
Online and the DMA instituted a rule barring membership to marketers that did not have a 
privacy policy in place by July 1999.82  
Some of the largest companies involved with online data collection began to post 
individual privacy polices during this period. DoubleClick and others even moved to create “opt-
out” mechanisms, whereby consumers could choose to withdraw from surveillance and ad 
targeting. Although these were significant steps, the implementations were seriously flawed (as 
will be addressed in detail below). For now it suffices to note that privacy policies were often 
written in vague and inaccessible language and opt-out mechanisms were partial at best. Beyond 
this there was no cohesiveness or accountability among privacy protection efforts across the 
various components of the marketing complex, while some major marketing collations still 
remained nonchalant about privacy matters. In August 1998 Proctor & Gamble organized a 
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gathering of marketers and ad agencies called the Future of Advertising Stakeholders Summit 
(FAST). The assembly was a reboot of CASIE, meant to catalyze the internet industry to address 
problems relating to audience measurement standards, consumer acceptance of ads, and online 
media buying.83 Notably absent from the docket were efforts towards addressing issues of online 
data collection and privacy. 
While industry began to organize, privacy advocates formed their own coalitions to lobby 
the FTC, White House, and the private sector itself. Anticipating that Congress would not fully 
commit to legislation absent the buy-in of at least some of the powerful corporations in the 
children’s media sector, the CME reached out to EPIC, the CFA, and the National PTA in order 
to start behind-the-scenes negotiations with Disney, AOL, and other major companies to forge an 
agreement on a regulatory framework for children’s online marketing.84   
In June the FTC reported the findings of its study to Congress. Examination of over 1,400 
websites showed that while the vast majority (85%) of sites collected consumer information, 
very few (14%) provided any notice whatsoever of such practices, and fewer still (2%) provided 
comprehensive privacy policies.85 About half (56%) of sites directed to children disclosed their 
data collection practices, though less than 10% provided means for parental control over the 
collection and use of information from children. The study revealed that while industry leaders 
were making halting steps toward the most basic of privacy protections, the majority of the 
online advertising sector continued to operate without regard for public concerns. Chairmen 
Pitofsky called such efforts “disappointing” and warned that the Commission’s patience in 
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awaiting self-regulatory solutions was wearing thin.86 In what became another milestone for 
privacy advocates, the FTC recommended that Congress pursue legislation that would facilitate 
parental control over the collection and use of children’s personal information online.87 On the 
heels of this recommendation, the popular online home page publisher GeoCities settled an 
earlier case brought by the FTC concerning deceptive privacy and data collection practices. 
Accused of “obtaining information from children under 13 without seeking proper parental 
approval and misrepresenting how personal information gathered from adults was being used,” 
GeoCities agreed to implement a series of reforms including the deletion of all information 
gathered from children without parental consent.88    
Responding to the FTC and increasing public concern, the 106th Congress began to look 
into issues pertaining to children’s advertising and internet privacy more generally. The White 
House officially endorsed children’s privacy legislation as well, and major companies in the 
sector decided to “cut their losses” and work to shape the law that was likely coming.89 These 
developments enabled the bi-partisan passage of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA) in late 1998. The statute created basic standards for the collection and use of children’s 
(defined as under age 13) data by website operators to be enforced by the FTC.90 Despite 
COPPA’s relative tameness, it was nonetheless criticized by the DMA and other industry groups 
for making it more difficult and expensive for advertisers to reach children.91 
While the FTC had stepped up to advocate for children, data collection regarding adults 
remained a different matter. In what essentially amounted to yet another punt, the Commission 
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refrained from making any substantive recommendations concerning online privacy more 
broadly, noting that it would “make recommendations on this subject this summer [of 1998].”92 
Summer passed and the FTC was silent, despite the claims of privacy advocates that industry 
self-regulation was an obvious failure. Though it refused to act, the FTC seemed to agree with 
this assessment, summarizing in 1998: 
The Commission has encouraged industry to address consumer concerns regarding online 
privacy through self-regulation. To date, however, the Commission has not seen an 
effective self-regulatory system emerge. As evidenced by the Commission’s survey 
results, and despite the Commission’s three-year privacy initiative supporting a self-
regulatory response to consumers’ privacy concerns, the vast majority of online 
businesses have yet to adopt even the most fundamental fair information practice[s].93 
The FTC’s hesitance seems to be traceable to the pressure applied by industry 
representatives and the White House to stall broad legislative or regulatory recommendations. 
The marketing complex argued that it was making significant progress and that more time was 
needed. Facing continuing negotiations regarding the EU data protection directive, the Clinton 
administration remained strongly in favor of industry-developed solutions. However, the White 
House increasingly threatened government intervention should self-regulation fail to 
materialize.94 In this light, COPPA’s passage seemed to be born in part of political expediency. 
As Montgomery notes, “By focusing on children the government was able to demonstrate that it 
was taking decisive action to protect online privacy, while also buying additional time for 
industry to get its act together.”95  
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COPPA’s passage did in fact spur increased action within the marketing complex to set 
self-regulatory standards regarding privacy issues. In 1998 and into 1999 the OPA and others 
achieved some success in standardizing the basic practice of posting privacy policies and 
disclosures among most major online websites. It helped that OPA members Microsoft and IBM, 
each among the net’s largest marketers, announced they would no longer advertise on any site 
that failed to post a comprehensive privacy policy. Wary of Congressional action and public 
concern, these companies and other major marketers began to view a disregard for online privacy 
as “a top barrier to the continued growth of e-commerce.”96 Microsoft even developed a web-
based “privacy wizard” tool to automate the writing of privacy policies for website 
administrators. Additionally, advertising infrastructure providers, heretofore relatively 
underrepresented in Washington, formed a trade association of their own: the Networking 
Advertising Initiative (NAI). Members included DoubleClick, NetGravity, 24/7 Media, CMGI’s 
ADSmart and Engage, and others. The NAI’s principal tasks were mapping out a self-regulatory 
framework for the online ad services industry and formalizing a more comprehensive opt-out 
mechanism for consumers.97 Together with the OPA, the NAI became a fixture in Washington 
policy discussions during this period.  
DoubleClick, Abacus, and Personally Identifiable Information 
In the summer of 1999, a high profile controversy erupted over the proposed merger between 
DoubleClick and the marketing database company Abacus Direct. David Todd argues that this 
transaction became a “focusing event” that engendered a wide politicization of privacy issues 
that might have otherwise remained suppressed.98 Of course, this was only the case because the 
merger occurred within the ongoing conflict among government, industry, and privacy advocates 
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that had been building momentum since the CME released its Web of Deception report in early 
1996. Nonetheless, the DoubleClick/Abacus merger was singularly important in that it 
represented the most sweeping attempt to date to link anonymous online profile information with 
personally identifiable information (PII) culled from everyday offline consumption practices. 
Stridently opposed to the move to attach names to online profiles, EPIC, CDT, and CME 
organized a coalition campaign to oppose the merger.99 Such advocacy efforts prompted a formal 
FTC investigation into DoubleClick’s data collection practices, brought a new level of publicity 
regarding online privacy issues to the general public and Congress, and clarified the limits of 
self-regulation, namely the lack of enforcement mechanisms to ensure that companies actually 
complied with their own self-imposed privacy standards. 
At the time DoubleClick was the largest online advertising infrastructure company and 
was expanding rapidly via the financial engine of the dotcom bubble. When the Abacus merger 
was announced, DoubleClick had just recently acquired its biggest rival in the ad services sector, 
NetGravity. Its new target, Abacus, maintained a massive consumer purchasing database that 
contained information about some 90% of US households compiled from catalog records, 
magazine subscriptions, and retail transactions.100 While DoubleClick’s 120 million profiles 
were ostensibly anonymous, Abacus’ 88 million profiles contained PII such as names and 
residential addresses. As the Wall Street Journal explained: “If you’ve bought anything from a 
large department store or a catalog lately, Abacus probably has your name and address, what you 
bought, and how much you spent.”101 
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Beyond the sheer magnitude of the stockpile of consumer information that would result 
from the combination of these two companies, privacy advocates worried that DoubleClick’s 
move to merge anonymous online data with identifiable offline data would become standard 
practice. In response, representatives from CME, EPIC, Junkbusters, Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, and the US Public Interest Research Group wrote an open letter to DoubleClick 
and Abacus executives, copying key members of Congress across party lines.102 The letter 
charged that the merger would “fundamentally change the internet from an anonymous space to 
one where consumers are silently identified” and criticized DoubleClick’s opt-out mechanism as 
meaningless absent more robust implementation and wider awareness of its availability.103 They 
sent similar letters to the shareholders of both companies, encouraging them to disapprove of the 
merger. 
DoubleClick replied indirectly through the trade press saying that not only was it against 
company policy to merge such information, but it was also technically impossible to achieve.104 
The anonymity of consumer profiles had long been a standard rhetorical shield used by online 
data gatherers to deflect privacy-related criticism. As DoubleClick CEO Kevin O’Connor liked 
to say, “We can’t invade anyone’s privacy because we don’t know who you are.”105 Moreover, 
the company argued that “truly paranoid” web users could opt-out of its tracking program via its 
website.106 Receiving no direct acknowledgement from either company, advocates sent a third 
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letter in November, this time addressed to managers of “socially responsible mutual funds.”107 
They warned of the “harmful social effects of the imminent merger” and framed online 
advertising practices as “severely damaging the fundamental human right of privacy.”108 The 
letter concluded by asking fund managers to divest holdings of both companies, add them to 
screening lists of businesses that are to be avoided for disregarding human rights, and support 
shareholder activism towards these ends. 
Despite these efforts, stock prices were rising for both companies leading up to the 
merger, which was successfully completed on November 23, 1999. The dotcom bubble was in a 
full-blown frenzy at this point, pricing the final deal at $1.8 billion and spiking DoubleClick’s 
market value to some $8.8 billion.109 Shortly after the new year DoubleClick quietly removed its 
pledge to keep consumer profiles anonymous from its privacy policy, obliquely revealing its 
plans to merge Abacus’ databases with its own in order to build “consumer profiles that would 
include each user’s name and address; retail, catalog and online purchase history; and 
demographic data.”110 Press reports indicated that DoubleClick began working to combine the 
data almost immediately after the merger, achieving what it previously described as technically 
“impossible” by creating a merged database with a test group of 100,000 profiles.111 This was 
accomplished “through an alliance of undisclosed data-sharing sites” [called the Abacus Online 
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Network] that enabled DoubleClick to collect PII from web users, link the information to its 
profile database, and then match the named profiles with Abacus’ records.112 Highlighting the 
limits of trade association-led self-regulation, both DoubleClick and Abacus were leading 
members of the DMA and OPA. 
In early February, privacy advocates led by EPIC filed a complaint with the FTC alleging 
that DoubleClick was “unlawfully tracking the online activities of internet users and combining 
surfing records with detailed personal profiles.”113 EPIC argued that the merger of the two 
databases violated prior assurances of anonymity and therefore ran afoul of rules regarding 
deceptive advertising practices. The complaint requested that the FTC require DoubleClick to 
obtain permission for all future data collection practices, destroy all wrongfully acquired profile 
information, and pay civil penalties. At the same time, an overlapping coalition of advocates 
organized a public letter-writing campaign opposing the data-matching practices. The CDT 
created an email application that enabled individuals to send complaints to DoubleClick and 60 
of its clients.114 One such client, TheStreet.com, reported receiving 2,200 emails within a few 
days of the campaign’s launch. Within three weeks some 25,000 people had sent messages to 
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DoubleClick, while “several thousand” had written to clients.115 Organizers of both campaigns 
issued press releases to media outlets regarding their efforts.  
The public relations fallout proved substantial. The Washington Post called DoubleClick 
“one of the most vilified companies in the online world” and USA Today reported that it had 
become  “the media’s poster boy for bad behavior on the web.”116 Responding to EPIC’s 
complaint, the FTC opened a formal investigation into DoubleClick’s data collection practices, 
while a number of state’s attorneys general initiated inquiries of their own.117 It was also 
revealed that the company had been implicated in several civil lawsuits involving alleged 
improper consumer profiling without consent.118 Perhaps most damaging was the attendant 
slippage of its stock in a financial market that had already begun to show signs of impending 
collapse. Upon news of the FTC investigation, DoubleClick’s share price reportedly dropped by 
25% in a single day.119 
Initially, DoubleClick responded to the criticism by digging in its heels. It is telling that 
one of its first countermeasures was to hire a politically connected former congressional staffer 
as its new director of public policy and government affairs, i.e.: “lead lobbyist.”120 The company 
also stepped up its public relations efforts, announcing a consumer education campaign that 
included full page advertisements in the New York Times as well as 50 million banner 
impressions directing web users to a newly created website, Privacychoices.org.121 DoubleClick 
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also attempted to qualify (albeit in vague terms) the scope of its data collection, saying it did not 
use “highly sensitive information for profiling such as health information, detailed financial 
information, information of a sexual nature, and information on children.”122 It also maintained 
that it would “not link personally identifiable information about a user to online behavior without 
first giving that user notice and the choice not to participate.”123  
This rhetoric of consumer notice and choice (or “user empowerment”) was a constant 
refrain among defenders of online profiling. On the ground however, DoubleClick’s mechanisms 
for consumer control were far less empowering than the company claimed. First, DoubleClick’s 
default practice was to link online profile data with offline PII whenever possible via its Abacus 
Online Network. As stated in its privacy policy: “Unless specifically disclosed to the contrary in 
a website’s privacy policy, most non-personally-identifiable information collected by 
DoubleClick from websites on the DoubleClick Network is included in the Abacus Online 
database.”124 Further, DoubleClick essentially offloaded the burden of disclosing its own data 
collection practices to its massive network of affiliates and clients. As a company executive 
explained, “Any site that we work with that provides us with personally identifiable information 
… must provide the user with the notice and choice.”125 
However, the standards to which this requirement was held were poor. As EPIC noted in 
its FTC complaint, AltaVista (DoubleClick’s largest client) acknowledged passing information 
to third parties but made no specific mention of DoubleClick.126 Most web users were unaware 
that by “surfing the site of one of its affiliates, they had entered into an agreement to provide 
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DoubleClick with their personal data.”127 Thus, DoubleClick’s data collection practices were 
alleged to be deceptive and unconsented. Jason Catlett of JunkBusters summarized the situation 
as follows: “Thousands of sites are ratting on you, so as soon as one gives you away, you’re 
exposed on all of them. If you don’t like Yahoo’s privacy policy, you don’t have to use its site. 
But it’s very difficult for consumers to avoid DoubleClick because most don’t know when it is 
collecting information.”128 Moreover, by virtue of its expansive network, DoubleClick’s reach 
extended far beyond that of any single publisher.  
DoubleClick made much of the fact that it provided a privacy policy and opt-out 
mechanism on its own website, noting that 50,000 people had opted out of its tracking system.129 
Again, the catch was that the average web user was unaware of DoubleClick’s existence, let 
alone its opt-out mechanism. As an ad infrastructure provider, DoubleClick’s massive internet 
presence was largely behind-the-scenes. Its access to consumers was mediated through web 
publishers, who were then responsible for informing people of DoubleClick’s data practices and 
providing some form of notice and control. It should be unsurprising that while 50,000 people 
may have opted-out of DoubleClick’s profiling apparatus, the company maintained some 100 
million cookies in circulation across the web that fed into database of 120 million consumer 
profiles.130 In other words, DoubleClick’s opt-out program was statistically insignificant.  
A turning point came in March. The company had been battered in the media for months 
and the value of its stock was down some 20% since the imbroglio began.131 DoubleClick was 
forced to relinquish and Kevin O’Connor fell on his sword, issuing a press release admitting his 
personal mistake in moving forward with merging the databases “in the absence of government 
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and industry standards.”132 Shortly thereafter O’Connor stepped down as CEO, while privacy 
advocates cautiously celebrated. The question remains, was this armistice a genuine victory for 
privacy advocates? What is clear is that the conflict surrounding the DoubleClick/Abacus merger 
brought data collection practices into sharp relief, crystalizing a set of policy issues that would 
fundamentally impact the ability of internet advertisers to engage in widespread consumer 
surveillance as a default practice. Privacy advocates had momentum, but industry was on red 
alert. Washington was highly attuned to the issues, but 2000 was an election year, which added a 
layer of political complexity. The policy-making activities over the next 18 months would 
establish the foundational regulatory framework for internet data collection and consumer 
privacy at the start of the 21st century.  
Rich Lobby, Poor Protection: The Efficacy of Corporate Politics and Limits of Self-
Regulation 
Privacy advocates achieved another milestone on the heels of DoubleClick’s decision to halt its 
database merging operations. After four years of conceding to industry requests for more time to 
develop self-regulation, the FTC reversed its position regarding privacy legislation in May 2000. 
In a 3-2 vote, agency commissioners recommended that Congress “enact legislation that, in 
conjunction with continuing self-regulatory programs, will ensure adequate protection of 
consumer privacy online.”133  Chairman Pitofsky tempered the recommendation, offering the 
caveat that self-regulation had not failed: “On the contrary, self-regulation has made 
considerable progress. But in certain respects it looks as if self-regulation would be more 
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successful if there was some backup legislation.”134 The specific guidelines proposed by the FTC 
had been jointly drafted by the NAI trade group, so they were hardly stringent, applying only to 
the collection of personally identifiable information.135 The proposal recommended that PII data 
collection be governed according to four “fair information practices”: Notice (consumers must be 
given notice of sites’ data practices), Choice (consumers must be given choices regarding how 
their data is used by third parties), Access (consumers must be given access to their data for 
review, correction, or deletion), and Security (sites must take steps to protect the security of 
consumer data).136   
Due in no small part to the actions of privacy advocates, online privacy issues had “gone 
off the Richter scale in terms of public sensitivity.”137 One survey of “experienced internet 
users,” found that 87% of respondents were “somewhat or very concerned about threats to their 
privacy online.”138 With elections looming, the White House and both parties in Congress 
increased their focus on the issue. House Democrats convened a Privacy Task Force, while the 
Senate created a bi-partisan Congressional Privacy Caucus.139 “This year’s campaign slogan 
could be: It’s online privacy, stupid,” wrote BusinessWeek.140 According to one account, by early 
2000 “more than one hundred privacy bills had been introduced in the legislatures of 41 states,” 
and by May, laws had been passed in ten.141 Congress, too, was busy, holding no less than ten 
committee hearings on the subject between 1998 and 2000 and introducing numerous pieces of 
legislation. 
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In line with FTC recommendations, Republican John McCain of Arizona introduced a 
representative bill requiring companies to provide “conspicuous notice” of their data practices.142 
Other members of Congress pushed for a policy framework that went beyond the FTC’s 
proposals. Democrats in both houses introduced plans that included a measure that privacy 
advocates had been requesting for years and that was universally reviled throughout the online 
advertising sector: a mandate that the default regime of data collection be opt-in, rather than opt-
out. As summarized by the Wall Street Journal: “Beneath all the fuss about cookies and 
databases, the debate about internet privacy comes down to two very different approaches. In 
privacy jargon, the first is known as opt-in. Marketers agree not to collect or use personal data 
unless you affirm that you want to participate in their programs. Opt-out takes the opposite tack, 
assuming you want to participate unless the site hears otherwise.”143 
McCain’s proposed legislation was opt-out. Though it would mandate privacy policies, it 
left data collection as the default practice. Representative of the opt-in strategy was the 
Consumer Privacy Protection Act proposed by Senator Fritz Hollings of South Carolina.144 This 
was one of several high-profile opt-in bills that would have required all website operators to 
obtain “affirmative consent in advance from consumers before collecting and using or disclosing 
personally identifiable information.”145 “Any bill that does not have the opt-in is just whistling 
Dixie,” said Hollings at a committee hearing.146 Opt-in represented a significant change to the 
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status quo. Online advertising business models and self-regulatory frameworks (to the extent that 
they existed) were firmly grounded in surveillance as the default setting.  
As Congress debated these approaches, The New York Times reported of a “nervousness 
among internet marketers about the public relations and regulatory minefields they know lie 
ahead.”147 Marketers understood that a requirement to obtain consent from people in advance of 
data collection would severely impede the surveillance-based advertising model they had been 
building on the web. The “digital enclosure” movement was grounded in data collection as the 
default condition of internet use, yet most internet users were opposed to rampant surveillance.148 
Industry associations and coalitions foretold of apocalyptic consequences for economic growth 
and technological innovation should any kind of opt-in framework be adopted. According to the 
ANA, “The whole question of target marketing [was] at risk.”149 The trade press mounted 
vitriolic defenses of data collection practices and accused privacy advocates and government 
regulators of neo-luddism. As Thornton May, a consultant and “corporate futurist,” spouted in 
Advertising Age: 
Congratulations, interactive marketers: You have been anointed the new villains of the 
digital age. Like the chemical polluters of the 1960s, the napalm makers of the ‘70s, the 
oil companies of the ‘80s, and the HMOs of the ‘90s, interactive marketers are on the 
cusp of some very bad press. … These cyber-left-behinds, data privacy tree-huggers, and 
self-appointed guardians of digital rights for the bit-challenged, privacy-violated hoi 
polloi have targeted interactive marketers as the ‘digital satans’ of the wired world. 
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Privacy is their rallying cry. … Unless you mobilize a counteroffensive today … we will 
be forever branded the bad boys on the digital block.150 
Industry rallied to create increased lobbying and public relations efforts. The most 
powerful internet companies including DoubleClick, Amazon, eBay, Yahoo, and Excite “planted 
their corporate flag’s in the nation’s capital,” establishing Washington “government affairs” 
offices.151 “Washington is no longer this great East Coast bogeyman, a place where you can trot 
out your CEO once or twice a year,” said one corporate policy expert. “Internet companies must 
include a policy component in their business model.”152 “If the industry moves aggressively, 
there is still a shot to forestall legislation,” said an executive at CMGI’s Engage.153 
In addition to closed-door lobbying efforts, trade groups and individual companies 
testified in force at congressional hearings. The Online Privacy Alliance (OPA) hired as its 
director Christine Varney, a former FTC Commissioner involved in the agency’s early 
examinations of online privacy.154 Under Varney’s leadership, the OPA became a strident 
advocate for industry self-regulation and “user empowerment,” publishing privacy policy 
guidelines for its members and appearing frequently in press coverage of privacy issues.155 
Representing the OPA, Varney testified twice at Congressional subcommittee hearings regarding 
privacy issues, advancing a position that was uniformly against legislative action, opposed to 
giving the FTC increased authority to police privacy violations, and in support of industry self-
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regulation.156 This quote from her testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation in May 2000 is exemplary of broader industry arguments:  
“What we do not need are sweeping regulations governing the collection and use of data 
[or] the conditions and methods under which that data use can be consented to… 
Whatever solutions Congress, industry, and consumers come to that will make privacy 
choices on the internet ubiquitous, the solutions must be technology neutral, market 
driven, and hospitable to the online [business] environment.” 157 
Amidst industry public relations teams, the trappings of privacy protection became a 
“new religion.”158 DoubleClick, in the aftermath of the Abacus media firestorm, hired New York 
City’s former consumer affairs commissioner to serve in the newly created position of Chief 
Privacy Officer and assembled an external advisory board led by a former New York attorney 
general to consult on privacy issues.159 Other internet marketers followed suit.160 Whatever their 
operative functions, the creation of these positions appeared to be highly “symbolic, as indicated 
by the fact that they worked more closely with internal marketing and public relations 
departments than management and operations.”161 Separately, the AAAA, ANA, and DMA 
floated the idea of launching a $25 million ad campaign to address the public about privacy 
issues.162 As might be expected from the advertising industry, public relations efforts such as 
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these have a long lineage in media policy history and in this case, aggressive industry PR 
campaigning simply overwhelmed the meager resources available to privacy advocates.163  
The OPA’s hiring of Varney and DoubleClick’s hiring of former New York public 
officials are prime examples of the fully legal political corruption that plagues the nation’s 
regulatory and legislative systems. Much like public relations campaigns, this “golden revolving 
door” strategy is a staple of American political lobbying.164 From Congress to the Department of 
Homeland Security, the US Treasury Department to the Federal Communications Commission, 
the scale of this particular form of corruption is overwhelming. By one count, former lobbyists 
working for Congress outnumbered elected lawmakers in 2011.165 The revolving door strategy is 
so prevalent because it is often highly effective. Framing policy-making in these terms helps to 
contextualize the fact that despite overwhelming public support, privacy legislation was, as one 
observer put it, “something of a political football in Congress.”166 As previously noted, Congress 
held no les than ten hearings on online privacy issues between 1998 and 2000 and introduced 
dozens of bills containing varying degrees of consumer protections. The only bill to make it out 
of committee, let alone be passed into law, was the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA). Industry was successful not only in defeating opt-in measures, but in forestalling any 
privacy legislation whatsoever outside of COPPA.  
COPPA was a laudable, but ultimately limited, victory. Privacy advocates who initially 
supported the legislation have since criticized its implementation. EPIC has demonstrated that 
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the FCT has failed to adequately enforce the bill’s protective provisions and has argued that its 
specifications have become outmoded by the dramatic growth of social networks such as 
Facebook.167 Kathryn Montgomery of the CME, a leader within privacy advocacy network who 
worked with the FTC to draft initial language for COPPA, has acknowledged that the bill as it 
passed contained loopholes and placed an excessive burden on parents to maintain a haphazard 
system of privacy protection.168 Ultimately, COPPA is reminiscent of the passage of the 
Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1938 as recounted by 
Stole.169 Like Wheeler-Lea, COPPA’s passage perhaps serves to obstruct more ambitious 
regulatory efforts, specifically the movement to limit data collection more broadly via the 
implementation of an opt-in policy framework. Still, Montgomery maintains that COPPA did 
curtail some of the more egregious practices that might have become commonplace without 
government oversight.  
Jeff Chester, another leading figure within the privacy advocacy network and the media 
reform movement more generally, said in an interview that COPPA was significant not because 
the law was strong on protections, but because of the organizing effort itself.170 “The fact that 
one tiny non-profit advocacy group was able to overcome the opposition of the online ad 
industry as well as the White House to get legislation passed that limited the ability of marketers 
to have this one-on-one paradigm with kids is remarkable given the history [of media policy-
making].”171 Without a doubt, it helped that opposing the protection of children was a rather 
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unpopular stance for political elites. In the undemocratic tradition of media policy-making that 
has solidified since the 1930s, many of the key decisions regarding internet development were 
made behind closed doors with minimal public participation or awareness.172 Thanks to the labor 
of advocates, online privacy represented one of the few internet policy issues that achieved any 
semblance of public debate during this crucial period. Beyond COPPA, the very existence of the 
proposal by Hollings and others regarding broader opt-in privacy legislation is evidence of the 
political efficacy of privacy advocates, whose efforts were aided by a more “organic” public 
concern stemming from increased internet use in general and the rapidly growing consumer 
surveillance occurring across a spectrum of visibility and social acceptability. That some bills 
contained strong opt-in provisions also indicates that there was some magnitude of political 
capital for Congress to cross the marketing complex.  
The larger truth remains that if privacy advocates won some battles, the marketing 
complex won the war. In defeating privacy legislation, industry was successful in extending the 
status quo of advertising self-regulation to the internet under a weakly implemented opt-out 
regime. In this instance, power operated structurally. While instrumental exertions of corporate 
influence may indeed have been present, it is difficult to demonstrate direct causal linkages from 
industry lobbying to the failure of Congress to legislate meaningful privacy protections. 
Nevertheless, a theme of this dissertation has been that disparate actors within the marketing 
complex broadly conceived came together to construct an advertising-supported internet. Smaller 
rivalries aside, these companies had a shared interest in creating the largest possible canvas for 
advertising practices and needed to redefine the potentialities of the new internet medium 
accordingly.  
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Calls to reign in data collection practices became obstructive to these goals and therefore 
needed to be neutralized. As reflected in the construction of an online surveillance infrastructure, 
pervasive data collection was becoming indispensible to convergent marketing practices. It was 
essential that unrestrained data collection be encoded into the legal (and technical) structure of 
the developing internet medium, despite that a growing majority of individuals felt that they 
needed more – not less – privacy on the internet. This is the context for the formation of sector-
spanning coalitions such as the OPA and NAI, which illustrate the “co-respective behavior” of 
otherwise competing interests.173 Corporate efforts to control public policy-making present a 
counterpoint to the Get Big Fast narrative of finance and infrastructure presented in prior 
chapters. Here the goal was to delay any assertive government regulation while the new online 
ad infrastructure was being put into place.  
Against a vast corporate lobbying effort and a neoliberal political zeitgeist, bills that 
contained opt-in provisions had little chance of success. Beyond the fact that, as Magaziner said 
in an interview, “it is hard to underestimate the power of some of the groups who were lobbying 
for opt-out,” the US economy had been overtaken by the dotcom financial boom.174 Actions that 
were perceived as threats to economic growth – even if dubiously constructed as such – were 
politically untenable. Moreover, both houses of Congress were controlled by the Republican 
Party, which was on the whole even more supportive of government “deregulation” than 
neoliberal Democrats. In the words of one journalist regarding privacy legislation: “If you 
believe these bills will pass, I have a can’t-miss dotcom to sell you.”175 The FTC, too, was 
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embedded within power structures that severely limited its efficacy. Despite overwhelming 
evidence that self-regulation had failed to uphold even the most basic of privacy protections, the 
agency repeatedly abstained from recommending legislation, perpetually citing renewed industry 
commitments to find self-policing solutions. It took a “focusing event” like the 
DoubleClick/Abacus merger and a sustained advocacy campaign to move the agency to 
meaningful action.  
In this scenario the range of acceptable debate was circumscribed. Discussion was largely 
restricted to issues of consumer awareness, limited notions of user empowerment, and the 
personal character of the data being collected. The controversy at the heart of the DoubleClick 
Abacus merger was whether companies could combine anonymous online profile data with 
personally identifiable information obtained from offline sources. The social desirability of 
online advertising, consumer surveillance, or the commercial structure of the internet more 
broadly were never on the table. Opt-in measures, the most progressive proposed legislation, still 
did not approach structural issues. As McChesney has shown, media criticism during this period 
became increasingly confined to “liberal” debates taking place within market structures, rarely 
questioning the validity of the market as an organizing force.176 According to Chester, privacy 
advocates had no option to substantively tackle issues beyond those pertaining to children; there 
was “no political support for that.”177 
As one commentator noted, it was a “familiar do-si-do between government and industry. 
The government is acting OK so long as it appears to be protecting consumers against harmful 
practices. And businesses are acting OK so long as they appear to have consumers’ interest in 
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mind with privacy policies that no one can understand.”178 This is unsurprising from a critical 
structural perspective which situates the state “in general terms as an agency of upper-class 
interests, but specifically, as an institution that is fought over by all of society on a playing field 
that is sloped in favor of those with capital.”179 As such, the détente between government and the 
private sector regarding privacy issues was ultimately politically safe. 
While the government appeared to be doing its job, the regime of self-regulation that was 
extended to the internet medium was patently bad for the privacy of web users and 
overwhelmingly positive for an online advertising industry with surveillance at its core. 
Surveying the outcomes of the political struggle over internet privacy, EPIC’s Rotenberg 
concluded that “online consumers are more at risk today than they were in 1997.”180 The major 
solutions put forth by industry were the implementation of privacy policies and paltry opt-out 
mechanisms, which allowed companies to claim they were providing consumers with control 
over their information, while leaving an open door for unrestrained data collection.181 Self-
regulation had a double meaning in this sense: industry was responsible for setting its own 
standards of behavior and policing itself and users were “empowered” through opt-out 
mechanisms to regulate their own privacy interactions online. However, the execution of these 
measures was deeply flawed.  
Privacy policies were by and large incomprehensible. Even Senator McCain complained 
that “too many privacy policies confuse and contradict rather than provide a conspicuous notice 
of a consumer’s rights.”182 The Wall Street Journal summarized the issue using the example of 
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Yahoo, long one of the most popular sites on the web. “Yahoo’s statement is two pages long and 
packed with links to other pages you need to read to fully comprehend it. It’s also sprinkled with 
euphemisms.”183 Attempting to read the policy highlighted “the burden placed on consumers 
who want to opt out of web tracking efforts. Sixteen paragraphs in, users learn that Yahoo 
doesn’t vouch for the advertising networks that insert ad banners onto its pages. Those networks 
… have their own privacy policies. So if you use Yahoo and want to opt-out of such tracking, 
you’ll need to visit the websites of every ad network Yahoo works with – all 19 of them.”184  
Under the auspices of industry self-regulation, the “fair information principles” of notice 
and choice were implemented in such a way that they served the exact opposite purposes for 
which they were designed. Rather than providing genuine notice, privacy policies “let users 
know as little as possible about data collection activities, in as polite but complex a fashion as 
possible so that they wouldn’t understand what was going on but could feel good about them.”185 
Privacy seal programs such as TRUSTe and BBBOnline awarded certification based on the 
existence of privacy policies without taking into consideration their actual contents or legibility. 
Any data practice, no matter how egregious, was eligible to receive a seal of approval as long as 
it was “properly disclosed” in a privacy policy of some kind.186 Likewise, mechanisms for 
consumer control were feeble at best. Opt-out, a “concept cloaked in the rhetoric of consumer 
freedom, was designed to ensure that data collection would become the default in online business 
transactions.”187 In 2001 the NAI created a web application that ostensibly enabled web users to 
opt-out of its member companies’ behavioral targeting programs by downloading a series of opt-
out cookies. Since the opt-out system was cookie based, it was limited to specific browsers on 
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specific computers and would need to be reinstalled if a browsers’ cache of cookies were ever 
cleared.188  
Still another critique of self-regulation is the lack of enforcement against those who 
violate agreed upon rules, so-called “bad actors.” The period was characterized by seemingly 
regularly scheduled technology-based privacy abuses from within the private (and public) 
sectors.189 Most prominently, Intel embedded unique identifiers into its Pentium III microchips 
that enabled identification of individual computers.190 Microsoft, too, included unique identifiers 
in a version of its Windows operating system. Self-regulatory organizations such as TRUSTe, of 
which Microsoft was a supporter, ruled that the practice was not a violation of its standards 
because the tracking mechanism was deployed via software, not the Microsoft website.191 Even 
while DoubleClick faced heavy scrutiny for merging online and offline data, other ad 
infrastructure providers engaged in similar practices and remained relatively unscathed. 
DoubleClick competitor 24/7 Media also matched online and offline profiles during this period 
through an agreement with a company called Naviant (later purchased by Equifax), while 
RealNetworks was caught collecting information on users’ internet activity without disclosure 
and in violation of its own privacy policy.192 The failed online retailer Toysmart attempted to 
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auction off its customers’ personal information as part of its liquidation process.193 In all of these 
cases, any abatement of offending practices was due to the intervention of privacy advocates 
and/or news outlets, not self-regulatory bodies. A final quote from an ode to self-regulation from 
the editorial pages of Advertising Age demonstrates the system’s weaknesses with unintended 
irony: “Twenty-five years of testing leaves no doubt that the people who created advertising self-
regulation designed a service so non-intrusive that the individual advertising person is barely 
aware of its existence.”194 
By 2001, the issue of online consumer privacy protection had been substantively dropped 
by all branches of federal government. After George W. Bush’s presidential victory in 2000, the 
limited “political capital of privacy activists dried up.”195 The FTC had quietly concluded its 
investigation of DoubleClick’s data collection practices without saying whether or not deception 
or other violations had occurred. Many of the civil suits against the company were dropped as 
well.196 The “Internet Privacy Debate is Dead,” declared InternetWeek. 197 
The surveillance infrastructure has grown since the turn of the century and privacy 
debates have been periodically resurrected. The expansion of data collection practices to mobile 
devices has been a particular area of concern, as have new forms of data exchange that fall under 
the umbrella of “big data.” These issues are briefly addressed in the dissertation’s conclusion. I 
want to end this chapter by gesturing to the flaws inherent in a particular rhetorical shield utilized 
by industry to deflect meaningful privacy legislation in the 1990s that remains widely used 
today: the condition of anonymity. The argument here is not especially sophisticated. Recall the 
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reasoning of DoubleClick’s O’Connor: “We can’t invade anyone’s privacy because we don’t 
know who you are.”198 
The argument is bogus for at least two reasons. As explained above, DoubleClick and 
others were in fact very interested in collecting personally identifying information (PII) and took 
aggressive steps to merge online and offline information. Today PII is routinely collected and 
used for advertising and marketing purposes. Secondly, research has shown that the PII 
designation has become meaningless as sorting technology has advanced. Not only can PII be 
ascertained using relatively few non-PII data points, but, functionally, surveillance and profiling 
proceed even if users remain “anonymous.”199 As the FTC noted in 2000, “Although much of the 
information that goes into a profile is fairly innocuous when viewed in isolation, the 
accumulation over time of vast numbers of seemingly minor details about an individual produces 
a portrait that is quite comprehensive and, to many, inherently intrusive. … Regardless of 
whether they contain personally identifiable information, profiles are used to make decisions 
about the information individuals see and the offers they receive.”200 
There is an element of duplicity and perhaps disrespect present when industry 
representatives reassure internet users and policy-makers of the anonymous nature of their data, 
while simultaneously peddling hyper-individualized advertising services to marketers and 
investors. In this sense, the whole of the online advertising industry is premised on a 
fundamental deception, the regulation of which should surely fall within the Federal Trade 
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Commission’s purview. If addressing this issue falls outside the FTC’s legal authority to regulate 
deceptive advertising practices, then the spirit of that mandate is hollowed and the law must be 
revised. As Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren understood over a century ago: 
“The narrower doctrine may have satisfied the demands of society at a time when the 
abuse to be guarded against could rarely have arisen without violating a contract or a 
special confidence; but now that modern devices afford abundant opportunities for the 
perpetration of such wrongs without any participation by the injured party, the protection 
granted by the law must be placed upon a broader foundation.”201 
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Conclusion 
The Legacy of the Dotcom Era 
As the leading contemporary online advertising company, Google has been conspicuously absent 
in this dissertation. As of early 2013, Google held two-thirds of the US web search market and 
was the most popular search engine globally.1 This market position has enabled it to dominate 
the online advertising market. In 2012 Google accounted for an estimated 45% of all US online 
advertising revenues and one out of ten advertising dollars spent across all media.2  
While Google began developing its search engine technology in 1996 and was 
incorporated in 1998, many see it as a post-dotcom era company with little connection to banner 
ads and the financial mania of the bubble. Indeed, Google did not offer ad services of any kind 
until October 2000, when it began to pair “contextual” keyword advertising with its web search 
results. This first version of its AdWords service followed the standard banner pricing model 
(cost per thousand impressions, or CPM) and grew fairly slowly.3 It was not until late 2001 that 
Google reengineered the service to be more heavily attuned to “relevance” and follow the now 
familiar auction-based pay-per-click (PPC) pricing system.4 Shortly thereafter the company 
launched a companion product, AdSense, which allowed web publishers of all sizes to host 
similar contextual ads under revenue sharing agreements. These two innovations set Google on 
the path to become the premier provider of online advertising services. 
It is important to emphasize that Google’s approach to advertising was of a different 
character than the surveillance infrastructure strategy. While building on the ad network 
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distribution model, Google’s mechanism for producing relevant ads was based primarily on the 
context in which they appeared rather than via consumer profiling.5 The context for search ads 
was provided by the keywords entered by users, while ad placement on the AdSense network 
was determined by the content of the hosting website. An ad for a musical instrument retailer 
might be paired with a web search for guitar chord charts or a fan-produced weblog dedicated to 
The Band. Many marketers judged this strategy to be equally if not more effective than profile-
based banner ads and found the PPC pricing structure highly attractive. In the early 2000s, 
context seemed to trump surveillance as the preferred means of targeting ad messages. 
Keyword search went from comprising just 6% of internet advertising in 2001 to 35% in 
2003, supplanting banners as the most popular format.6 At the top of the search advertising heap 
was Google. During this period, the proportion of total spending dedicated to “display” 
advertising – the new moniker for banners and other graphical formats – fell from over half in 
1999 to settle in around 20%. Although search-based keyword advertising became the most 
important online category, the surveillance infrastructure model remained under construction. 
DoubleClick endured as the market leader in targeted banner ads and consumer profiling, but 
faced increasing low-cost competition in these areas from rivals. Hobbled after the collapse of 
the dotcom bubble, DoubleClick was sold to a private equity firm in 2005 for $1.1 billion, a tenth 
of it former market capitalization.7 More dependent upon the bubble’s inflated financial markets, 
CMGI fared much worse as the value of its stock was decimated in the crash (shares that once 
traded at $160 traded for less than $1 by 2002).8 Writing off some $65 million in debt, CMGI cut 
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ties with its Engage division, which was reorganized as a privately held reincarnation of one of 
its own subsidiaries, Accipiter.9 Free of major financial burden, Accipiter was rebuilt into a 
successful infrastructure provider once more, serving over 50 billion ads a month in 2006 before 
being acquired by one of DoubleClick’s major competitors, aQuantive.10  
By 2004 the keyword format accounted for 40% of internet advertising, where it has 
hovered ever since.11 Even though the total amount of online ad spending had quickly resumed 
growth after the dotcom crash (nearly reaching $10 billion in 2004), the proportion of that 
spending going to search had plateaued in just three years. Google found itself in control of a 
saturated domestic search market that accounted for nearly 100% of its revenues. Moreover, the 
company was facing renewed competitive efforts by Microsoft and Yahoo in search-based 
advertising. After going public in a lucrative and massively hyped IPO, Google needed to 
diversify its service offerings to maintain forward momentum. “Google is a one-trick pony,” 
declared an analyst with Forrester Research. “It’s a nice-looking pony. But they have to grab a 
bigger piece of the display advertising market.”12 
Google began to move into display with limited success, adding basic graphics to its text-
based AdSense service and striking a deal with AOL to tap into its sales force in order to sell 
banner ads on Google’s AdSense network sites.13 As broadband internet service provision 
diffused and improved, online video emerged as a new frontier for advertising. Enamored with 
prospects for “interactive television” since the early 1990s, marketers were eager to test out the 
format, which became the newest addition to the display category. In 2006, Google acquired the 
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explosively popular (and virtually advertising-free) YouTube web video platform. Recall that at 
this time Google’s advertising strategy was still firmly anchored in the contextual model. To 
effectively exploit video and move more forcefully into the display market, Google needed to 
expand beyond keyword advertising. It needed to move into the business of consumer 
surveillance. 
Still the industry standard ad infrastructure provider and now under private equity 
ownership, DoubleClick was a prime target for acquisition.14 In early 2007 Google and 
Microsoft entered into a bidding war, which Google won paying a $1 billion premium.15 The 
final cost was $3.1 billion (in stock), nearly double what Google paid for YouTube. The 
acquisition provided Google with an immediate leadership position in serving targeted display 
ads – at the time DoubleClick was serving as many as 20 billion per day – but more importantly, 
it plugged Google into the massive surveillance infrastructure that DoubleClick had been 
building for over ten years.16 DoubleClick’s broad service offerings yielded an expansive roster 
of clients and partners from both the supply side (web publishers) and the demand side 
(marketers and ad agencies) of the ad market. This enabled Google to “lock the interactive 
agencies and media buyers deeper into their clutches, and by waving rich media opportunities 
like video at marketers, offer an integrated network that [was] easy to buy, easy to measure, and 
easy to manage.”17 
In the wake of the transaction, Google’s rivals did two things. They mounted what 
became an unsuccessful challenge to the legality of deal on anti-trust grounds and they went 
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shopping. In its largest acquisition to date, Microsoft paid $6 billion in cash for aQuantive, the ad 
services provider that a year earlier had purchased Accipiter/Engage.18 That deal came one day 
after the WPP advertising holding company bought 24/7 Real Media, another survivor of the 
dotcom crash, and one month after Yahoo – already a leader in display advertising – acquired the 
remainder of the privately-held Right Media data exchange that it didn’t already own.19 
Of course, the other key spoil of Google’s DoubleClick acquisition was the latter’s 
massive trove of consumer data. One year to the day after completing the takeover, Google 
reversed its long-standing policy of abstaining from behavioral/profile-based ad targeting and 
introduced what was branded as a new “interest-based” advertising program for AdSense and 
YouTube.20 In other words, Google began to integrate its technologies and expertise with 
DoubleClick’s in order to move beyond contextual advertising to offer targeted ads based on 
consumer profiles.21 “These ads will associate categories of interest … with your browser, based 
on the types of sites you visit and the pages you view,” said Susan Wojcicki, VP of Product 
Management. “We may then use those interest categories to show you more relevant text and 
display ads.”22 Over the next few years, surveillance-based advertising, conducted on an opt-out 
basis, was integrated into various Google products from personalized web search to Gmail (e-
mail service) to YouTube. As the company’s founders reported in 2009, Google had “really 
benefited from a successful integration with DoubleClick,” which brought ad serving and 
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profiling capabilities to Google services and gave it control of an extensive ad network.23 In 
2009, Google sold display advertising, including video, to 94 of Advertising Age’s top 100 
advertisers.24  
This brief sketch of Google’s appropriation of surveillance-based advertising highlights a 
trajectory that is generalizable across the industry. By the end of the 2000s, the five most 
powerful internet advertising companies – Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, AOL, and the social 
networking site Facebook – each served profile-based targeted advertising and/or collected 
consumer data across expansive networks that included their own properties and millions of 
other sites. Each also offered variations of consumer data exchanges enabling the real-time 
buying and selling of access to individuals, a process dependent upon sophisticated exchange of 
data among many market constituents. After a brief stalling out in the wake of the dotcom crash, 
the surveillance infrastructure model developed during that period and many of the major 
companies that pioneered it were quickly integrated into the central powers of online advertising.  
Beyond the creation of any specific technology or company, the framework established in 
the late 1990s has not only endured, but has dramatically expanded. Online retailers such as 
Amazon have now begun to exploit their stockpiles of consumer data for advertising purposes.25 
New forms of surveillance-based advertising such as “deep packet inspection” have evolved on 
the internet and are being applied to other media from mobile platforms to cable television.26 
Barack Obama’s presidential campaigns set milestones regarding the deployment of data 
collection and analysis for electioneering, reportedly expanding the Democratic Party’s voter 
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data by a factor of ten in the last two months of the 2008 campaign alone.27 In 2013 the data 
storage market is worth an estimated $70 billion.28 Companies such as Switch maintain facilities 
the size of seven football fields that house row upon row of clustered networked data storage 
units and servers, each of which is capable of cataloging the digital equivalent of “the entire 
written works of man, from the dawn of time until today, in every single language.”29  
With some one billion users worldwide variously uploading streams of personal 
information, Facebook is perhaps one of the best-positioned companies to take the lead in 
surveillance-based advertising. In what may induce déjà vu for readers of this dissertation, 
Facebook partnered with the marketing information firm Datalogix in 2012 to integrate records 
of past offline purchasing behavior into its profile-based ad targeting processes. After finding 
that “fewer than one percent of in-store sales could be tied to brand advertising campaigns on 
Facebook,” the company began to offer advertisers insights on the “ideal number of ad 
impressions” to maximize the efficiency of particular campaigns geared to particular 
individuals.30 
One could argue that Facebook’s rehashing of techniques implemented by DoubleClick 
some 15 years prior signals the industry’s ultimate weakness rather than its increasing vigor. But 
focusing on any given implementation, no matter how flawed, of a broader advertising system 
that is based a massive and increasingly integrated surveillance infrastructure misses the forest 
for the trees. Even if data collection and analysis perpetually fall short of marketers’ 
expectations, the socio-technical foundations of consumer surveillance are cemented within the 
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prevailing system of capitalist development. Even if current ad targeting systems produce 
hopelessly irrelevant appeals in the short term, the apparatus of data collection continues to 
expand, largely hidden from view. 
This arrangement bears significant social costs. Cultural production in a commercial 
media system is inescapably filtered through the demands of marketers, while consumer 
surveillance opens the floodgates to the reproduction of social discrimination in new contexts 
and the enactment and institutionalization of new forms of prejudice based on intersectional 
difference. Established liberal democratic norms regarding privacy are derided as outmoded and 
the promotion of unsustainable consumption contributes to deepening crises within our material 
and mental environments.31 Before the first advertisement appeared on the web, Sut Jhally 
developed a critique of the social effects of an advertising system that appeals to people as 
atomized individuals, manufacturing individualized problems and then purporting to solve them 
through individualized material consumption.32 Jhally reasoned that advertising is therefore 
unable to provide a cultural lexicon in which broad social problems, the kind that must be 
negotiated collectively, can be meaningfully addressed. The negative effects of this scenario are 
compounded as advertising permeates an ever-greater proportion of culture, squeezing out 
alternative frameworks, while social problems that demand collective solutions intensify. The 
force of this argument is amplified by the logic of surveillance-based marketing, which aims to 
engage all consumers in the most individualized way possible, even if that means denying them 
services and opportunities. 
                                                
31 Robert W. McChesney, John Bellamy Foster, Inger L. Stole, and Hannah Holleman, “The Sales Effort and 
Monopoly Capital,” Monthly Review, 60, no. 11 (2009), 17. 
32 Sut Jhally, “Commercial Culture, Collective Values, and the Future,” Texas Law Review, 71, no. 4 (1993), 805-
14; Sut Jhally, Advertising at the Edge of the Apocalypse,” in Robin Andersen and Lance Strate, eds., Critical 
Studies in Media Communication (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 27-39. 
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Imperfect as it may be, now that the surveillance infrastructure is in place it will not be 
easily disassembled. Joseph Turow argues that the present system has calcified to the extent that 
any significant reversal of course is all but impossible.33 I would surmise that this is likely the 
case if such a reversal was pursued only via “normal” channels of social change such as 
government appeal or consumer-based activism. Capitalist infrastructural inertia is well 
underway as surveillance-based marketing becomes normalized throughout the economy.34 Any 
meaningful intervention requires popular and sustained political action in conjunction with, and 
building upon, directed consumer activism and government petition. For that to occur, the links 
between surveillance infrastructure and capitalism’s deepening contradictions must be drawn out 
in more detail and made accessible to as many people as possible. While this has not been the 
primary task of this research, it is certainly a worthy extension of its project. 
Ultimately, the point of critical analysis is not to theorize the domination engendered by 
capitalism, but to clarify its dynamism in order to support and work toward forms of 
intervention. Revisiting the degree of autonomy we presume to give the marketing complex and 
capital at large is an important step toward political mobilization. Critical media scholarship 
shows that commercial media systems are by no means preordained. As Stuart Ewen 
demonstrated in his classic account of the birth of modern consumer culture, mass consumerism 
“emerged in the 1920s not as a smooth progression from earlier and ‘less developed’ patterns of 
consumption, but rather as an aggressive device of corporate survival” in the face of labor unrest 
and industrial overproduction.35  
                                                
33 Joseph Turow, The Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry Is Defining Your Identity and Your Worth. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). 
34 Turow, The Daily You. 
35 Stuart Ewen, Captains of Consciousness: The Politics of Style in Contemporary America (New York: Basic 
Books, 1988), 54. 
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Likewise, this research has argued that surveillance-based advertising was not 
constructed as some masterstroke of the irrepressible marketing complex. Facing a crisis of 
control over emerging interactive media, corporate actors swiftly and unevenly mobilized to 
integrate the nascent web medium into the commercial media system, transforming the character 
of both. These developments occurred through the contested actions of individuals who were 
empowered by corporate institutions, financial markets, and systems of government. As such, 
specific outcomes were not inevitable. There was no certainty among the advertising and media 
industries that all would work out to their advantage. In the words of one marketing executive, 
the move towards consumer surveillance was “less about competitive advantage and more about 
survival.”36 This highlights the coercive force of an economic system based on perpetual 
expansion, while simultaneously denaturalizing its progress.  
 
                                                
36 Stacey Lynn Schulman, “Hyperlinks and marketing insight,” in The Hyperlinked Society, ed. Joseph Turow and 
Lokman Tsui (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 145. 
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